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EDIT OR’S PREFACE.

.

Since the publication in 1823 by Mr. D. G. Lubé of his Princi-

ples of Equity Pleading that work has been recognized by the

profession as a standard treatise upon that subject. The two

generations of lawyers and judges who have come and gone since

Lubé wrote have contributed little to the art and science of equity

pleading, so that to_day Lubé’s work is the best in existence. In

this edition of the second part of his work the Editor has added

little to the text of importance and has omitted substantially noth-

ing. The only object he had in view in preparing this edition was

to obtain a text suitable for the use of the student.

B. M. THOMPSON.

UNIVERSITY on MICHIGAN,

October 1, 1890.
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EDI'fOR'S PREFACE.
Since the publication in 1823 by Mr. D. G. Lube of his Principles of Equity Pleading that work has been recognized by the
profession as a standard treatise upon that subject. The two
generations of lawyers and judges who have come and gone since
Lube wrote have contributed little to the a~t and science of equity
pleading, so that to-day Lube's work is the best in existence. In
this edition of the second part of his work the Editor has added
little to the text of importance and has omitted substantially nothing. The only object he had in view in preparing this edition was
to obtain a text suitable for the use of the student.
B. M. THOMPSON.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,

October I,

1~.

PREFACE.

It has long been a subjectof reproach that the study of the

law has degenerated from a liberal and scientiﬁc pursuit into a

mere mechanical process of acquiring forms by dint of manual

labor at the desk. How far this general censure on the profession

may be just, we will not now stop to inquire; but this much we

may be permitted to observe, that they who would conﬁne the edu-

cation of a lawyer to mere books, without affording the student the

advantages to be derived from the practice of an office; and those

who, on the other hand, recommend to have the pupil immersed in

all the details of business, without a previous competent knowledge

PREFACE.

of the theory, would equally pursue a system erroneous and un-

proﬁtable. “

Precision of language is so essential to law proceedings that the

change or omission of a word frequently frustrates the object in

view; and hence has arisen the custom of adhering to such forms

as experience has determined to be adequate. Without settled

forms the most extensive and profound acquaintance with the

theory could not secure the practicer against overlooking, in the

hurry of business, some point, or, perhaps, some phrase, important

to his case.* No general course of reading will ever suffice to draw

the attention to these minute, but necessary points, the knowledge

of which can be derived from practice alone in the oﬁice of some
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experienced guide who, in rectifying the errors and supplying the

omissions of the pupi1’s ﬁrst efforts, can at the same time inform

him of the reasons and rules of law which suggest the propriety of

the alteration. This at once serves as an illustration of the theory

of the law, and impresses its maxims on the memory, and thus the

pupil gradually increases in conﬁdence, until he feels himself com-

petent to enter the lists of the profession, and perform his duty to

his client with facility and dispatch. ,

On the other hand, to plunge the student at once. into all the

servile drudgery of copying precedents, and literally adhering to

* “ Nihil simul lnventum est, et perfectum.” Co. Litt. 230, a.

It has long been a subject-of reproach that the study of the
law has degenerated from a liberal and scientific pursuit into a
mere mechanical process of acquiring forms by dint of manual
labor at the desk. How far this general censure on the profession
may be just, we will not now stop to inquire; but this much w.e
may be permitted to observe, that they who would confine the edu..
cation of a lawyer to mere books, without affording the student the
advantages to be derived from the practice of an office; and those
who, on the other hand, recommend to have the pupil immersed in
all the details of business, without a previous competent knowledge
of the theory, would equally pursue a system erroneous and unprofitable.
Precision of language is so essential to law proceedings that the
change or omission of a word frequently frustrates the object in
view ; and hence has arisen the custom of adhering to such forms
as experience has determined to be adequate. 'Vithout settled
forms the most extensive and profound acquaintance with the
theory could not secure the practicer against overlooking, in the
hurry of business, some point, or, perhaps, some phrase, important
to his case.* No general course of reading will ever suffice to draw
the attention to these n1innte, but necessary points, the knowledge
of which can be derived from practice alone in the office of some
experienced guide who, in rectifying the errors and supplying the
omissions of the pupil's first efforts, can at the same tin1e inform
him of the reasons and rules of law which suggest the propriety of
the alteration. This at once serves as an illustration of the theory
of the la·w, and impresses its maxims on the memory, and thus the
pupil gradually increases in confidence, until he feels himself competent to enter the lists of the profession, and perform his duty to
his client with facility and dispatch.
On the other hand, to plunge the student at once. into all the
servile drudgery of copying precedents, and literally adhering to
*"Nihil simullnventum est, et perfectum." Co. Lltt. 230, a.

“ PREFACE.

forms, the origin and meaning of which is seldom comprehended,

vi

PREFACE.

and frequently never investigated, is to begin at the wrong end, and

is certainly liable to all the animadversions cast upon that illiberal

mode of education which degrades one of the noblest and most

useful sciences into a narrow and insigniﬁcant art, and which has

given occasion to all the obloquy from time to time heaped on a

profession, thus requiring a very ordinary degree of capacity in the

acquisition. A man so trained may be an expert mechanic, but

can never be a sound lawyer. Besides, a system of this kind en-

feebles and contracts the mind, by bindfng it down to a timid and

obsequious subservance to the very syllable and letter of the form,

from which it durst not deviate because ignorant of its utility and

effect. Hence the worse than useless prolixity of deeds and other

law writings, and the accumulation of unnecessary phraseology

everywhere to be met with in the written proceedings. The student

who has gone through an ordeal of this kind, previous to his admis-

sion to the bar, comes out the “ leguleius cautus atque acutus aucepa

syllabarum cantor formularum.” But such a process of initiation is

abhorrent to the mind imbued with the taste of classic literature

and fresh from the spring of genuine science. The study of the

law, however, when properly pursued, is perfectly congenial to the

most enlightened intellect, connected as it is with ethics, legislation
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and rhetoric.

If, as Mr. Locke has affirmed, morality be capable of demon

stration, a fortiori are the propositions of law, the terms of which

are precise and well deﬁned, susceptible of proof. The laws of our

country, in fact, form a connected and well digested system of mu-

tually dependent rules, even to its minutest ramiﬁcations, and

those propositions which, when isolated, appear arbitrary, and

sometimes even attended with hardship, if traced to their source,

will be discovered as necessarily ﬂowing from some ﬁxed and just

principle of legislation. On this principle the following pages

attempt to pursue the course of the subject under investigation, up

to its fountain head, rather than track the several channels of its

divergence ; their design is more to point out the origin and ration-

ale of the rule, than to hunt after the shades of difference in its

application; “potius fontes expectere quam sectari rivulos.” By this

process of analytical research, the student will sometimes be sur-

prised to ﬁnd himself landed on a conclusion, by necessary infer-

forms, the origin and meaning of which is seldom comprehended,
and frequently never investigated, is to begin at the wrong end, and
is certainly liable to all the animadversions cast upon that illiberal
mode of education whieh degrades one of the noblest and most
useful sciences into a narrow and insignificant art, and which has
given occasion to all the obloquy from time to time heaped on a
profession, thus requiring a very ordinary degree of capacity in the
acquisition. A man so trained m·ay be an expert mechanic, but
can never he a sound lawyer. Besides, a system of this kind enfeebles and contracts the n1ind, by bindfng it down to a timid and
obsequious subservance to the very syllable and letter of the form,
from which it durst not deviate because ignorant of its utility and
effect. Hence the worse than useless prolixity of deeds and other
law writings, and the accumulation of unnecessary phraseology
everywhere to be met w·ith in the \Vritten proceedings. The student
who has gone through an ordeal of this kind, previous to his admission to the bar, comes out the "leguleius cautus atque acutus auceps
syllabarum cantor formularum." But such a process of initiation is
abhorrent to the mind in1bued with the taste of classic literature
and fresh from the spring of genuine science. The study of the
law, however, when properly pursued, is perfectly congenial to the
most enlightened intellect, connected as it is \vith ethics, legislation
and rhetoric.
If, as Mr. Locke has affirmed, morality be capable of demon
stration, a jortior·i are the propositions of la\Y, the terms of which
are precise and well defined, susceptible of proof. The laws of our
country, in fact, form a connected and well digested system of mutually dependent rules, even to its minutest ramifications, and
those propositions which, when isolated: appear arbitrary, and
sometimes even attended with hardship, if traced to their source,
will be discovered as necessarily flowing from son1e fixed and just
principle of legislation. On this principle the following pages
attempt to pursue· the course of the subject under investigation, up
to its fountain head, rather than track the several channels of its
divergence; their design is more to point out the origin and rationale of the rule, than to hunt after the shades of difference in its
application; "potius jontes expectere quam sectari rivulos." By this
process of analytical research, the student will sometimes be surprised to find himself landed on a conclusion, by necessary infer-
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ence, which he may elsewhere meet with as an unsupported dictum,

or resting only on the authorfty of decision. Indeed, it seems to be

the prevalent fault of our law tracts that they heap together a mul-

titude of independenl rules, for the accuracy of which they are

contented to refer to the cases where they occur, without ever once

adverting to the grounds of their adoption; and the work is es-

teemed in proportion to the diligence with which cases are col-

lected, and to the number of references in the margin. This may

be abundantly useful, as the plan of a work of consultation, for the

beneﬁt of such as are satisﬁed with point-learning, but cannot be

advantageous as an elementary treatise. On the contrary, the at-

tention is distracted and the intellect wearied by the inﬁnity of

minute distinctions, and it requires the most patient industry and

indefatigable zeal to draw any general conclusion from a multitude

of apparently contradictory authorities.

A treatise intended for instruction should do little more than

sketch an outline of ﬁrst principles, carefully discriminating be-

tween those propositions which are essential to the understanding

of the subject, and those superﬂuous corrollaries which only create

embarrassment. The student thus conversant with the elements of

his science, will be able to reason a priori upon every new case that
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is presented to him, instead of being obliged to have recourse to

ence, which he may elsewhere meet with as an unsupported dictu~,
or resting only on the authorfty of decision. Indeed, it seems to be
the prevalent fault of our law tracts that they heap together a multitude of independenl rules, for the accuracy of which they are
contented to refer to the cases where they occur, without ever once
adverting to the grounds of their adoption; and the work is esteemed in proportion to the diligence with which cases are collected, and to the number of references in the margin. This may
be abundantly useful, as the plan of a work of consultation, for the
benefit of such as are satisfied with point-learning, but cannot be
advantageous as an elementary treatise. On the contrary, the attention is distracted and the intellect wearied by the infinity of
minute distinctions, and it requires the most patient industry and
indefatigable zeal to draw any general conclusion from a multitude
of apparently contradictory authorities.

analogy, which is oftentimes a fallacious, and at best, a laborious

test. He will have less occasion to depend on the exercise of his

memory, and at every step that he advances, he will ﬁnd order

and harmony throughout the whole progress of his acquirement.

Even the monotonous routine of the office, in the place of a mind-

less task of copying forms, is raised by him to intellectual dignity,

and he ﬁnds, even in that employment, a new and beautiful appli-

cation of foregone knowledge to present practice.

With this object in view, various books have been written to

assist the student, both in conveyancing and special pleading; but

nothing of the same kind seems to have been attempted in equity

drafting, partly from the notion that there is less nicety required in

equity pleadings, which are not so liable to be vitiated by verbal

ﬂaws, or errors of form, and partly, perhaps, from an idea that

there can be no systematic arrangement of the subject—an opinion

that is countenanced by the latitude of indulgence prevalent in

equity, and its apparent deviations from the technical subtleties of

A treatise intended for instruction should do little more than
sketch an outline of first principles, carefully discriminating between those propositions which are essential to the understanding
of the subject, and those superfluous corrollaries which only create
embarrassment. The student thus conversant with the elements of
his science, will be able to reason a priori upon every new case that
is presented to him, instead of being obliged to have recourse to
analogy, which is oftentimes a fallacious, and at best, a laborious
test. He will h,ave less occasion to depend on the exercise of his
memory, and at every step that he advances, he will find order
and harmony throughout the whole progress of his acquirement.
Even the monotonous routine of the office, in the place of a mindless task of copying forms, is raised by him to intellectual dignity,
and he finds, even in that employment, a new and beautiful application of foregone knowledge to present practice.
With this object in view, various books have been written to
assist the student, both in conveyancing and special pleading; but
nothing of the same kind seems to have been ·attempted in equity
drafting, partly from the notion that there is less nicety required in
equity pleadings, which are not so liable to be vitiated by verbal
flaws, or errors of form, and partly, perhaps, from an idea that
there can be no systematic arrangement of the subject-an opinion
that is countenanced by the latitude of indulgence prevalent in
equity, and its apparent deviations from the technical subtleties of

viii PREFACE.

common law. But that this is a mistake arising from want of suffi-

viii

PREFACE.

cient attention to the forms of pleading in equity, will, it is

imagined, be apparent from a perusal of the following sheets. We

have endeavored to reduce the pleadings in equity into a scientiﬁc

method, to show their analogy to the pleadings at common lavw, and

of both to the principles of dialectics. Hitherto the pupil has been

left without any other guide than a few imperfect precedents, and

the scanty observations that are to be found scattered among books

of practice; added to which, he has to struggle against a very

faulty enumeration of the parts of a bill calculated to mislead and

perplex him. The deﬁciency in this particular has long been sensi-

bly experienced, and the following analysis is an attempt to supply

the desideratum.

As the original design was principally for the instruction of

pupils, the author thought it right to preﬁx an epitome of the prac-

tice; which, however, from his anxiety not to omit anything which

might be of utility, has gradually been raised into an important

portion of the work. He trusts, at the same time, that this part

of the performance will not be found superﬂuous; as, not satisﬁed

with seeing that ita lea: scripta est, he has endeavored throughout to

discover the origin and reason of the rule. This attempt is, for the

most part, entirely new; nnd so far as he has been enabled to suc-
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ceed, is elucidatory of many points, which otherwise appeared co.n-

fused‘ and irrelevant. He has carefully abstained from encumber-

ing the memory with any disjointed matter, while he has been

diligent not to overlook anything material to a just apprehension of

the subject, being desirous of making it a useful as well as conve-

nient compendium. In this point of view, solicitors who wish to

acquire a knowledge of the principles of practice, will ﬁnd it ad-

vantageous, at the same time that it is suﬁiciently copious for the

purposes of general reference.

The author ventures to hope that a previous acquaintance with

the present work would materially abridge both the labor and dura-

tion of the pupil’s service in the equity draftsman’s oﬂice; and as

such, he recommends it to those young friends who are destined for

that branch of the profession. He also suggests the propriety of

not hastening too cursorily over the subject, as many parts of it

may appear at ﬁrst somewhat difﬁcult and abstruse. The pupil

should advance cautiously, secure of understanding previous points,

common law. But that this is a mistake arising from want of sufficient attention to the forms of pleading in equity, will, it is
imagined, be apparent fron1 a perusal of the following sheets. We
have endeavored to reduce the pleadings in equity into a scientific
method, to show their analogy to the pleadings at common lww, and
of both to the principles of dialectics. Hitherto the pupil has been
left without any other guide than a few imperfect precedents, and
the scanty observations that are to be found scattered among books
of practice; added to which, he has to struggle against a very
faulty enumeration of the parts of a bill calculated to mislead and
perplex him. The deficiency in this particular has long peen sensibly experienced, and the following analysis is an attempt to supply
the desideratum.
As the original design was principally for the instruction of
pupils, the author thought it right to prefix an epitome of the praatice; which, however, from his anxiety not to omit anything which
might be of utility, has gradually been raised into an important
portion of the work. He trusts, at the same time, that this part
of the performance will not be found superfluous; as, not satisfied
with seeing that ita lex scripta est, he has endeavored throughout to
discover the origin and reason of the rule. This attempt is, for the
most part, entirely new; nnd so far as he ha~ been enabled to suc£eed, is elucidatory of many points, which otherwise appeared con•
fused and irrelevant. He has carefully abstained from encumbering the memory with any disjointed matter, while he bas been
diligent not to overloolt anything material to a just apprehension of
the subject, being desirous of making it a useful as well as convenient compendium. In this point of view, solicitors who ·wish to
acquire a knowledge of the principles of practice, will find it advantageous, at the same time that it is sufficiently copious for the
purposes of general reference.
~

The author ventures to hope that a previous acquaintance with
the present work would materially abridge both the labor and duration of the pupil's service in the equity draftsman's office; and as
such, he recommends it to those young friends who are destined for
that branch of the profession. He also suggests the propriety of
not hastening too cursorily over the subject, as many parts of it
may appear at first somewhat difficult and abstruse. The pupil
should advance cautiously, secure of understanding previous points,

PREFACE. I ix

before he presses on to their deducibles, and proceed always a

PREFACE.

notioribus ad minus nota.

ix

With this advice the author takes his leave_—conc1uding with

the exhortation of Cicero to his friends—“Quamobrem pergite, ut

facitis, adolescentis ; atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite, ut et

vobis honori, et amicis utilitati, et reipublicae emolumento esse possi-

tis.”* t
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"’ Cic. de Oratore, Lib. 1.

before he presses on to their deducibles, and proceed always a
notioribus ad minus nota.
With this advice the author takes his leave-concluding with
the exhortation of Cicero to his friends-" Quamobrem pergite, ut
facitis, adolescentis; atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite, ut et
vobis honori, et amicis utilitati, et reipublica emolumento esse possitis."*
* Cic. de Oratore, Llb. 1.

B

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

Page

Of Pleading in General___..___'___ ______ .___ ____ ____ _______ . ___ 1

Snc. I.—Analysis of the Pleadings at Common Law __________ _. 3

S1ac.II.—The Analogy of the Rules of Pleading to pure Dia-

lectics ____-____-______-________-______ __‘ _________ __ 18.

SEC. III.-—Of Pleading in Equity, and its Analogy to Common

Law _____________.___________.________________________ __ 21

CHAPTER II.

Of the Original Bill in Equity ______________________________ __ 32

SEC. I.—Of the General Form and Structure of Ordinary Bills“ 32

CONTENTS.

SEC. II._—Of the First Part of a Bill, and herein of the Doctrine

of Relations ._________________________________________ __ 40

SEC. III.—Of the Second Part, or Statement of Injury _______ __ 47

SEO. IV.—Of the Third Part, or Pretences and Charges ...... __ 49 '

CHAPTER I.

Page

SEC. V.—Of the Fourth, or Interrogating Part, and Prayer___“ 52

CHAPTER III.

Of Secondary Bills .________ __‘ .................. _‘_ ___________ _;_ 58

SEC. I.—_Of Abatement, and the distinction between Suits

abated and those become merely defective ____ . "___ ____ 59

SEC. II.—Of the Form and Structure of Supplemental Bills"___ 67

SEC. III.—Of the Form and Structure of Bills of Revivor, and of

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Bills in the nature of Bills of Revivor _________________ __ 69

SEC. IV.—Of the Form and Structure of the Original Bill in the

nature of 9. Supplemental Bill ________________________ __ 71

Of Pleading in Genera} _______ .:. ________ ·-·--------------------

1

SEc. I.-Analysis of the Pleadings at Common Law------------

3

.

t

SEc. 11.-The Analogy of the Rules of. Pleading to pure Dialectics-------------------------- ----- --·-- --------- 18
SEc. III.-Of Pleading in Equity, and its Analogy to Common
Law ------------ -·--- -------- ---- ---------------------- 21

j
:

CHAPTER II.

i

SEO. V.—Of the Form and Structure of Bills in the nature of

Original Bills _______ __. ._______________________________ __ 73

l

Of the Original Bill in EquitY-------------------------------- 32
SEc. I.__.:Of the General Form and Structure of Ordinary Bills-- 32
SEc. II.-Of the First Part of a.Bill, and herein of the Doctrine
of Relations-------------------------------------------- 40
SEc. III.-Of the Second Part, or Statement of Injury--------- 47
SEc. IV.-Of the Third Part, or Pretences and Charges-------- 49 ·
SEc. V .-Of the Fourth, or Interrogating Part, and Prayer----- 52
CHAPTER III.
Of Secondary Bills-----------.-- .. ------------ ___ :_ ____ ..:_---- __ ..:._ 58
SEc. I.-Of Abatement, and the distinction between Suits
abated and those become merely defective---- .. ----- ---- 59
SEC. II.-Of the Form and Structure of Supplemental Bills----- 67
SEc. III.-Of the Form and Structure of Bills of Revivor, and of
Bills in the nature of Bills of Revivor-------------------· 69
SEc. IV .-Of the Form and Structure of the Original Bill in the
nature of a Supplemental Bill-------------------------- 71
SEc. V.-Of the Form and Structure of Bills in the nature of
Original Bills---------.·---------------------·-----~----- 73

I

l

i
l

!

I

xii conranrs.

CHAPTER IV.

xii

CONTENTS.

Pleas and Demurrers _______________________________________ __ 79

SEC. I.-_Of the the General Nature of the Defence by Plea or

Demurrer ____ . _______________________________________ __ 79

CHAPTER IV.

Sac. II.—Of the subject matter of Pleas and Demurrers, both to

the discovery and relief _______________________________ __ 84

SEC. III.—Of the defence to Bill not original ________________ __ 89

Sac. IV.—Of the General Form and Structure of Pleas and De-

murrers ______________________________________________ __ 92

SEO. V._—Of the Commencement .____________.______________ __ 94

SEO. VI.—Of the Body, and herein of Averments and Intend-

ments _______________________________________________ _ 98

SEC. VII.—Of the Conclusion_____.._________.___.. _.-_____..___ 105

CHAPTER V.

Answers __________________________________________________ __ 109

CHAPTER VI.

The Replication ._____________ __. ____________________________ _ 120

APPENDIX.

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Forms ____________________-_____________-____..______..____ __ l24.

Pleas and I>enrrurrers----------------------------------------SEc. I.-Of the the General Nature of the Defence by Plea or
I>emurrer---------------------------------------------SEc. II.-Of the subject matter of Plea.s and I>emurrers, both to
the discovery and relief--------------------------------SEc. III.-Of the defence to Bill not original-----------------SEc. IV .-Of the General Form and Structure of Pleas and I>enrrurrers-----------------------------------------------SEc. V .-Of the Commencen1ent -------------.---------- -----SEc. VI.-Of the Body, and herein of Averments and Intendnrrents ---------- ---- ~--- ------------ ------------------SEc. VII.-Of the Conclusion----------------------··------·---

79
79
84

89

92
94
98

105

CHAPTER V.

Ans~ers ----------------------------------------------------- 109
CHAPTER VI.
The Replication·--------------------------------------------- 120

APPENDIX.
Forms------------------------------------------------------- 124

EQUITY PLEADING.

CHAPTER I.

OF PLEADING IN GENERAL.

“ And know, my son, that it is one of the most honorable,

laudable, and proﬁtable things in our law, to have the science of

well pleading; and therefore I counsaile thee especially to im-

ploy thy courage and care to learne this.”—Littleton.

1, The science of pleading has been so long regarded

by those who are ignorant of its true nature and objects

as a system invented for the purpose of evasion and per-

version of justice, an opinion which is unfortunately

countenanced by the frequent miscarriages of causes upon

small and trivial niceties in pleading, [a] that it will be

EQUITY PLEADING.

necessary for us to enter into the consideration of plead-

ing in general, its use and design, in order to rescue it

from undeserved obloquy, and to endeavor to remove

CHAPTER I.

from the mind of the pupil the unfavorable impression he

is apt to conceive on his ﬁrst entrance upon the study.

OF PLEADING IN GENERAL.

2, From the number of minute and intricate rules

laid down in the treatises on this subject, collected from

decisions in an inﬁnite variety of cases, the compilers of

which consider it quite sufﬁcient to refer to the authorities

without stating the reason upon which the rule is founded,
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the student ﬁnds himself involved in a net of inextricable

"And know, my son, that it is one of the most honorable,
laudable, and profitable things in our law, to have the science of
well pleading ; and therefore I counsaile thee especially to imploy thy courage and care to learne this."-Littleton.

diﬁiculties and niceties, for which he in vain seeks for a

solution. He is terriﬁed in approaching a subject which

[a] Hale’s Hist. Com. Law, 212.

1. The science of pleading has been so long regarded
by those who are ignorant of its true nature and objects
as a system invented for the purpose of evasion and perversion of justice, an opinion which is unfortunately
countenanced by the frequent miscarria~es of causes upon
small and trivial niceties in pleading, [a] that it will be
necessary for us to enter into the consideration of pleading in general, its use and design, in order to rescue it
from undeserved obloquy, and to endeavor to remove
from the mind of the pupil the unfavorable impression he
is apt to conceive on his first entrance upon the study.

2. From the number of minute and intricate rules
laid down in the treatises on this subject, collected from
decisions in an infinite variety of cases, the compilers of
which consider it quite sufficient to refer to the authorities
without stating the reason upon which the rule is founded,
the student finds hin1self involved in a net of inextricable
difficulties and niceti~s~ for which he in vain seeks for a
solution. l-Ie is terrified in approaching a subject which
[a] Hale's Hist. Com. Law, 212.

2 EQUITY PLEADING.

2

EQUITY PLEADING.

I

at ‘ﬁrst seems necessary to be committed to memory in

order to be mastered. He is in despair when\ be ob-

serves its complication and minute magnitude, and he too

often throws it up in disgust, from supposing that sub-

stantial justice is, in many instances, intercepted by mere

technical, and, to him, apparently unmeaning forms.

Add to this, that from the abuses that from time to time

have crept into the system, “special pleading” has been

long a byword for sophistry and the splitting of straws.

We cannot, therefore, be much surprised at the number of

prejudices to be overcome, on commencing the study of

this branch of the profession, that so few ever become

acquainted with its real principles, and that so little has

been done towards bringing back the science to that

ancient simplicity and perfection to which it had attained

in the reign of Edward the Third. [a]

3, It will be our business, then, to make an effort to

justify the encomiums of Littleton upon it; and to prove,

as Lord Mansﬁeld says, that the “substantial rules of

pleading are founded in strong sense and in the soundest

and choicest logic; and so appear, when well understood
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and explained,” but which (as he remarks in the same

case) “ by being misunderstood and misapplied, are often

made use of as instruments of chicane.” [b] To this pur-

pose we must commence, by endeavoring to arrive at a

at 'first seen1s necessary to be committed to memory in
order to be mastered. He is in despair whet\ he observes its complication and minute magnitude, and he too
of~en throws it up in disgust, from supposing that substantial justice is, in many instances, intercepted by mere
technical, and, to him.. apparently unmeaning forms.
Add to this, that from the abuses that from time to time
have crept into the system," special pleadin~ '' has been
long a byword for sophistry and the ~plitting of straws.
We cannot, therefore, be much surprised at the number of
prejudices to ·be overcome, on commencing the study of
this branch of the profession, that so few ever becom~
acquain.ted with its real principles, and that so little has
been done towards bringing back the science to that
ancient simplicity and perfection to which it had attained
in the reign of Ed ward the Third. [a]

clear and precise notion of what it is a man does when he

is said to bring an action, or institute a suit against

another. When a person feels himself aggrieved, and

cannot otherwise have redress, he applies to the law to

interpose its authority, in order to restore to him a right

that is withheld, or to give him reparation for an injury

sustained. But the law will not interfere by its minis-

[a] Vide Hale’s Hist. Com. Law. Co. Litt., 304, b. (h).

[b] 1 Burr., 319.

3. It will be our business, then, to make an effort to
justify the encomiums of Littleton upon it; and to prove,
as Lord Mansfield says, that the "substantial rules of
pleading are founded in strong sense and in the soundest
and choicest logic; and so appear, when well understood
and explained;'' but which (as he remarks in the same
case) " by being misunderstood and misapplied, are often
made use of as instruments of chicane." [b] To this purpose we must commence, by endeavoring to arrive at a
clear and precise notion of what it is a man does when he
is said to bring an action, or institute a suit against
another. When a person feels himse]f aggrieved, and
cannot o~;herwise have redress, he applies to the law to
interpose its authority, in order to restore to him a right
that is withheld, or to give him reparation for an injury
sustained. But the law will not interfere by its minis[a] Vide Hale's Hist. Com. Law.
[b] 1 Burr., 319.

Co. Litt., 304, b. (h).

OF PLEADING IN GENERAL. 3

OF PLEADING IN GENERAL.

terial oﬁicers, upon the bare suggestion of injury; it re-

3

quires that the wrong shall be proved, and the right

substantiated, for otherwise it might be turned into an

instrument of violence. For this purpose courts of judi-

cature have been erected, where the claims of the parties

may be contested and the judgment of the law ascertained,

before its sanction is awarded. The courts of law have,

on their part, laid down certain rules and formulae of pro-

ceeding, which long experience has taught to be the best

adapted to the purpose of arriving at a speedy andjust

decision; a departure from which rules must occasion

great inconvenience, and sometimes a manifest defect of

justice. Hence causes are frequently delayed by the

raising of mere technical, and, to a common observer,

frivolous objections. And although this is an evil much

to be regretted, it is one that arises more from the ignor-

ance of practicers than from any inherent blemish in the

law. [a] This is an observation which applies with pecu_

liar force to pleading, the propriety and utility of the rules

in which are not always so discernable as in the other

branches of practice.

SECTION 1.
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Analysis of the Pleadings at Common Law.

4, Upon complaint being made to a court of justice,

its ﬁrst step is to summon the defendant to appear and

answer the allegations made against him. As it would be

[a] 1 Bos. & Pul., 59; where it is observed by Eyre, Chief

Justice, that “inﬁnite mischief has been produced by the fa-

cility of the courts in overlooking errors in form ; it encourages

carelessness, and places ignorance too much on a footing with

knowledge, amongst those who practice the drawing of plead-

ings.”

terial officers, upon the bare suggestion of injury; it requires that the wrong shall be ~roved., and the right
substantiated, for otherwise it 1night be turned into an
instrument of violence. For this purpose courts of judicature bave been erected, where the claims of the parties
may be contested and the judgment of the law ascertained,
before its sanction is awarded. The courts of law have,
on their part, laid do\vn certain rules and formulre of proceeding, which long experience has taught to be the best
adapted to the purpose of arriving at a speedy and just
decision; a departure from which rules must occasion
great inconvenience, and sometimes a manifest defect of
justice. H~nce causes are frequently delayed by the
raising of mere technical, and, oo a common observer,
frivolous objections. And although this is an evil much
to be regretted, it is one that arises more from the ig.nor . .
ance of practicers than from any inherent blemish in the
law. [a] This is an observation which applies with pecu_
liar force to pleading, the propriety and utility of the rules
in which are not always so discernable as in the other
branches of practice.

I.
Analysis of the Pleadings at Common Law.
SECTION

4. Upon complaint being made to a court of justice,
its first step is to summon the defendant to appear and
answer the allegations made against him. As it would be
[a] 1 Bos. & Pul., 59; where it is observed by Eyre, Chief
Justice. that ''infinite mischief has been produced by the facility of the courts in overlooking errors in form; it encourages
carelessness, and places ignorance too much on a footing with
knowledge, amongst those who practice the drawing of plead-

ings.''

4 EQUITY PLEADING.

4

EQUITY PLEADING.

contrary to justice to pronounce an opinion “altera parte

inaudita,” the defendant thereupon comes and contests

the plaintiff’s right, either by disputing its legality or de-

nying the facts, or some particular fact, on the ground of

- which such right is claimed; or alleging on his own be-

half‘, such matter as would operate to avoid the plaintiﬁ"s

demand, by showing that no cause of complaint existed;

or if it once existed, was subsequently removed. These

are such answers as go to the merits of the point in dispute.

But independently of these, there are preliminary objec-

tions which may be taken, to excuse the defendant from

entering into any contest about the matter—as that the

court applied to by plaintiff for relief, is not the one proper

to take cognizance of the suit; or that the plaintiff is, for

some reason foreign to the cause of action, not entitled to

claim the assistance of a court of justice; or lastly, that

there is some defect in the mode of proceeding, which

would ultimately render the interference of the law abor-

tive.

5, These disputations of the parties were originally

delivered “ore tenus ” .in court, and were noted down by

the oﬂicer, that the court might understand what was the
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real point of controversy. And if any objection arose up-

on the law of the case,it was at once decided on argument.

If the dispute turned upon a question of fact, it was sent

to be ascertained, according to its appropriate mode of

trial. In process of time, however, as the business of the

courts increased, the parties were sent out of court to set-

tle among themselves the terms of the question upon

which the judgment of the court was demanded, or the

verdict of a jury required; and thenceforward the counsel

contrary to justice to pronounce an opinion . "altera parte
ina·udita/' the defendant thereupon comes and contests
the plaintiff's ri~ht., either by disputing its l~gality or denying the facts, or some particular fact, on the ground of
· which such right is claimed; or alleging on his own behalf, such matter as would operate to avoid the plaintiff's
demand, by ~howing that no cause of complaint exi~ted;
or if it once existed, was subsequently removed. '".rhese
are ~uch ans,vers as go to the rnerits of the point in dispute.
But independently of these, there are preliminary objections which may be taken, to excuse the defendant from
entering into any contest about the matter-as that the
court applied to by plaintiff for relief, is not the one proper
to take cognizance of the suit; or that the plaintiff is, for
some reason foreign to the cause of action, not entitled to
claim the assistance of a court of justice ; or lastly, that
there is some defect in the mode of proceeding, which
would ultimately render the interference of the law abortive.

on both sides drew up, in writing, the several allegations

and answers of their respective clients, until, in course of

the altercation, they arrive at some disputed point of law,

5. These disputations of the parties were originally
delivered "ore tenus". in court, and were noted down by
the officer, that the court might understand what was the
real point of controversy. And if any objection arose upon the law of the case, it was at once decided on argument.
If the dispute turned upon a question of fact, it was sent
to be ascertained, according to its appropriate mode of
trial. In process of time, however, as the business of the
courts increased, the parties were sent out of court to settle among themselves the terms of the question upon
which the judgment of the court was demanded, or the
verdict of a jury required; and thenceforward the counsel
on both sides drew up, in writing, the several allegations
and answers of their respective clients, until, in course of
the altercation, they arrive at some disputed point of law,

PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW.

PLEADINGS AT common LAW. 5

5

or some material fact, distinctly alleged on one side and de-

nied by the other; for not until then did they require the

assistance of the court or jury. These preliminary dispu-

tations of the parties are termed Pleadz'n-gs ; and the point

to which they arrive, is called the Issue.

The foregoing view at once furnishes us with the true

end and design of pleadings, which is nothing more

than to disencumber the question at issue between the

parties of all irrelevant and perplexing matter; that so the

or some material fact., distinctly alleged on one side and denied b.v the other; for not until then did they require the
assistance of the court or jury. 'rhese preliminary disputations of the parties are termed Pleadin,qa ,· and the point
to which they arrive, is called the Issue.

court and jury may be saved from embarrassment by

having the points submitted to their consideration distinct

and material, and that the parties themselves may be

spared the trouble and expense of unnecessary litigation.

This accords with what Sir Matthew Hale says of “the art

or dexterity of pleading," which, as he expresses it, in its

use, nature and design, was only to render the fact plain

and intelligible, and to bring the matter tojudgment with

a convenient certamty. [a]

6, The student will observe that the rules of plead-

ing, how complicated or abstruse soever they may appear,

are all built upon the foundation of this single principle,

and all aim at the accomplishment of this one object. It
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may seem extraordinary to some, how so plain and deﬁn-

ite an object could ever be lost sight of in stating the

claims of the conﬂicting parties, or that a principle so ob-

vious could give birth to a system of rules upon which

volumes have been expended; but whoever will reﬂect

upon the many arguments which arise in ordinary conver-

sation, and how few of them are ever brought to any con-

clusion, solely in consequence of the disputants traveling

out of the true point in debate, will cease to be surprised

at the ﬁrst; and when we come to consider that the most

abstruseand extensive sciences are foundedupon data,

[a] Hist. Com. Law, 2l2.

The foregoing view at once furnishes nq .wit.h the true

end and design of pleadings, which is nothing more
than to disencumber the question at issue between the
parties of all irrelevant nnd perplexing matter; that so the
court and jury may be saved from en1barrassn1ent by
having the points submitted to their consideration distinct
and material, and that the parties themsel v·es may be
spared the trouble and expense of nnnece~sary litigation.
l'his accords with what Sir Matthew Hale says of ''the art
or dexterity of pleading,'" which, as he expre~s~s it, in its
use, nature and de~ign, was only to render the fact plain
and intelligible, and to bring the matter to judgment wit.h
a convenient certainty. [aJ

6. The student will observe that the rules of pleading, how complicated or abstruse soever they may appear,.
are all built upon the foundation of this single principle,
and all aim at the accomplishment of this one object. It
n1ay seem extraordinary to some, how so plain and defin.
ite an object could ever be lost sight of in stating the
claims of the conflicting parties, or that a principle so obvious could give birth to a system of rules upon which
volu1nes have been expended; but whoever will reflect
upon the many arguments which arise in ordinary conversation, and how fe\v of thetn are ever brought to any conclusion, solely in consequence of the disputants travelin~
out of the true point in de hate, \Vill cease to be surprised
at the first; and when we cotne to cun~ider that the n1ost
abstruse ·and extensive sciences are founcled ·upon data,
[a]

Hist. Corn. Law, 212.

6 EQUITY PLEADING

6

EQUITY PLEADING

comparatively few and simple, and that pleading is, in

fact, a very important branch of dialectics, or the art of

right reasoning, we shall no longer be astonished at the

complication and variety of its rules, which in reality, are

no more than a counterpart of the rules laid down in the

system of logic. Of this we shall have occasion to speak

more at large by and by. These rules, when properly

understood, are all conducive to the same end, and are

perfectly intelligible when referred to the principle above

stated. It is only when they are regarded as so many in-

dependent propositions, and grounded upon mere author-

ity (in which light our writers on pleading are too much

accustomed to treat them), that they appear to the student

as an arbitrary and unmeaning collection, calculated to in-

volve and embarrass the real justice of every case.

7, We shall now proceed to show the application of

these principles to the several pleadings on either side,

taking each of them separately as they occur on the part

of the plaintiff and defendant: and ﬁrst, of the statement

of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and his application

for redress. Here then are two points to be considered:

ﬁrst the nature of the wrong sustained, and how it is to be
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set out; and, secondly, the plaintiff’s right to make the

application to the particular court, and the form of such

application. Of each of these in their order:

comparatively few and simple, and that pleading is, in
fact, a very important branch of dialectics, or the art of
right reasoning, we shall no longer be astonished at. the
complication and variety of its rules, which in reality, are
no more than a counterpart of the rules laid down in the
system of logic. Of this \Ve shall have occasion to spealr
more at large by and by. These rules, when properly
understood, are all conducive to the same end, and are
perfectly intelligible when referred to the principle above
stated. It is only when they are regarded as so many independent propositions, and grounded upon mere authority (in which light our writers on pleading are too much
accustomed to treat them), that they appear to the student
as an arbitrary and unmeaning collection, calculated to involve and embarrass the real justice of every case.

8, First, as to the statement of the injury. “ Wrongs

convey to us an idea merely negative, as being nothing

7. We shall now proceed to show the application of

else but a privation of right.” [a] In complaining of a

wrong done to him, therefore, the plaintiff does nothing

more than to set out a right of which he has been deprived.

This leads us to the consideration of rights, which are noth-

ing more than legal or equitable relations. To prove a right,

[a] 3 Blacks, Com. 2.

these principles to the several pleadings on either side,
taking each of them separately as they occur on the part
of the plaintiff and defendant: and first, of the statement
of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and his application
for redress. Here then are two points to be considered:
first the nature of the wrong sustained, and how it. is to be
set out; and, secondly, the plaintiff's right to make the
application to th.e partia1tlar aou'l't, and the form of such
application. Of each of these in their order:

8. First, as to the statement of tl~e injury. "'Wrongs
convey to us an idea merely negative, as being nothing
e1se but a privation of right." [a] In complaining of a
wrong d0ne to him, therefore, the plaintiff does nothing
more than to set out a 1 i,qht of which he has been deprived.
This leads us to the consideration of rights, which are nothing 1nore than }ega) or equitable relations. rfo prove a right,
1

[a]

3 Blacks, Com. 2.

PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW. 7

then the relation in which it is related must be distinctly

PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW.

7

shown. And here we must premise that in speaking of

relations we allude more particularly to such as arise ex

contractu, and are the foundation of action of that nature,

as being more analogous to cases in equity, and quite sulﬁ-

cient for purposes of illustration. Relations, again, let in

three separate considerations: ﬁrst, the parties with their

several disabilities and liabilities in law; secondly, the

subject matter, or contract, with cigcumstances under

which it was made; and lastly, the legal and equitable

incidents or rights, the withholding of‘ any of which is

the cause of complaint. Who, then, for a moment reflects

upon the vast and diffusive ﬁeld of‘ controversy which this

includes, can be surprised at the difficulty attending upon

the preliminary arrangement of the points in litigation, or

the number of minute regulations that have from time to

time been found necessary to be adopted in order “ to ren-

der the fact plain and intelligible, and to bring the matter

to judgment with a convenient certainty.”

Hence, we see that the statement of the injury is com-

posed of these three points: the setting forth the relation

between the parties; the right accruing by such relation,
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and that such right is withheld. This entirely agrees with

the ancient view taken of a declaration at common law,

which was said to consist of three parts~—the demonstra-

tive, the declarative, and the perclose or conclusion. Here

the demonstrative part, which states the names of parties,

and the nature of the action corresponds with the setting ‘

forth of the right, because at common law certain actions

were given for certain injuries; the declarative part which

explains the cause of action is equivalent to the showing

the relation between the parties, and the perclose is the

then the relation in which it is related must be distinctly
shown. And here we must premise that in speaking of
relations we allude more particularly to such as arise e:n
contractu, and are the foundation of action of that nature,
as being more analogous to cases in equity, and quite sufficient for purposes of illustration. Relation~, again, let in
three separate considerations: first, the parties with their
several disabilities and liabilities in law; secondly, the
subject matter, or contract, with ciJcumstances under
which it was made; and lastly, the legal and equitable
incidents or right~, the withholding of any of which is
the cause of complaint. Who, then, for a moment reflects
upon the vast and diffusive field of controversy which this
includes, can be surpri~ed at the difficulty attending upon
the preliminary arrangement of the points in litigation, or
the number of minute regulations that have from time to
time been found necessary to be adopted in order "to render the fact plain and intelligible, and to bring the matter
to judgment with a convenient certainty."

complaint of injury sustained. The ﬁrst and principal

point, therefore, with the plaintiff, is to show his right,

Renee, we see that the atatement of the injury is cornposed of these three points: the setting forth the relation
between the parties; the right accruin~ by such relation,
and that such right is withheld. 'fhis entirely agrees with
the ancient view taken of a declaration at common law,
whieh was said to consist of three parts-the demoustrative, the declarative, and the perclose or conclusion. Here
the demonstrative part, \Vhich states the names of parties,
and the nature of the action corresponds \Vith the setting
forth of the right,. because at common law certain action8
were given for certain injuries; the declarative part which
explains the cause of action is equivalent to the showing
the relation between the partie~, and the perolose is the
con1plaint of injury sustained. The fir~t and principal
point, therefore, with the plaintiff, is to show his right,

8 EQUITY PLEADING.

8

EQUITY PLEADING.

and however complicated and diffuse the statement in a

declaration at common law, or a bill in equity, may ap-

pear, it is nevertheless reducible to two propositions dec-

larative of such right. The first proposition states the

rule of law, that a certain right flows from a certain rela-

tion; the second, that the parties stand in such relation.

1. The ﬁrst is proved—1st, by act of parliament, on

which turns the question of construction ; 2d,by precedent,

on which turns the meaning and extent of the rule gath-

ered from the precedent; 3d, by analogy, where a still

and however complicated and diffuse the staternent in a
declaration at cotnmon la\v, or a bill in equity, may appear, it is nevertheless reducible to t\vo propositions declarative of such right. The first propo~ition states t.he
rule of law, that a certain right flows fron1 a certain relation; the second, that the parties stand in such relation.

more general rule is to be collected, from a variety of

‘analogous cases, or from the universal principles of equity

itself.

2. The second proposition is founded on the facts of

the case, as stated in the declaration at common law, and

the bill in equity. But these statements may be untrue,

or inadequate. Their truth which is a question of fact, is

decided by the verdict of a jury, at common law; and in

equity, by written depositions and the defendant’s admis-

sions upon oath. But, secondly, the facts, though proved

to be true may be inadequate to sustain the assumed re-

lation. As if, for instance, a man, who claimed some duty

1. The first is proved-1st, by act of parliament, on
which turns the question of construction; 2d, by pre~edent,
on which turns the meaning and extent of the rule gathered from the precedent; 3d, by analogy, where a still
more general rule is to be collected, from a variety of
·analogous cases, or from the universal principles of equity
itself.
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arising from the relation of copartnership, was unable to

prove a contract for the participation of loss as well as

proﬁt (for without such essential ingredient; it would not

be a copartnership concern,) [a] he would thereby fail to

establish the relation on which his claim was founded,

‘ and this is frequently the ground of non-suit at law, and

‘of dismissing the bill in equity. This point of adequacy,

is purely a question of law, and is proved by showing that

the case made out has all the essential qualities of the

assumed relation; or in other words, that the facts proved,

[a] l-Iesketh v. Blanchard, 4 East., 144.

2. The second proposition is founded on the facts of
the case, as stated in the declaration at common law, and
t.he bill in equity. But these statements may be untrue,
or inadequate. 'fheir truth which is a question ·of fact, is
decided by the verdict of a jury, at cotntnon law; and in
equity, by \Vritten depositions and the defendant's adnlissions upon oath. But, secondly, the facts, thongh proved
to be true may be inadequate to sustain the assutned relation. As if, for instance, a man, \Vho c]aitned son1e duty
arising fron1 the relation of copartnership, wa~ unable to
prove a contract for the partir.jpation of loss as well a:;
profit (for without such essential ingredient; it would not
be a copartnership concern,) [a] he wonld thereby fail to
establish the relation on which his claim was founded,
and this is frequently the ground of non-snit at law, and
'of di~n1issing the bill in equity. This point of adequacy,
is purely a question of la\v, and is proved by showing that
the case made out has all the e8sential qualities of the
assumed relation; or in other words . that the facts proved,
[al

Hesketh v. Blanchard, 4 East., 144.
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bring the case within the application of the rule oflaw,

PLEADINGS AT. COMMON LAW.

laid down in the ﬁrst proposition. The conclusion here is

as 1nuch demonstration as any theorem in pure quantities.

9, Next, as to the application for redress: although

every man who has suffered wrong is prima acie entitled

' to redress in a court of justice, yet as the aw has estab-

bring the case within the application of the rule of law,
laid down in the first proposition. The conclusion here is
as tnuch demonstration as any theorem in pure quantities.

lished for the convenience and dispatch of business,

several distinct and independent judicatures, with exclu-

sive jurisdiction, the plaintiff must take care to bring his

action or commence his suit in such court as has authority

to take cognizance of the wrong complained of; otherwise,

besides the general inconvenience that would result from

an opposite course, great injustice might be done to the

defendant if he were obliged to contest the right in an in-

competent court, for want of adequate means of defence.

Secondly, there are certain disabilities, some of which

are only temporary, imposed by law, which restrict those

who are subject to them from suing in a court of justice;

and, on the other hand, there are certain privileges at-

tached to individuals in particular capacities, which ex-

empt them from liability.

Thirdly, as the courts have by a series of decisions,
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laid down a system of proceedings which experience has

proved to be the best calculated to attain the ends ofjus-

tice, the application for redress must follow the established

9. Next, as to the application for redress: although
every man who has suffered wrong is prima/acie entitled
to redress in a court of justice, yet as the faw has established for the convenience and dispatch of business,
several distinct and independent judicatures, with exclusive jurisdiction, the plaintiff must take care to bring his
act.ion or commence his suit in such court as has authority
to take cognizance of the wrong complained or; otherwise,
besides the general inconvenience that would result from
an opposite course, great injustice might be done to the
defendant if he were obliged to contest the right in an incomp~tent court, for want of adequate means of defence.

forms, that the defendant may at once know what and

how to answer. The complaint must likewise be so framed

as that the whole question, and between all the parties,

may be brought before the court; since, otherwise, the

defendant would be harrassed by uselessly contestinga

suit in which complete and ample justice could not be

ﬁnally administered. And, lastly, we may add under this

head that no man is permitted to sue another while a

former suit for the same cause of action is pending, either

Secondly, there are certain disabilities, some of which
are only temporary, imposed by law, which restrict thos~
who are subject to them from suing in a court of justice;
and, on the other hand, there are certain privileges attached to individuals in particular capacities, which exernpt them from liability.
Thirdly, as the courts have by a series of decisions,
laid down a system of proceedings which experience ,has
proved to be the best calculated to attain the ends of justice, th~ application for redress must follow the established
forms, that the defendant may a.t once know what and
how to answer. The complaint must likewise be so framed
as that the whole question, and between all the parties,
may be brought before the court; since, otherwise, the
defendant would be harrassed by uselessly contesting ·a
suit in which complete and ample justice could not be
finally administered. And, lastly, we may add under this
head that no man is permitted to sue another while a
former suit fo~ the same cause of action is pending, either
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in the same or any other court of competent authority.

“ Nemo debet his uezcari pro eadem causa.”

10, We now come to the pleadings on the part of the

defendant, or the answer which he gives to the complaint

made against him; and here an obvious distinction pre-

sents itself, corresponding with the division we have made

of the complaint into the statement of the injury and the

application for redress. The defendant either directly

answers the statement of the injury by denying it alto-

gether or, or by confessing and avoiding it; or, secondly,

if there be any objections to the application for redress,

founded upon the reasons speciﬁed in the preceding sec-

tion, he states such a ground why he should not be

further called to account, at least untilthe disability be

removed or informality rectiﬁed. The former are called

pleas in bar, and go to the merits of the cause. The latter

are termed pleas in abatement, their sol.e effect being to

set aside the complaint, and are sometimes distinguished

by the appellation of dilatory pleas, because their opera-

tion, for the most part, is only temporary.

11, As, therefore, pleas in abatement being merely

objections to entering into the “ litis contestatio,” must
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precede the “ litis contestatio,” itself, we shall commence

our observations with them; and, in point of fact, a de-

fendant, after putting in a plea in bar, cannot plead in

abatement, for, by submitting to answer the substance of

the complaint, he waives all preliminary exceptions which

might have been taken to the mode of application. The

several species of pleas in abatement are conformable to

the subdivision we have noticed in the application for

redress.

1. First, therefore, if the suit be instituted in a court

which has not competent authority, the defendant may

in .the same or any other court of competent authority.
"Nemo debet bis vewari pro eadem causa."

10. We now come to the pleadings on the part of the
defendant, or the answer which he gives to the complaint
made against him; and here an obvious distinction presents itself, corresponding with the division we have made
of the complaint into the statement of the injury and the
application for redress. The defendant either directly
answero the statement of the injury by denying it alto~ether or~ or by confessing and avoiding it; or, secondly,
if there be any objections to the application fo1' redress,
founded upon the reasons specified in the preceding section, he states such a ground why he should not be
further called to account, at least until· the disability be
removed or informality rectified. The former are called
pleas in bar, and go to the merits of the cause. The latter
are termed pleas in abatement, their sole effect being to
set aside the complaint, and are sometimes distinguished
by the appellation of dilatory pleas, because their opera·
tion, for the most part, is only temporary.

state that circumstance as a reason why he should not

11. As, therefore, pleas in abatement bting merely
objections to entering into the " litis contestatio," must
precede the " litis contestat-io," itself, we shall commence
our observations with them; and, in point of fact, a defendant" after putting in a plea in bar, cannot plead in
abatement., for, by subrnitting to answer the substance of
the complaint, he waives all preliminary exceptions which
might have been taken to the mode of application. The
several species of pleas in abatement are conformable to
the subdivision we have noticed in the application for
redress.
1. First, therefore, if the suit be instituted in a court
which has not competent authority, the defendant n1ay
state that circumstance as a reason why he should not

PLEADINGS AT common LAW. 11

answer to the cause of complaint; and this kind of dila-

PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW.

11

tory plea is called a plea to the jum‘sdiction.

2. Secondly, the defendant may allege in abatement

of the suit, either, ﬁrst, a legal disability on the part of the

plaintiff, disentitling him from seeking the assistance of a

answer to the cause of complaint; and this kind of dilatory plea is called a plea to the ju1'isdiction.

court ofjustice, or some privilege of the defendant, which

saves him from responsibility. Of these, some are only

temporary, and are the proper subject of abatement ;

others, again, are permanent and take away all right of

action at any time. These latter, therefore, are of an

amphibious character, and may be ple'aded in bar as well

as in abatement; for it is manifest that these latter may

be considered as an answer to the very cause of action, by

annulling the relation between the parties. This second

species of pleas in abatement are termed pleas to the per-

sons; and under this head may be classed such pleas as

state that the plaintiff is a ﬁctitious person or dead.

3. Thirdly, if there be any defect in the mode or

form of proceeding adopted by the plaintiff, arising from

mistake or want of certainty in his statement of the cause

of action, in consequence of which the real merits of the

question cannot conveniently be inquired into, or, when
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inquired into, cannot lead to any satisfactory result, the

defendant may take advantage of it by pleading the same

in abatement of the complaint. The plea of want of

proper parties is a plea of this nature, as also the plea of

the pendenoy of another action for the same cause. Pleas

of this last kind are strictly dilatory pleas, and have this

quality annexed: that where the deﬁciency is in a point

which comes more properly within the knowledge of the

defendant, he must give the plaintiff a better form, 71. e.,

at the same time that he states the error he must show

how it may be corrected, as, for example, when he pleads

a misnomer he must give the real name, for justice must

2. Secondly, the defendant may allege in abatement
of the suit, either, first, a legal disability on the part of the
plaintiff, disentitling him from seeking the assistance of a
court of justice, or some privilege of the defendant, which
saves him fron1 responsibility. Of ~hese, some are only
tetnporary, and are the proper subject of abatement;
others, again, are permanent and take away all right of
action at any time. 1,hese latter, therefore, are of an
amphibious character, and may be ple"aded in bar as well
as in abatement; for it is manifest that these latter may
be considered as an answer to the very cause of action; by
annulling the relation between ~he parties. This second
species of pleas in abatement are termed pleas to the per·
aona; and under this head may be classed such pleas as
state that the plaintiff is a fictitious person or dead.
3. Thirdly, if there be any defect in the mode or
form of proceeding adopted by the plaintiff, arisin~ from
mistake or want of certainty in his statement of the cause
of action, in consequence of which the real merits of the .
question cannot conveniently be inquired into, or, when
inquired into, cannot lead to any satisfactory result, the
defendant may take advantage of it by pleading the same
in abatement of the complaint. The plea of want of
proper parties is a plea of this nature, as also the plea of
the pendency of another action for the same cause. Pleas
of this last kind are strictly dilat01'Y pleas, and have this
quality annexed: that where the deficiency is in a point
which comes more properly within the knowledge of the
defendant, he must give the plaintiff a better form, i. e.,
at the same t.ime that he states the error he must show
how it may be corrected, as, for example, when he pleads
a misnomer he must give the real name, for justice must
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not be eluded by any frivolous evasion. These pleas are

called pleas in abatement, because they go particularly to

quash the form of proceedings. The same objections, if

they appear on the face of the pleading, may also be taken

by special demurrer, which is the denial of the suﬂiciency

of the pleading, in the particular matter specified; for this

is a 1nere point of law, and does not involve any dispute as

to fact.

12. Next, as to pleas in bar, or answer as to the

merits of the complaint, the substance of every complaint

being, as we have already seen, the subtraction of some

duty or right (these being co-relative terms) derived from

an existing relation, the only conclusive answer must be,

either of the four following

Modes of Defence.

1. First, confessing the relation, to deny the right;

and this is the general issue in law, and is called a demur-

rer; an issue being, as was before stated, formed of an

affirmative and negative.. [a]

2. Secondly, confessing that the right demanded
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would follow from the relation assumed, to deny generally

the existence of the relation, which is the general issue in

fact, or to deny some particular allegation, upon which the

whole relation rests.

3. Thirdly, confessing the right and relation, to deny

the subtraction.

La] It may appear startling, from its novelty, to class de-

murrers under the head of pleas in bar ; but taking the deﬁni-

tion of pleas in bar to be such answers as go to the gist of the

action, demurrers are clearly a species, being the pleading which

tends an issue in law as the general issue does in fact;-and the

general is confessedly a plea in bar. In reality, however, it mat-

ters little how the parts are distributed, provided the arrange-

ment be intelligible; and that has been the principal aim of the

present treatise.

not be eluded by any frivolous evasion. These pleas are
called pleas in abatement, because they go particularly to
quash the form ot proceedings. The same objections, if
they appear on the face of the pleading, may also be taken
'by special demurrer, which is the denial of the sufficiency
of the pleading, in the particular matter specified; for this
is a tnere point of law, and does not involve any dispute as
to fact.

12. Next, as to pleas in bar, or answer as to the
merits of the complaint, the substance of every complaint
being, as we have <O.lready seen, the subtraction of some
duty or rigltt (thes~ being co-relative terms) derived from
an existing relation, the only conclusive answer must be,
either of the four following
.Modes of Defence.
1. First, confessing the relation, to deny the r1:gn,t;
and this is the general issue in law, and is called a demurrer; an issue being, as was before stateu, formed of an
affirmative and negative. [a]
2. Secondly, confessing that the right demanded
would follow from the relation assumed, to deny generally
the ewistence of the relation, which is the general issue in
fact, or to deny some particular allegation, upon which the
whole relation rests.
3. Thirdly, confessing the right and relation, to deny
the subtraction.
La] It may appear startling, from its novelty, to class demurrers under the head of pleas in bar; but taking the definition of pleas in bar to be such answers as go to the gist of the
action, demurrers are clearly a species, being the pleading which
tends an issue in law as the general issue does in fact,- .and the
general is confessedly a plea in bar. In reality, however, it utatters little how the parts are distributed, provided the arrangement be intelligible; and that has been the principal uirn of the
present treatise.

PLEADINGS AT conmon LAW. 13

PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW.

4. And fourthly, confessing the subtraction, to give

13

some valid reason to excuse the non-performance of a duty.

The two latter are called special pleas in bar.

13. Again: the reason assigned in excuse may be

twofold, in reference to the two propositions concerning

the relation and the right. First, it may be some new

matter to invalidate the prima facie relation set out in

An(l fourthly, confessing the ~ubtraction, to give
so1ne valid reason to e~cuse the non-performance of a duty.
'fhe two latter are called special pleas in bar.
4.

the complaint; or secondly, it may be some new matter by

means of which, supposing the relation to exist, yet the

right derived from it is gone; and here it is obvious that

the reason alleged must be of new matter; for if the

san1e statement appeared on the face of the complaint,

the defendant might at once deny the right; which, as ob-

served above, would be a demurrer, or general issue in

law. It has been before remarked that relations may be

considered with respect to the parties, the subject matter,

and the incidents.

1. First, then, to invalidate the relation, the new

matter may show, first, that the parties were incapacitated

from contracting the relation,or are incapable to continue

it. Secondly, that the subject matter was insuﬂicient or

illegal, or had undergone some alteration. Thirdly, that
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the right, being incidental, had not accrued.

2. Second, the new matter may show that the right,

though once existing, is barred by the act of the part;/;

by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act of God, or un-

avoidable calamity. ’

The student, upon examination, will ﬁnd that every

possible species of defence is included under the above

13. Again: the reason

assig1~ed

in eaJcuse ma.y he

t\vofold, fn reference to the two propositions concerning
the relation and the right. ·First, it may be som~ new
matter to invalidate the prima facie 'relation set out in
the complaint; or secondly, it tnay be some neu' matter by
menns of which, supposing the relation to exist, yet the
right derived from it is gone; and here it is obvious that
the reason alleged must be of HAW matter; for if the
same state1nent appearea on the face of the complaint,
the defendant might at once deny the right; which, as observed above, would be a demurrer, or general issue in
law. It has been before remarked·that relations may be
considered with respect to the parties, the subject matter,
and the incidents.

heads, and may be referred to some one of the foregoing

classes—a proof of the correctness of the principles from

which they are deduced. . .

14, Upon an attentive investigation of the four modes

1. First, then, to invalidate the relation, the new
matter tnay show, first, that the parties were incapacitated
from contracting the relation, or are incapable to continue
it. Secondly, that the aubject matter was insufficient or
illegal, or had undergone some alteration. Thirdly, that
the ri,qht, being incidental, had not accrued.
2. Second, the new matter may show that the ri,qht,
though once existing, is barred by the act of the party;
by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act of God, or unavoidable calamity.
The student, upon exan1ination, \viii find that every
possible species of defence is included under the above
heads, and may be referred to some one of the foregoing
classes-a proof of the correctness of the principles from
which they are deduced ..
'

14.

'~

..

Upon an attentive investigation of the four modes

1_1 . EQUITY PLEADING.

14

EQUITY PLEADING.

of rebutting the complaint just enumerated, it will be

seen that the fourth is in a great measure resolvable into

the second; for it is manifest that whatever matter is ad-

duced to demonstrate that the relation is invalidated or its

incidents altered, will tend to prove that it is not the same

as stated in the complaint, and therefore may be denied

generally,‘ and this, at ﬁrst view, would appear to be the

shortest course. In effect, many things which might be

pleaded specially in excuse, are allowed to be given in

evidence under the general issue, in avoidance of the

claim. [a] But there are three grand objects achieved by

special pleas: ﬁrst, the law and the fact are kept distinct;

second, the issue is narrowed, by means of which the points

to be proved in evidence are considerably diminished, and

the parties saved expense; and third, the court and oppo-

site party are apprised of the nature of the defence.

Wherever the attainment of these three ends, therefore,

is not materially obstructed, the court has given great lat-

itude in allowing the general issue to he pleaded.

15, From what has been said above, it is clear that

to constitute a suﬂicient answer to any material allegation

in a pleading. the adverse party must either deny the alle-
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gation altogether, or r,-onfess the fact, and avoid the infer-

ence, viz.: by setting up some new matter consistent with

such allegation, but which, if true, is an answer to it. [b]

If, however, he set forth matter inconsistent with the allega-

tion, by way of avoidance, this will not be suﬂicient, with-

out a direct denial of the allegation. And this for two

reasons; ﬁrst, because as the inconsistent matter is in

effect a different statement, both statements may relate to

distinct subjects and so be both true; [c] and, second,

of rebutting the complaint just enumerated, it will be
seen that the fourth is in a great 1neasure resolvable into
the second; for it is manifest that whatever n1atter is adduced to detnonstrate that the relation is invalidated or its
incidents altered, will tend to prove that it is not the same
as stated in the complaint, and therefore may be denied
generally,· and this, at first view, \Vould appear to be the
shortest course. In effect, tnany things which might be
pleaded specially in ·excuse, are allowed to be given in
evidence under the general issue, in avoidance of the
claim. [a] But there are three grand objects achieved by
special pleas: first, the la\V and the fact are kept distinct;
second, the issue is narrowed, by means of which the points
to be proved in evidence are considerably diminished, and
the parties saved expense; and third, the court and opposite party are apprised of the nature of the defence.
Wherever the attainment of these three ends, therefore,
is not materially obstructed, the court has given great latitude in allo\ving the general issue to be pleaded.

[a] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 468.

[b] 1 Saunders, 22, n. 2.

[0] Bennett v. Filkins, 1 Saund., 23.

15. From what has been said above, it is clear that
to constitute a sufficient answer to any material allegation
in a pleading, the adverse party must either deny the allegation altogether, or oonfess the fact, and avo·id the infer·
ence, viz.: by setting up some new matter consistent with
such allegation, but which, if true, is an answer to it. [h]
If, however, he set forth tnatter inconsistent \Vith the allegation, by \Vay of avoidance, this \Vill not be sufficient, without a direct denial of the allegation. And this for two
reasons; first, because as the inconsistent matter is in
effect a different staten1ent, both staternents may relate to
distinct subjects and so be both true; [ c] and, second,
[a] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 468.
[b] 1 Saunders, 22, n. 2.
[c] Bennett v. Filkins, 1 Saund., 23.
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such denial avoids prolixity, by tendering an issue at once,

and gives the party an apportunity to prove his allegations.

16, A denial of this kind, prefaced by matter of

avoidance, is called a traverse, and begins with the techni-

cal words “absque hoc.” The preceding statement is

such denial avoids prolixity, by tendering an issue at once,
and gives the party an apportunity to prove his allegations.

termed the inducement, [a] and such formal traverse is

only necessary when it is requisite to show that the point

traversed is material; [b] otherwise a simple denial, ac-

cording to the second mo ie of defence, will be suflicient.

[c] As the inducement, therefore, shows the materiality

of the traverse if the inducement be bad. the traverse will

be insufficient. The inducement, however, cannot be met

by a denial,.because it is enough for the opposite party to

prove his allegation true (which the traverse enables him

to do), and then the inducement being of inconsistent

matter, if relating to the same subject, must be false;

or relating to a different subject, does not operate as an

avoidance. This is the meaning of the rule laid down in

the books, that “ a traverse cannot be taken after a trav-

verse.” [d]

17, The immediate use and design of pleading is the

formation for an issue, which Lord Coke deﬁnes to be “ a
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single, certain, and material point, issuing out of the alle-

gations or pleas of the plaintiff and defendant, consisting

regularly upon an aﬂirmative and negative.” [e] As soon

as this object is effected, therefore, in such manner as to

answer the whole of the precedent pleading, the matter is

brought to a close; and the party who ﬁrst arrives at that

point is said to tender an issue; and concludes by praying

[a] 1 Saund. 22, n. 2. I Chitty, 592, n. (g) and 699.

[b] Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 20.

[c] 1 Saund., 103, b.

[cl] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 612 Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 17.

16. A denial of this kind, prefaced by matter of
avoidance, is called a traverse, and begins with the technical words ""absque hoc." The preceding statement is
termed the inducement, [a] and such formal traverse is
only necessary when it is requisite to show that the point
-traversed is material; [b] otherwise a sitnple denial, according to the second mo.ie of defence, will be sufficient.
[c] As the inducement, therefore, shows the materiality
of the traverse if the inducement be bad . the traverse will
be insufficient. The inducement, however, cannot be met
by a denial,.because it is enough for the opposite party to
prove his allegation true (which the traverse enables him
to do), and then the inducetnent being of inconsistent
matter, if relating to the same subject, must be false;
or relating to a different subject, does not operate as an
avoidance. This is the meaning of the rule laid down in
the books, that "a traverse cannot be taken after a travverse.'' [ d]

[e] 00. Lit., 126, a (q)

17. The immediate use and design of pleading is the
formation for an issue, which Lord Coke defines to be.;, a
single, certain, and material point, issuing out of the allegations or pleas of the plaintiff and defendant, consisting
regularly upon an affirmative and negative." [e] As soon
as this object is effected, therefore, in such manner as to
answer the whole of the precedent pleading, the matter is
brought to a close; and the party who first arrives at that
point is said to tender an issue; and concludes by praying
[a] 1 Saund. 22, n. 2. I Chitty, 592, n. (g) and 699.
[b] Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 20.
[c] 1 Saund., 103, b.
[d] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 612 Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 17.
[e] Co. Lit., 126, a (q)
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the judgement of the court, if it be a question of law; or

if it be a matter of fact, he concludes to the country, i. e.,

he demands a trial by jury; for if it be a disputed record;

he appeals to the record itself, and the adverse party joins

issue by doing the like. On the other hand,when a plead-

ing introduces new matter by way of avoidance or excuse,

it only concludes with a veriﬁcation, because such new

matter may be contested as to its validity in law or its

truth in fact, or the other side may adduce new reasons

to invalidate it in turn. In this latter case, the pleadings

must advance one step further.

18, Having taken this view, we shall now proceed

to the plaiutilf’s reply to the defendant’s plea, called the

Replication. The replication being an answer to ,the plea,

we shall consider it with reference to the four modes of

defence already enumerated. It is manifest that the ﬁrst

two constitute issues, there being an afﬁrmation on one

side, met by a denial on the other. The replication in

these cases, therefore, only joins issue.

19, The third mode of defence, namely, the denial

of subtraction is' always put aflirmatively, by averring a

performance; because this is is a proposition which ad-
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mits of dispute both in law and in fact, and, therefore, the

opposite side should have an opportunity of answering it.

which is done by assigning a particular breach. This last

mentioned replication bears a strong analogy to that which

is called a “novel assignment,” [a] viz: where the com-

plaint not having been set out with sufficient precision, it

becomes necessary from the evasiveness of the plea, to

re-sign the cause of the action with fresh particulars.

20, It is, however, the excusing non-performance

(being the fourth mode of defence) which opens the widest

[a] 2Chitty on Pleading, 617, 1 Saund., 299, 6. Com. Dig-

Pleader, 3 M. 34.

the judgement of the court, if it be a question of law; or
if it be a matter of fact, he concludes to the country, i. e.,
he demands a trial by jury: for if it be a disputed record;
he appeals to the record itself, and the adverse party joins
issue by doing the like. On the other hand, when a pleading introduces new matter by way of avoidance or excuse,
it only concludes with a verification, because such new
matter may be contested as to its validity in Jaw or its
truth in fact, or the other side may adduce new reasons
to invaliaate it iu turn. In this- latter case, the pleadings
mdst advance one step further.

18. Having taken this view, we shall now proceed
to the plaintiff's reply to the defendant's plea, called the
Replication. 1 he replicfl;tion being an answer to ,the plea,
we shall consider it with reference to the four modes of
defence already enumerated. It is manifest that the first
two constit11te issues, there being an affirmation on one
side, Inet by a denial on the other. rfhe replication in
these cases, therefore, only joins issue.
19. 1 he third mode of defence, narnely, the denial
of subtraction is· always put affirtnatively, by ~verring a
performance; because this is is a proposition which ad ..
mits of dispute both in la\v and in fact, and, therefore, the
·opposite side should have an opportunity of answering it,
which is done by assigning a particular breach. This last
mentioned replication bears a strong analogy to that which
is called a "novel asai.qnment," [a] viz: \vhere the complaint not having been set out with sufficient precision, it
becomes necessary froni the evasiveness of the plea, to
re-~ign the cause of the action with fresh particu Iars.
20. It is, however, the excusing non-performance
(being the fourth mode of defence) which opens the \Videst
1

1

[a] 2 Chitty on Pleading, 617, 1 Sauntl., 299, 6, Con1. Dig.
Pleader, 3M. 34.
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range for replicationi The statement of excuse may, like

17

the statemerit of the right, be reduced to two propositions,

and of a similar nature. The ﬁrst proposition is-

T hat certain incidents superadded to the admitted re-

lation, operate as a legal discharge to the otherwise result-

ing liability.

The second— That such incidents affect the acknowl-

range for replication. The statement of excuse may, like
the state merit of the right, be reduced to two propositions,
and of a similar nature. The first proposition is-

edged relation.

Therefore, That the defendant is discharged from lia-

bility.

The first proposition here is a question of law. and

may be met by demurrer; the second is a question of fact,

That certain incidents superadded to the admitted relation, operate aa a legal discharge to the otherwise resulting liability . .

and may be denied or confessed, and avoided by a new

showing; or traversed, in a manner precisely similar to

that which we have described at large, when treating of

pleas in bar.

The second- That auah incidents affect the acknowl-

edged relation.

To the replication the defendant must again rejoin, by

taking issue or tendering issue, or adding new matter of

avoidance; and so on, until the parties arrive at the true

and simple point of controversy.

Therefore, That the defendant is dischar_ged from lia-

bility.

21, This will sufﬁce to convl'hce'the student that the

rules of pleading are, in reality, founded in common sense,
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and are by no means so abstruse as he might be inclined

to suppose them. At the same time they offer the

greatest possible scope for exercising the intellectual fac-

ulties, and might, with great advantage, be studied for the

mere improvement of the reasoning powers. Indeed,

pleading affords the most beautiful illustration of the

nature and utility of the art of logic—an art which has also

been greatly and undeservedly decried, but from which

2

The first proposition here is a question of law.. and
may be met by demurrer; the second is a question of fact,
and may be denied or confessed, and avoided by a new
showing; or traversed, in a manner precisely similar to
that which we have described at large, when treating of
pleas in bar.
To the replication the defendant must again rejoin, by
taking issue or tendering issue, or adding new matter of
avoidance; and so on, until the parties arrive at the true
and simple point of controversy.

21. This will suffice to convftlce•the student that the
rules of plearling are, in reality, founded in common sense,
and are by no means so abstruse as he rnight be inclined
to suppose them.
At the same time they offer the
greatest poss1ble scope for exercising the intellectual faculties, _and might, with great advantage, be studied for the
mere improvement of the reasoning powers. Indeed,
pleading affords the most beautiful illustration of the
nature and utility of the art of logic-an art which has also
been greatly and undeservedly decried, but from which
2
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the most important advantages may be derived, both in

morals and science. (a)

.

SECTION II.

the most important advantages may be derived, both in
morals and science. (a)

The Analogy of the Rules of Pleading to Pure Dialectics.

22, In order to show the close connection which ex-

ists beween the forms of pleading and the rules of logic,

SECTION

II.

we shall endeavor to put the foregoing pleadings into dia-

lectic form, which will also serve to elucidate the observa-

tions we have already made.

The declaration may be resolved into a syllogism, of

The Analo.qy of the R·ules of Pleading to Pure Dialectics.
22. In order to show the close connection which ex-

which the major premise states the rule of law, and the

minor shows the application of the case to the rule. This

syllogism, however, is usually an enthymeme, of which the

major premise is suppressed. To take a familiar example,

suppose debt on bond, the declaration states:

Min. That the defendant acknowledges himself, by a cer-

ists beween the forms of pleading and the rules of logic,
we shall endeavor to put the foregoing pleadings into dialectic form, which will also serve to elucidate the observations we have already made.

tain writing obligatory, bound to pay a certain

sum to the plaintif.

Therefore, he ought to pay it.

Here the suppressed premise,which for greater conven-

ience we shall make an hypothetic, is :
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Maj. If a man acknowledges himself, by a writing, obli-

gatory bouhd to pay a certain sum, he ought to

pay it.

(a) Lord Coke, in his Commentary on Sect. 381 of Little

ton, says, “By this argument, logically drawn a divisione, it ap-

peareth how necessary it is that our student should (as Littleton

did) come from one of the universities to the study of the com-

mou law, where he may learn the liberal arts, and especially

logic; for that teacheth a man, not only by just argument to

conclude the matter in question, but to discern between truth

and falsehood, etc., whereby it appeareth how necessary it is for

our student.” Co. Litt. 235, b.

The declaration may be resolved into a syllogism, of
which ·the major premise states the rule of law, and the
minor shows the application of the case to the rule. This
syllogis1n, however, is usually an enthymeme, of which the
majo1' premise is suppressed. To take a familiar example,
suppose debt on bond, the declaration states:
Min. That the defendant acknowledges himself, by a cer-

tain writin.q obligatory, bound to pay a certain
sum to the plaintiff.
Therefore, he ought to pay it.
Here the suppressed premise,which for greater convenience we shall make an hypothetic, is :
Maj. If a man acknowledges himself, by a writing, obli-

gatory bou1td to pay a certain sum, he ought to
pay it.
(a) Lord Coke, in his Commentary on Sect. 381 of Littleton, says, "By this argument, logically drawn a divisione, it appeareth how necessary it is that our student should (as Littleton
did) come from one of the universities to the study of the common law, where he may learn the liberal arts, and especially
logic; for that teacheth a man, not only by just argument to
conclude the matter in question, but to discern between truth
and falsehood, etc., w1tereby it appeareth how necessary it is for
our student." Co. Litt. 235, b.

RULES or PLEADING. 19

This is the general rule of law, and is prima facie

true. I

RULES OF PLEADING.

19

23, Now let us examine each proposition separately:

if the minor be false, the defendant at once pleads the

general issue of “ non est factam,” which is equivalent to

“ negatur minor,” and puts the plaintiff on the proof. If

This is the general rule of law, and is prima facie
true.

the minor be true, then the error must lie in the sup-

pressed premiss, or the conclusion is badly drawn. But

the hypothetic major may be a in two ways: ﬁrst, the con-

sequent may not follow from he antecedent at all, or, in

other words, there may be no such general rule of law ; and

to this the defendant may demur, which is equivalent to

“ negatm‘ major; ” but, secondly, as the antecedent of the

hypothetic is indeﬁnite, it may be taken either as uni-

versal or particular, i. e., it may be considered as an uni-

versal rule, or one admitting of exceptions if it be taken

in the argument as universal, then it may be bad; or, in

other words, there may be exception to the general rule of

law. And, on the other hand, if in such case it be taken as

particular, then the conclusion is improperly drawn, for it

is “ argumentum a particulars‘ ad um‘versaZe,” because,

the conclusion being in the singular, the subalternans,
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from which it is deduced, must be universal. In other

words, the defendant may show that the case falls within

the exceptions, and not within the rule ; and this he

must do by special plea, which is equivalent to a “non

sequitur,” and must be proved by a collateral argument,

for it is not enough to show that there are exceptions to

the general rule, but the defendant must prove his case to

be one of the exceptions. And, in general, where the con-

clusion is contingent it will be taken to be good until the

contrary is proved. Another reason why the defendantis,

in this latter instance, bound to prove his case, is because

no man shall be obliged to prove a negative, which the

. 23. Now let us examine each proposition separately:
if the minor be false, the defendant at once pleads the
general issue of "non est faotam," which is equivalent to
"negatur minor," and puts the plaintiff on the proof. If
the minor be true, then the error must lie in the suppressed premiss, or the conclusion is b.adly drawn. B.ut
the hypothetic major may be q~<}Jn two ways: first, the con.sequent may not follow fro~he antecedent at all, or, in
other words, there.may be no such general rule of law; and
to this the defendant may demur, which is equivalent to
'' negatur major,·~' but, secondly, as the. antecedent of the
hypothetic is indefinite, it may be taken either as universal or particular, i. e., it may be considered as an universal rule, or one admitting of exceptions if it be taken
in the argument as universal, then it may be bad; or, in
other words, there may be exception to the general rule of
law. And, on the other hand, if in such case it be taken as
particular, then the conclusion is improperly drawn, for it
is " arg~umentum a partioulari ad universale," because,
the conclusion being in the singular, the subalternans,
from which it is deduced, must be universal. In other
words, the defendant may show that the case falls within
the exceptions, and not within the rule ; and this he
must do by special plea, which is equivalent to a ''non
8equitur," and must be proved by a collateral argument,
for it is not enough to show that there are exceptions to
the a;ceneral rule, but the defendant must prove his case to
be one of the exceptions. And, in general, whe.re the conclusion is contingent it will be taken to be good un~il the
contrary is proved. Another reason why the defendant is,
in this latter instance, bound to prove his case, is because
no man shall be obliged to prove a negative, which the
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plaintiff would be compelled to do if it lay upon him to

show that the case did not fall within the exceptions.

Let us‘ suppose, then, in the example given, that the

defendant pleads satisfaction “ solvit ad diem.” We shall

now examine his collateral syllogism.

Here the suppressed premiss is :

Maj. If the condition of the bond has beeen performed,

then the defendant is not liable.

Min. The condition has been performed, for the money

was paid at the day.

Therefore, the defendant is not liable for the penalty.

24, The student will observe that the minor of this

plaintiff would be compelled to do if it lay upon him to
show that the case did not fall within the exceptions.
Let us· suppose, then., in the example given, that the
defendant pleads satisfaction " solvit ad diem." We shall
now examine his collateral syllogism.
Here the suppressed premiss is :
Maj. If the condition of the bond has beeen performed,

syllogism is not a simple proposition, but that the whole

argument is in fact a “ sorites,” though expressed for the

sake of brevity in the above form. Here “negatur major”

is a demurrer to the exception, or that there is no such

exception to the general rule of law laid down by the

plaintiff. But the minor is resolved into two parts,

namely, whether the money has been paid in the manner

stated, or at all; and, secondly, whether such payment is

a performance of the condition. The ﬁrst is put in issue

by a negatur minor, and the defendant must prove it at
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the trial; the second point results from the major of the

second syllogism, into which the sorites is resolved, and is

a demurrer in law by a “ negatur major secunda.”

25, We might pursue this investigation much higher,

but we have purposely selected the simplest example for

illustration; and this, it is apprehended, is suﬁicient to let

the student see that the principles of special pleading and

those of pure dialectics are perfectly similar, [0] It is

[a] “ The structure of a record raised on these foundations is

not less solid than the demonstration of a proposition in Euclid ;

and pleading formed on these maxims, is not only matter of

science, but perhaps aﬂords some ol‘,the best specimens of strict

genuine logic.” Vide Wynne’s Eunomus, Dial. 2d.

then the defendant ·is not liable.
Min. Th,e condition has been performed, for the money
was Pfid at the d~y.
Therefore, the defendant is not liable for the penalty.

24. The student will observe that the minor of this
syllogism is not a simple proposition, but that the whole
argument is in fact a "sorites,'' though expressed for the
sake of brevity in the above form. Here ''negatur major"
is a demurrer to the exception, or that there is no such
exception to the general rule of law laid down by the
plaintiff. But the minor is resolved into two parts,
namely, whether the money has been paid in the manner
stated, or at all ; and, secondly, whether such payment is
a performance of the condition. The first. is put in issue
by a negatur minor, and the defendant must prove it at
the trial; the second point results from the major of the
second syllogism, into which the aorites is resolved, and is
a demurrer in law by a " negatur major secunda."

25. We might pursue this investigation much higher,
but we have purposely selected the simplest example for
illustration; and this, it is apprehended, is sufficient to let
the student see that the principles of special pleading and
those of pure dialectics are perfectly similar, [a] It is
[a] "The structure of a record raised on these foundations is
not less solid than the dem9nstration of a proposition in .Euclid ;
and pleading formed on these maxims, is not only matter of
science, but perhaps aftords some ot . the best specimens of strict
genuine logic." Vide Wynne's Eunomus, Dial. 2d.
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obvious that the illustrations we have adduced refer only

PLEADING IN EQUITY, ETC.
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to special pleas in bar. The same logical method is, how-

ever, equally applicable to all other pleas. In effect, the

declaration does not conﬁne itself to the naked proof of

right, but proceeds to show,by a statement of demand and

refusal, that the right is withheld, and therefore the plain-

tiﬁ‘ calls upon the court for its assistance, or, in other

words, the sanction of the law. By this concluding part

of the declaration, the competency of the jurisdiction, the

non-disability of the plaintiﬁ‘, and the correctness of the

form of proceeding, are all inferred; and if the defendant

can show a deﬁciency in any of these particulars he may

plead the same in abatement. And these propositions,

like the former, may be all put in the syllogistic form, and

their correctness tried by the same test.

SECTION III.

Of Pleading in Eguiil/, and its Analogy to Common Law.

26, We shall now proceed to show the application of

the principles we have laid down, to cases in equity, and

although from the difference in the forn1s of proceeding in

chancery it may not appear at ﬁrst sight, yet upon a closer

inspection we shall ﬁnd that there is a strict analogy be-
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tween the pleadings in equity and those at common law.

27, The original writ, sued out at common law, re-

quires the defendant to repair the injury complained of,

or to appear in court and show cause to the contrary.

obvious that the illustrations we have adduced refer only
to special pleas in bar. The same logical method is, however, equally applicable to all other pleas. In effect, the
declaration does not confine itself to the naked proof of
right, but proceeds to show, by a statement of demand and
refusal, that the rigb~ is withheld, and therefore the plaintiff calls upon the court for its assistance, or, in other
words, the sanction of the law. By this concluding part
of the declaration, the competency of the jurisdiction, the
non-disability o.f the plaintiff, and the correctness of the
form of proceeding, are all inferred; and if the defendant
can show a deficiency in any of these particulars he may
plead the same in abatement. And these propositions,
like the former, may be all put in the syllogistic form, and
their correctne.3s tried by the same test.

The declaration afterwards is but an exposition or ampli-

ﬁcation of the writ. If the defendant contests the suit, he

comes in and pleads, in the manner we have described in

the former part of this chapter. Proceedings in equity are

commenced by a petition to the court, to issue the king’s

writ of subpoena, to compel the defendant to appear and

Ill.
Of Pleading in Equity, and its Analogy ·to Oo1nmon Law.
26. We shall now proceed to show the application of
the principles we have laid down, to cases in equity, and
although from the difference in the forn1s of proceeding in
chancery it may not appear at first sight, yet upon a closer
inspection we shall find that there is a strict analogy between the pleadings in equity and those at common law.
27. ':rhe original writ, sued out at common law, requires the defendant to repair the injury complained of,
or to appear in court and show cause to the· contrary.
The declaration after\vards is but an exposition or amplification of the writ. If the defendant contests the suit, he
comes in and pleads, in the manner we have described in
the former part of this chapter. Proceedings in equity are
commenced by· a petition to the court, to issue the king's
wnt of suhpmna, to compel the defendant to appear and
SECTION
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“ answer concerning those things which shall be objected to

by him; and further, to do and receive what the said court

shall have considered in that behalf :” which is the lan-

guage of the writ. The petition must, therefore, state the

cause of complaint, as a ground for issuing the subpama.

Originally when the defendant appeared on the wbpwna,

articles in writing were exhibited to him, containing such

charges as he was required to answer upon oath; but it

was found more convenient to insert such charges in the

body of the petition itself, which was thence denominated a

bill in chancery. Hence the primary object of a bill is to

obtain a discovery upon oath from the defendant, and

then to have such relief grounded upon the defendant’s ,

admissions, or the complainant’s proofs, as the court shall

think proper. The bill. therefore, being framed with a

view to extract a discovery in the ﬁrst instance, is gener-

ally of considerable amplitude, stating a variety of cir-

cumstances by way of inducement, and usually anticipat-

ing and controverting the defence of the adverse party;

In this respect it differs from the declaration at common

law, Which is a pure pleading, conﬁned to the single and

simple point of charge or statement of injury; and from
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this difference, it will be seen, some of the apparent an-

omalies in pleading in equity arise.

28, As the bill in setting out a cause- of complaint

must state an injury sustained, or likely to be sustained, it

will contain the two propositions to prove the right for-

merly noticed, and will, in substance, admit of the same

modes of defence as at common law; whatever dissimilar-

ity exists, is qaused by the difference of form. The prayer

of the bill is, in the ﬁrst instance, that the defendant shall

be compelled to answer upon oath the several allegations

contained in the bill; and thus it performs the oﬁice of an

examination as well as of complaint. Hence arises a species

"answer concerning those things which shall be objected to
by him; and further, to do and receive what the said cour~
shall have considered in that behalf:" which is the language of the writ. The petition must, therefore, state the
cause of complaint, as a ground for issuing the subpmna.
Originally wlien the defendant appeared on the subpmna,
articles in writing were exhibited to him, containing such
charges as he was required to answer upon oath; but it
was found more convenient to insert such charges in the
body of the petition itself, which was thence denominated a
bill in chancery. Hence the primary object of a bill is to
obtain a discovery upon oath from the defendant, and
then to have such relief grounded upon the defendant's
admissions, or the complainant's proofs, as the court shall
think proper. The bill.. therefore, being framed with a
view to extract a discovery in the first instance, is generally of considerable amplitude, stating a variety of circumstances by way of inducement, and us~ally anticipating and controverting the defence of the adverse party~
In this respect it differs from the declaration at common
law, which is a pure pleading, confined to the single and
simple point of charge or statement of injury; and from
this difference, it will be seen, some of the apparent anomalies in pleading in equity arise.

28. As the bill in setting out a cause· of complaint
1nust state an injury sustained, or likely to be sustained, it
will contain the two propositions to prove the right for·
merly noticed, and will, in substance, admit ·of the same
modes of defence as at common law; whatever dissimilarity exists, is caused by the difference of form. The prayer
of the bill is, in the first instance, that the defendant shall
be compelled to answer upon oath the several allegations
contained in the bill; and thus it performs the office of an
examination as well as of complaint. Hence arises a species

PLEADING IN EQUITY, ETC. 23

PLEAD!NG IN EQUITY, ETC.

of pleading in equity different from anything we have hith-

23

erto seen, namely,the answer to the bill; which in analogy to

the bill, has the double character of a pleading and a proof,

being a plea so far as it denies the allegations of the bill,

perfectly analogous to the general issue at law; and a proof,

so far as it contains admissions of any part of the complain-

ant’s case. Here, too, many facts which might have been

available as a plea are allowed to be stated by way of an-

swer, similar to the rule which permits such facts to be

given in evidence under the general issue at common law.

And the reason seems to be, that as the chief end of a plea

in equity is to decide a preliminary .valid objection, with-

out putting the parties to the expense and trouble of arriv-

ing at the same point, by the circuitous mode of following

up the suit, wherever that object will not be eﬁected by a

plea, the party is at liberty to resort to which ever mode of

defence he thinks most suitable, for as the reason of the

rule ceases, “cessat et ipsa' Zex.” The invariable rule of

the law, that every defence which cannot be specially

pleaded, may be given in evidence under the general issue ;

and a similar rule holds in equity; for wherever the party

has a defence, which is not the proper subject of a plea,

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

such defence may be stated in the answer. [a] Thus we

ﬁnd the answer either, lst, traverses and denies the alle-

gations of the bill; or, 2nd, it admits them to be true; or,

3d, it confesses and avoids such points as need not be spe-

cially pleaded to, and these are in fact, the several parts of

an answer, as laid down in the books of practice.

29, Now, as a decree of the court of equity is pro-

nounced on a view, both of the fact and the law of the case,

the answer, such as we have described it, might be deemed

in all cases a sufﬁcient defence, since it includes the three

[a] Mitf. 249. 1 Atk. 54. 2 P. Wms. 145.

Eo. PL.-14.

of pleading in equity different from anything we have hitherto seen, namely,the answer to the bill; ·which in analogy to
the bill, has the double character of a pleading and a proof,
being a plea so far as it denies the allegations of the bill,
perfectly analogous to the general iaaue at ]aw; and a proof,
so far as it contains admissions of any part of the complainant's case. Here, too, many facts which might have been
available as a plea are allowed to be stated by way of answer, similar to the rule which permits such facts to be
given in evidence under the general issue at common law.
And the reason seems to be, that as the chief end of a plea
in equity is to decide a preliminary .valid ol?jection, without putting the p_arties to the expense and trouble of arriving at the same point, by the circuitous mode of following
up the suit, wherever that object will not be effected by a
plea, the party is at liberty to resort to which ever mode of
defence he thinks most suitable, for as the reason of the
rule ceases, "ceaaat et ipaa· ler».'' The invariable rule of
the law, that every defence which cannot be specially
pleaded, may be given in evidence under the general issue;
and a similar rule holds in equity; for wherever the party
has a defence, which is not the proper subject of a plea,
such defence may be stated in the answer. [a] Thus we
find the answer either, 1st, traverses and denies the allegations of the bill; or, 2nd, it admits them to be true; or,
3d, it confesses and avoids such points as need not be specially pleaded to, and these are in fact, the several parts of
an answer, as laid down in the books of practice.

29. Now, as a decree of the court of equity is pronounced on a view, both of the fact and the lavy of the case,
the answer, such as we have described it, might be deemed
in all cases a sufficient defence, since it includes the three
[a]

Mitf. 249. 1 Atk. 54.
EQ. PL.-14.

2 P. Wms. 145.
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last modes ; and the question of law is determined at the

hearing. But we must recollect that one of the principal

objects of special pleading is to save the parties the ex-

pense and trouble of proving, by evidence, facts which

might eventually turn out to be immaterial, or inadequate

to sustain the right demanded.

30, From the nature of equity, it is obvious that the

right demanded cannot be any deﬁnite essential quality,

ﬂowing from the relation, but only growing out of it inci-

dentally; and which, therefore, must be determined “secun-

dum oequum et bonum.” This is the proper business of the

last modes,· and the question of law is determined at the
hearing. But we must recollect that one of the princiJ]al
objects of special pleading is to save the parties the expense and trouble of proving, by evidence, facts which
might eventually turn out to b.e immaterial, or inadequate
to sustain the right demanded.

court at the hearing; and when the rights of all the parties

are ascertained, thereupon is grounded such measure of re-

lief as the reason and justice of the case may require. The

party complainant, therefore, after stating the hardship

under which he labors, from the nature of the relation ex-

isting between him and the defendant, prays the court to

grant him such speciﬁc relief as he conceives himself en-

titled to demand. The relief prayed includes, of course,

the restoration of the equitable right, supposed to be with-

held; and ancillary to relief, is discovery from the defend-

ant; or the discovery may be the principal point, and the
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only right demanded. Hence the propositions of a bill

may be universally laid down to be—1st: That from the

relation stated accrues the right to discover.//, and such re-

lief as is prayed for. 2d: That the relation stated is that

which actually exists.

31, It is evident that this ﬁrst proposition assumes

the sufﬁciency of the form of the application, as well as the

existence of the right; from which it has been doubted

whether equity has any pleas in abatement, as contradis-

30. From the nature of equity, it is obvious that the
right demanded cannot be any definite essential quality,
flowing from the relation, but only growing out of it incidentally; and which, therefore, must be detern1ined ,.; secundum mquum et bonum." This is the proper business of the
court at the hearing; and when the rights of all the parties
are ascertained, thereupon is grounded such measure of relief as the reason and justice of the case may require. The
party complainant, therefore, after stating the hardship
under which he labors, from the nature of the relation existing between him and the defendant, prays the court to
grant him such specific relief as he conceives himself entitled to demand. The relief prayed includes, of course,
the restoration of the equitable right, supposed to be withheld; and ancillary to relief, is discovery frotn the defendant; or the discovery may be the principal point, and the
only right demanded. Hence the propositions of a bill
may be universally laid down to be-1st: That from the
relation stated accrues the Tl~.qht to discover.'/, and such relief as is prayed for. 21: That the relation stated is that
which actually exists.

31. It is evident that this first proposition assumes
the sufficiency of the form ~f t.he application, as well as the
existence of the right; fron1 which it has been doubted
whether equity has any pleas in abatement, as contradis-
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tinguished from pleas in bar; but this is a mere question

25

of words, and not worth the inquiry. [a]

These two propositions admit of any defence which

either, 1st, denies the right either to discovery or ‘relief, or

both; or, 2d, denies the relation ; or, 3d, invalidates the re-

lation, or bars the right. Most of these may be done by

'way of answer; but as it may be a principal object with

the defendant not to answer at all, and as it will preclude

unnecessary litigation to state a valid bar in limine, the

ﬁrst mode of defence must,in general, be taken advantage

of by demurrer; the third, by plea. To these there is only

a formal replication,for the purpose of tendering andjoin-

ing issue; the necessity for special replications being obvi-

ated by the permission which the parties have to add to,

and amend their pleadings. '

32, From the principles above stated, it is sufficiently

clear that the two modes of defence just mentioned are

similar to the analogous ones at common law, and are here

perfectly applicable; for in general terms, a demurrer is

conﬁned to the single point of law, but aplea opens the

two questions of law and of fact, to either of which the op-

posite party may except. The demurrer, in the ﬁrst mode
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of defence in equity, is taken on the complainant’s own

statement, by his bill; and consequently the facts cannot

be disputed. In the third mode, the defendant puts for-

tinguished from pleas in bar,· but this is a mere question
of words, and not ·North the inquiry. [a]
These two propositions admit of any defence which
either, 1st, denies the right either to discovery or ·relief, or
both; or, 2d, denies the relation; or, 3d, invalidates therelation, or bars the right. Most of these may be done by
·way of answer; but as it may be a principal object with
the defendant not to answer at all, and as it will preclude
unnecessary litigation to st.ate a valid bar in limine, the
first mode of defence must, in general, be taken ad vantage
of by demurrer; the third, by plea. 11o these there is only
a formal replication, for the purpose of tendering and joining issue; the necessity for special replications being obviated by the permis..~ion which the parties have to add to,
and amend their pleadings.

ward a new statement of his own, and this must be by plea,

that the complainant may have an opportunity to reply,

and so put him to‘ the proof of the new facts.

33, Hence is the grand distinction which is drawn be-

tween demurrers and pleas in the books, that the one is an

La] Merewether v. Melish, 13 Ves. 437. And wide Beames’

Pleas, 57, 58, 59. The difference between pleas in abatement and

those in bar in equity, rests on precisely the same grounds as at

common law.

32. From the principles above stated, it is sufficiently
clear that the two modes of defence just mentioned are
similar to the analogous ones at common law, and are here
perfectly applicable; for in general terms, a demurrer is
confined to the single point of law, but a plea opens the
two questions of law and of fact, to either of which the opposite party may except. The demurrer, in the first mode
of defence in equity, is tak~n on the complainant's own
statement, by his bill; and consequently the facts cannot
be disputed. In the third mode, the defendant puts forwa.rd a new statement of his own, and this must be by plea,
that the complainant may have an opportunity. to reply,
and so put him to· the proof of the new facts.

33. Hence is the grand distinction .which is drawn between demurrers and pleas in the books, that th.e oBe is an
La] Merewether v. Melish, 13 Ves. 437. And vide Beames'
Pleas, 57, 58, 59. The difference between pleas in abatentent and
those in bar in equity, rests on precisely the same grounds as at

common law.
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objection, apparent from matter contained in the bill ; the

other, from matter “ dehors ” the bill. [a] But this latter

is rather an accident than the essential difference, as the

matter of a plea need not necessarily be dehors the bill.

Accordingly we ﬁnd that that species of plea, called a “neg -

ative plea,” [b] does not advance any new fact which the

bill had omitted, but is simply conﬁned to the denial of a

point stated in the bill, on which the whole right of action

depends. Nor is this peculiar to equity ; the plea of “ ne

unques executor” [c] “ ne unques accouple,” and such like,

which are pleas in bar at common law, coming under the

second mode of defence; and many of the pleas in abate-

ment are strictly of the same nature as the negative plea

in equity, and do not advance foreign matter. In like

manner that species of plea which sets up a defence an-

ticipated by the bill, and therein sought to be controverted,

does not bring forward matter dehors the bill; and yet the

objection cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer, but

is, with strict propriety, the subject of a plea, because it

involves a question of fact as well as of law. Such is the

plea of release to a bill, which seeks to set such release

aside on the ground of fraud, or want of consideration;
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or the plea to a bill to set aside a decree on the ground of

fraud, and the like. Here the whole question turns on the

validity of the bar sought to be impeached; and therefore

the plea must go on to deny, by averment, the ground of

impeachment; which is, in such case, the real point at

[a] Beames on Pleas, 2 Mitf. Passim.

[b] Mitf. 187, 188.

[c] The plea of “ne unques executor,” is classed by Lord

Redesdale, among pleas in abatement; and is treated as such by

Mr. Beames, when speaking of negative pleas. But it is mani-

festly a plea in bar, of the second mode; namely, the denial of a

particular fact on which the relation rests. See also 1 Saund.

274, a. (n. 3.)

objection, apparent from matter contained in the bill ; the
other, from matter" dehors" the bill. [a] But this latter
is rather an accident t.han the essential difl'erence, as the
matter of a plea need not necessarily be de/tors the bill.
Accordingly we find that that species of plea, called a ''negative plea," [b] does not advance any new fact which the
bill had omitted, but is simply confined to the denial of a
point stated in the bill, on which the whole right of action
depends. Nor is this peculiar to equity; the plea of" ne
unques ewecutor ,, [o] '' ne unques aooouple," and such like,
which are ·pleas in bar at comtnon law, coming under the
second mode of defence; and many of the pleas in abatement are strictly of the same nature as the negative plea
in equity, and do not advance foreign matter. In like
manner that species of plea which sets up a defence anticipated by the bill, and therein sought to be controverted,
does not bring forward matter dehors the bill; and yet the
objection cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer, but
is, with strict prolJriety, the subject of a plea, because it
involves a question of fact as well as of law. Such is the
plea of release to a bill, which seeks to set such release
aside on the ground of fraud, or want of consideration;
or the plea to a bill to set aside a decree on the ground of
fraud, and the lilre. Here the whole question turns on the
validity of the bar sought to be impeached; and therefore
the plea must go on to deny, by averment, the ground of
impeachment; which is, in such case, the real point at
[a] Beames on Pleas, 2 Mitf. Passim.
[b] Mitf. 187, 188.

[c] The plea of "ne unques executor," is classed by Lord
Redesdale, among pleas in abatement; and is treated as such by
Mr. Beames, when speaking of negative pleas. But it is manifestly a plea in bar, of the second mode; namely, the denial of a
particular fact on which the relation rests. See also 1 Saund.
274, a. (n. 3.)
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issue. But this point is a point of fact, and consequently
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cannot be controverted by demurrer, which is an issue in

l-aw only.

34, But it is necessary that the fraud, or other mat-

ter, be denied by answer likewise. To seek for the reason

of this peculiarity from the analogy of law, we must go

issue. But this point -is a point of fact, and consequently
cannot be controverted by demurrer, which is an issue in
· law only.

somewhat deeper into the inquiry. In the ﬁrst place, we

must recollect that an issue is produced by a direct aver-

ment on the one side and a traverse on the other, and that

party which ﬁrst traverses or denies a speciﬁc averment,

is said to tender an issue on that point. Now, at law no

issue is tendered by the special plea, but as it always relies

upon new facts, it concludes with a veriﬁcation. And

even in the case of a special negative plea there is no issue

tendered by such plea, because it is not the denial of a

distinct averment in the declaration, but only of apoint

assumed, and which must be formally averred before the

traverse can tender an issue; and the negative plea, as it

alleges no new fact, does not even require the usual veri-

ﬁcation. [a] In equity, since the disuse of special replica-

tions and rejoinders, there are but two of the pleadings

which tender an issue—the answer, on the part of the de-
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fendant, and the replication, on ‘that of the complainant.

When the defendant desires to take issue in law he ﬁles a

demurrer, and the complainant sets it down to be argued,

which is a joinder in demurrer; on the other hand, he

tenders an issue on the facts by his answer, so far as it

traverses or denies them; and the complainant ‘joins issue

by the ﬁrst part of his general replication, which states

that “he will aver and prove his said bill to be true, cer-

tain, and suﬁicient in law to be answered unto ;” and in

the latter part, which maintains that “ the said answer of

the said defendant is uncertain, untrue, and insuﬂicient to

[a] Co. Litt. 303, a.

34. But it is necessary that the fraud, or other matter, be denied by an.swer likewise. To seek for the reason
of this peculiarity from ·the analogy of law, we must go
somewhat deeper into the inquiry. In the first place, we
must recollect that an issue is produced by a direct averment on the one side and a traverse on the other, and that
party which first traverses or denies a specific averment,
is said to tender an issue on that point. Now, at law no
issue is tendered by the special plea, but as it always relies
upon new facts, it concludes with a verification. And
even in the case of a special negative plea there is no issue
tendered by such plea, because it is not the denial of a
distinct averment in the declaration, but only of a. point
assumed, and which must be formally averred before the
traverse can tender an issue; and the negative plea, as it
alleges no new fact, does not even require the usual verification. [a] In equity, since th~ disuse of special replications and rejoinders, there are but two of the pleadings
which tender an issue-the answer, on the part of the defendant, and the replication, on ·that of the complainant.
When the defendant desires to take iaaue in law he files a
demurrer, and the complainant sets it down to be argued,
which is a joinder in demurrer; on the other hand, he
tenders an issue on the facts by his answer, so far as it
trav.erses or denies them; and the complainant 'joins issue
by the first part of his general replication, which states
that "he will aver and prove his said bill to be true, certain, and sufficient in law to be answered unto;" and in
the latter part, which maintains that " the said answer of
the said defendant is uncertain, untrue, and insufficient to
[a] Co. Li tt. 303, a.
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be replied unto by this repliant,” he tenders an issue on

his part to such portions of the answer as confess and

avoid the bill, or to the new facts of the plea; and to this

the defendant pro forma rejoins. As, therefore, in conform-

ity to the rule of law, the plea in equity does not tender

an issue, [a] in the case of negative averments being con-

tained in the plea, the same points must also be denied by

way of answer, for othewise no issue could be joined on

such negative averments. The complainant could not

tender an issue upon them by his replication, for that

would be but the negation of a negation, which, in fact,

only amounts to an aﬁirmative; and we have seen that an

issue “ consists upon an afﬁrmative and an negative,”

therefore the defendant must produce the issue in the only

way whichremains to him—that is, by answer. This dif-

ﬁculty.is obviated at common law by a special replication,

which may tender an issue aﬂirmatively to the negative

averment.

35, And here we must mark the distinction between

a negative plea, which is frequently supported by aﬁirm-

ative averments, and negative averments, which are used

in support of an aﬂirmative plea. And this distinction
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will furnish us with another reason for the general rule

laid down, viz: “that if there is any charge in the bill

which is an equitable circumstance in favor of the plain-

tifl"s case against the matter pleaded, as fraud, or notice

of title, that charge must be denied by way of answer as

well as by averment in the plea.” [b] It will be seen at

once that such denials are negative averments in support

be replied unto by this repliant," he tender:s an issue on
his part to such portions of the answer as confess an~
avoid the bill, or to the new facts of the plea; and to this
the defendant pro forma rejoins. As, therefore, in conformity to the rule of law, the plea in equity does not tender
an issue, [a] in the case of negative averments being contained in the plea, the same points tnust also be denied by
way of answer, for othewise no issue could be joined on
such negative averments. T~e complainant could not
tender an issue upon them by his replication, for that
would be but the negation of a negation, which, in fact,
only amounts to an affirmative; and we .have seen that an
issue "consists upon an affirmative and an negative,"
therefore the defendant must produce the issue in the only
way which .remains to him-that is, by answer. 1,his difficulty .is obviated at common law by a special replication,
which may tender an issue affirmatively to the negative
averment.

of an affirmative plea. Now we have before noticed that

when the complainant intends to dispute the facts of the

plea he replies, and thereby puts the defendant to the

[a] 2 Bro. C. C. 144.

[b] Mitf. 241. Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 728.

35. And here we must mark the distinction between
a negative plea, which is frequently supported by affirmative averments, and negative averments, which are used
in support of an affirmat~ve plea. And this distinction
will furnish us with another reason for the general rule
laid down, viz : " that if there is any charge in the bill
which is an equitable circumstance in favor of the plaintiff's case against the matter pleaded, as fraud, or notice
of title, that charge must be denied by way of answer as
well as by averment in the plea." [b] It will be seen at
once that such denials are negative av~rments in support
of an affirmative plea. Now we have before noticed that
when the complainant intends to dispute the facts of the
plea he replies, and thereby puts the defendant to the
[a] 2 Bro. C. C. -144.
[ b] Mitf. 241. Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 728.
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proof of his allegations, so that in this instance the de-
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féndant would be forced to prove a negative, which is con-

trary to reason and the rule of law. This absurdity is ob-

viated by the defendant’s denying the fraud or notice in

his answer, which at once tenders the issue and puts the

complainant on the proof. But besides the denial by way

of answer, there must likewise be positive averments in

the plea; and this for two reasons: ﬁrst, because as the

plea admits the facts of the bill,without such averment, it

would acknowledge the fraud or other ground of impeach-

ment to the bar; and, secondly, by such acknowledgment

the plea would be imperfect, as a fraudulent release, for

instance, would be no release, and therefore not a good bar.

36, The mode of pleading has been objected to on

the ground of duplicity—a mistake which has arisen from

want of sufﬁcient attention to the distinction between

averments in support of a plea and the pleading a double

bar, which alone constitutes duplicity. [a]

Thus, it is humbly conceived, we have shown that this

kind of plea differs not in principle from other pleas—a

disquisition into which we have been led both because it

serves to elucidate the nature of pleas in general and to

proof of his allegations, so that in this instance the def~ndant would be forced to prove a negative, which is con·
trary to reason and the rule of law. This absurdity is obviated by the defendant's denying the fraud or notice in
his ans,ver, which at once tender~ the issue and puts the
complainant on the proof. But besides the denial by way
of answer, there must likewise be positive averments in
the plea; and this for two reasons: first, because as the
plea admits the facts of the bill. without such averment, it
would acknowledge the fraud or other ground of impeachment to the bar; and, secondly, by such acknowledgment
the plea would be imperfect, as a fraudulent release, for
instance, would be no release, and therefore not a good bar. ·
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point out the correctness of Lord Eldon‘s observation,

“ that the best rule is analogy to law ;” [b] but, princi-

pally, because Mr. Beames in his learned Treatise on Pleas

styles this an “incongruous plea,” and thinks that it is

not properly a plea, but something in the nature of one.

His opinion upon this subject seems to have been formed

from supposing that the essential difference between a

demurrer and a plea is that the latter always relies on

36. The mode of pleading has been objected to on
the ground of duplicity-a mistake which has arisen from
want of sufficient attention to t.he distinction between
averments in surport of a plea and tbe pleading a double
bar, which alone constitutes duplicity. [a]

matter “ delzo-rs ” the bill; whereas, the true distinction is

that the demurrer is an an issue in law, on the complain-

[a] 1 Burrows, 320.

[b] 9 Ves. 54.

Thus, 1t is humbly conceived, we have shown that this
kind of plea differs not in principle from other pleas-a
disquisition into which we have been led both because it
serves to elucidate the nature of pleas in general and to
point out the correctness of Lord Eldon,s observation,
''that the best rule is analogy to la.w ;" [b] but, principally, because Mr. Beames in his learned Treatise on Pleas
styles this an "incongruo·us plea," and thinks that it is
not properly a plea, but something in the nature of one.
His opinion upon this subject seems to have been formed.
from suppo~ing that the essential difference between a
demurrer and a plea is that the latter always relies on
matter "dehors" the bill; whereas, the true distinction is
that the demurrer is an an issue in law, on the complain[ a] 1 Burrows, 320.
[b] 9 Ves. 54.
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ant’s own showing; the plea is an objection raised by a

new showing of the defendant. But the defendant’s new

showing may be of old matter stated in the bill (out of

which matter a contradictory case may be made by trav-

erse), although most usually it is altogether of new matter.

And the reason for such new showing, whether old or new

matter, being the proper subject of a plea, is that it lets in

the fact as well as the law.

37, With the view that ishere taken of this subject,

the old deﬁnition of a plea in equity, laid down in the

Cursus Cancelariae, [a] and adopted by Lord Redesdale,

strictly accords, and tends to fortify and prove the correct-

ness of the foregoing reason. A plea is there deﬁned to

be, “ a special answer to a bill, or some part thereof, show-

a1"t's own showing; the plea is an objection raised by_ a
new showing of the defendant. But the defendant's new
showing may be of old matter stated in the bill (out of
which ma.tter a contradictory case niay be made by traverse), although most usual~y it is altogether of new matter.
And the reason for such new showing, \Vhether old or new
tnatter, being the proper subject of a plea, is that it lets in
the fact as well as the law.

ing and relying upon one or more things as a cause why

the suit should be either dismissed, delayed or barred.” [b]

37. With the view that is.here tal{en of this subject,

And, ﬁrst, it is an answer because it avers and maintains

one or more facts wherein itdiffers from a demurrer, which

rests upon law only; and in some instances it denies

allegations in the bill by negative averments.

But, secondly, it is a special answer, “ differing in this.

from an answer in the common form, as it demands the
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judgment of the court in the ﬁrst instance, whether the

matter urged by it does not debar the complainant from

his title to that answer which the bill requires.” [c]

Thirdly: “It relies upon one or more things (not new

things), as a cause why the suit should be either dismissed,

delayed or barred.” The ﬁrst part of this member of the

deﬁnition points out the integral division of a plea into

the matter of it and the averments: “ on one or more

things” (i. e. facts or averments which may be manifold)

[a] Cure. Ca. 180.

[b] Mitf. 178.

[c] Roche v. Morgell, Sch. & Lef. 721.

the old definition of a plea in equity, laid down in the
Cursus Cancelarire, [a] and adopted by Lord Redesdale,
strictly accords, and tends to fortify aud prove the correctness of the foregoing reason. A plea is there defined to
be, "a special answer to a bill, or some part thereof, showing and relying upon one or more things as a cause why
the suit should be either dismissed, delayed or barred." [b]
And, first, it i€ an answer because it avers and maintains
one or more facts wherein it differs from a demurrer, which
rests upon law only; and in some instances it denies
allegations in the bill by negative averments:.
But, secondly, it is a special answer, "'differing in this.
from an answer in the common form, as it demands the
judgment. of the court in the first instance, whether the
matter urged by it does not debar the complainant from
his title to that answer which the bill requires." [c]
Thirdly: "It relies upon one or tnore things (not new
things), as a cause why the suit should be either dismissed,
delayed or barred.'' The first part of this member o~ the
definition points out the integral division of a plea into
the matter of it and the averments: "'on one or more
things'' (i.e. facts or averments which 1nay be n1anifold)
[a] Curs. Ca. 180.
[b] Mitf. 178.

[c] Roche v. Morgell, Scb. & Lef. 721.
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—“ as a cause” (i. e. the matter or bar) which must be
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single. [a] The latter part brieﬂy gives the division of a

plea into its several kinds.

38, This will give the student some idea of. the ex-

treme accuracy of most old legal deﬁnitions, which can-

not be too attentively studied, and it was the more advan-

tageous to pursue this subject so far, because he might be

induced to conclude, from the loose manner in which it

has been ordinarily treated, that the system of pleading in

equity was not founded on any ﬁxed principles, but left to

ﬂuctuate amid variable decisions and arbitrary rules.

[a] 1 Burr. 320. Mitford, 238, and the cases there cited.

-"as a cause " ( i. e. the matter or bar) which must be
single. [a] The latter part briefly gives the division of a
plea into its ..l'everal kinds.

38. This will give the student some idea of_ the ex~
treme accuracy of most old legal definitions, which cannot be t.oo attentively studied, and it was the more advantageous to pursue this subject so far, because he might be
induced to conclude, from the loose manner in which it
has been ordinarily treated, that the system of pleading in
equity was not founded on any fixed principles, but -left to
fluctuate amid variable decisions and arbitrary rules.
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[a] 1 Burr. 320. Mitford, 238, and the cases there cited.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY.

.

SECTION I.

Of the General Form and Structure of Ordinary Bills.

39, A bill in equity, as we have remarked in the

preceding chapter, has a two_fold object in view, ﬁrst, the

statement of complaint, similar to the declaration at com-

mon law; and secondly, the examination of the defendant

upon oath. So far as it is a mere pleading, the bill must

CHAPTER II.

set out the nature of the relation between the parties,and

the particular incidents which create the hardship which

OF THE ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY.

is the cause of complaint; and one of these incidents is

the want of adequate relief at common law. This is the

main body of the bill. Again, so far as the bill acts the

SECTION

I.

part of an examination, it must state all such matters of

inducement, and such collateral circumstances as may tend

to extract a discovery, or which may raise a presumption

Of tlte General Form and Structure of Ord~inary Billa.

of the truth of the principal statement, even if denied by

the defendant. Should there be matter of avoidance, of

which the defendant might avail himself, the bill, as an

examination, should also contain charges to rebut the de-

fence. It has already been observed that the bill is a peti-
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tion‘ to the court for a subpaana, or such other writ as the

exigency of the case may require; and, accordingly, it

concludes with a prayer in the usual form of petition, and

stating the ends for which this writ it prayed; which are,

ﬁrst, that the defendant may answer the several distinct

allegations of the bill, which are for that purpose put in an

39. A bill in equity, as we have remarked in the
preceding chapter, has a two-fold object in view, first, the
statement of complaint, similar to the· declaration at common law; and secondly, the examination of the defendant
upon oath. So far as it is a mere pleading, the bill must
set out the nature of the relation between the parties,.arad
the particular incidents which create the hardship which
is the cause of complaint; and one of these incidents is
the want of as}equate relief at cornmon law. rrhis is the
main body of the bill. Again, so far as the bill acts the
part of an ewarn,ination, it must state all such matters of
inducement, and such collateral circumstances as rnay tend
to extract a discovery, or which may raise a presun1pt1on
of the truth of the principal statement, even if denied by
the defendant. Should there be tnatter of avoidance, of
which the defendant mi~ht avail hitnself, the bill, as an
e;rJamination, should also contain charges to rebut. the de. fence. It has already been observed that the bill is a petition· to the conrt for a subpmna, or such other writ as the
exigency of the case tnay require; and, accordingly, it
concludes with a prayer in the usual form of petition, nnd
stating the ends for which this writ it prayed; whieh nre,
first, that the defendant may answer the several distinct
allegations of the bill, which are for that purpose put in an

ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY. 33

interrogative form; and, second, that the court may inter-
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pose with relief.

33

40, This is the sum and substance of every bill

which can be ﬁled; and how long and intricate soever it

may be drawn, it nevertheless contains but the four fol-

lowing parts:

interrogative·form; and, second, that the court may interpose with relief.

1st. The circumstantial statement of the relation, in.

cluding the inducement or introductory part.

2d. The incidents which/produce the grievance oom-

plained of, including the requests made to the defendant,

and his refusal.

3d. The statement of such collateral circumstances,

if necessary, by way of charge, as may compel the defend-

ant to acknowledge tht: grievance, or which may antici-

pate and controvert his defence. J/

4th. And lastly, by reason of the foregoing complaint,

40. This is the sum and substance of every bill
which can be filed; and how long and intricate soever it
may be drawn, it nevertheless contains but the four following parts :
1st. The circumstantial statement of the relation, in_
eluding the inducement or introductory part.

and for the want of adequate remedy at common law, it

concludes with a petition for the subpcena, to the end that

the defendant may answer the premises, and the court

decree relief.

41, These four parts are each marked by certain

2d. The incidents which produce the grievance complained of, including the requeata made to the defendant,
and his refusal.

technical language, with which they commence. The first
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part begins thus: “Humbly complaining, showeth unto

your Lordship, your orator, A. B. of , that, etc.,” and

then proceeds at once to the statement. Here we must

stop to observe that this commencement of the bill is

framed to express its ofﬁce, both as a petition and com-

plaint. The words are: “ humbly complaining, showeth ; ”

and it styles the complainant not your petitioner, but your

orator, to mark the distinction between a bill and a mere

petition, and to designate the higher character which he

sustains. The word “orator” is used in allusion to the

formal conclusion of all petitions, “and your petitioner

.

3

3d. The statement of such collateral circumstances,
if necessary, by way of cfl,arge, as may co~pel the defend-ant to acknowledge th~· grievance, or which may anti~i
pate and controvert his defence. /-} /
4th. And lastly, by reason of"tn'e foregoing complaint,
a11d for the want of adequate remedy at common law, it
concludes with a petition for the aubpmna, to the end that
the defendant may answer the premises, and the court
decree relief.

41. These four parts are each marked by certain
technical language, with which they commence. The first
part begins thus: "Humbly complaining, showeth unto
your Lordship, your orator, A. B. of--, that, etc.," and
then proceeds at once to the statement.· Here we mus.t
· stop to observe that this commencement of the bill is
framed to express its office, both as a petition and complaint. The words are: "humbly complaining, showeth;"
and it styles the complainant not your petitioner, but your
orator, to mark the distinction between a bill and a mere
petition, and to designate the higher character which he
sustains. The word "orator" is used in allusion to the
formal conclusion of all petitions, "and your petitioner
3
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will ever pray,” [a] a custom which took its origin from

the piety of our ancestors, and the authority of ecclesias-

tics in these primitive days, when the seals were always

entrusted to churchmen,who were likewise the keepers of

the king’s conscience. [b] Another point to be observed in

the formal commencement of the bill is, the grammatical

inversion; a more remarkable instance of which, however,

occurs in the last part of the bill, which we shall notice

presently.

42, The second part commences, “And your orator

hath frequently and in a friendly manner applied to and

requested” [the defendant to do such acts according to

the nature of the bill, as equity and good conscience re-

quired of him.] “And your orator well hoped that such his

will ever pray," [a] a custom which took its origin from
the piety of our ancestors, and the authority of ecclesiastics in these primitive days, when the seals were always
entrusted to churchmen, who were likewise the keepers of
the king's conscience. [ b] Another point to be observed in
the formal commencement of the bill is, the grammatical
inversio~; a more remarkable instance of which, however,
occurs in the last part of the bill, which we shall notice
presently.

just and reasonable requests would have been complied

with, as in justice and equity they ought to have been;

but now so it is, &c.” [i. e. the defendant, confederating

with others to oppress and defraud the complainant, refuses

to do what isjust.] As this part is nearly the same in all

bills, it has become a common form. If the circumstances

creating the hardship be only such as the court can rectify

or control, and not depending on the acts of the defendant,
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as where trustees desire to act under the direction of the

court, and the like, then the above common forms are

omitted, and the diﬂiculty labored under is here stated

according to the nature of the case.

43, The third part is generally introduced by a state-

ment that the defendant makes various pretences to jus_ '

tify his refusal, the contrary of which the complainant

charges to be true; and then proceeds to make such other

charges as either corroborate his own statement or contro-

[a] In Ireland, the form used is, “your suppliant and daily

orator,” i. e. “ who remembers you daily in his prayers.”

[b] 3 Black. Com. 48-54. Madox Hist. Exch. 42.

42. The second part commences, "And your orator
hath frequently and in a friendly manner applied to and
requested" [the defendant to do such acts according to
the nature of the bill, as equity and good conscience required of him.] ''And your orator well hoped that such his
just and reasonable requests would have been complied
with, as in justice and equity they ought to have been;
but now so it is, &c." [i.e. the defendant, confederating
with others to oppress and defraud the complainant, refuses
to do what is just.] As this part is nearly the same in all
bills, it has become a common form. If the circumstances
creating the hardship be only such as the court can rectify
or control, and not depending on the acts of the defendant,
as where trustees desire to act under the direction of the
court, and the like, then the above common forms are
omitted, and the difficulty labored under is here stated
according to the nature of the case.
43. The third part is generally introduced by a statement that the defendant makes various pretences to jus- ·
tify his refusal, the contrary of which the complainant
charges to be true; and then proceeds to make such other
charges as either corroborate his own statement or contro[a] In Ireland, the form used is, "your suppliant and daily
orator.'' i.e. "who remembers you daily in his prayers."
[b] 3 Black. Com. 48-04. Madox Hist. Exch. 42.
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vert the defence likely to be adopted by the adversary.

“And to countenance such, his unjust conduct, the said

defendant sometimes pretends that” [there is some good

matter of excuse to discharge him from liability] “ where-

as your orator charges the contrary to be true, and that”

[there are such other circumstances in the case as invali-

date the excuse, or corroborate the statement]; “ and other

times he pretends” [other pretences], “ whereas your

orator charges the contrary to be true, and” [other charges.]

And the whole concludes with the averment, “all which

actings, pretences and refusals of the said confederates”

[alluding to the charge of confederacy on the second part]

“ are contrary to equity and good conscience, and tend to

the manifest wrong and injury of your orator in the

premises.”

44, The fourth part is, the petition to the court for

the subpoena ; and begins by formally setting out the rea-

sons for applying to the court, viz: “ In consideration

whereof” (i. e. “the wrong and injury” complained of,)

and forasmuch as your orator is without remedy at com-

mon law, and cannot have adequate relief but in a court

of equity; May it please your Lordship to grant his Ma-
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jesty’s most gracious writ of subpoena, etc., commanding

the defendant to appear; to the end that he may distinctly

answer upon oath whether each particular fact and charge

vert the defence likely to be adopted by the adversary.
"And to countenance such, his unjust conduct, the said
defendant sometimes pretends t~at" [there is some good
matter of excuse to discharge him from liability] '' whereas your orator charges the contrary to be true, and that"
[there are such other circumstances in the case as invalidate the excuse, or corroborate the statement]; "and other
times he pretends" [other pretences], "whereas your
orator charges the contrary to be true, and" [other charges.]
And the whole concludes with the averment, " all which
actings, pretences and refusals of the said confederates "
[alluding to the charge of confederacy on the second part]
'' are contrary to equity and good conscience, and tend to
the manifest wrong and injury of your orator in the
premises."

in the bill is not as therein stated, or how otherwise ; and

that he may be decreed by the court to perform such acts

44. 'fhe fourth part is, the petition to the court for

as the court in its wisdom shall think proper, and the jus-

tice of the case may require. “And your orator shall ever

pray,” etc. The whole of the part, beginning with the

words, “ in consideration whereof,” to the conclusion of

the bill, is but a single sentence. There is, however, a

considerable inversion in its form, the clause commencing

“ to the end,” being put before the prayer for the subpoena

the aubpwna,· and begins by formally setting out the reasons for applying to the court, viz: " In consideration
whereof" ( i. e. ''the wrong and injury" complained of,)
and forasmuch as your orator is without remedy at common law, and cannot have adequate relief but in a court
of equity; May it please your Lordship to grant his Majesty's most gracious writ of aubpmna, etc., commanding
the defendant to appear; to the end that he may distinctly
answer upon oath whether each particular fact and charge
in the bill is not as therein stated, or how otherwise ; and
that he may be decreed by the court to perform such acts
a~ the court in its wisdom shall think proper, and the justice of the case may require. "And your orator shall ever
pray," etc. The whole of the part, beginning with the
word~, ''in consideration whereof," to the conclusion of
the bill, is but a single sentence. There is, however, a
considerable inversion in its form, the clause commencing
''to the end," being put before the prayer for the su~pcena
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“ may it please,” etc. The want of sufﬁcient attention to

this point, coupled with the circumstance of the extreme

length of the sentence, the whole statement and charge of

the bill being here repeated in the form of interrogation,

and the prayer for particular relief being also included,

has occasioned great perplexity in the mind of many a

pupil, and in not a few instances, has prevented him from

ever arriving at the knowledge of the true bearing and

connection of the several members of this complicated

sentence. Nor is the pupil much assisted in this diﬂiculty

by the usual division of a bill into nine parts, than which

nothing can be more illogical and incorrect. According to

this arrangement, to be met with in all the books, the sev-

eral parts of a bill are: ﬁrst, the direction or address;

second, the parties; third, the plaintiff ’s case; fourth, the

charge of confederacy; ﬁfth, the pretence and charge;

sixth, that part which gives jurisdiction to the court;

seventh,the interrogating part; eighth, the prayer; ninth,

the usual prayer for a subpoena or other process. The four

last are included in the single sentence to which we have

just called the student’s attention, and which are thus

presented to his mind as so many distinct and unconnected
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parts; and his embarrasment is increased by ﬁnding that

in the precedents to be found in the books these several

parts are marked as distinct periods.

In order to illustrate the forgoing observations, we

shall insert here the skeleton of a bill:

To the Rt. Honorable the Earl of Eldon,

Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain :

(1.) Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lord-

ship, your orator, A B, of , gent. that [at a particular

time mentioned, certain events took place which led to

the relation now existing between your orator and G D,

the defendant, hereinafter named] And your orator

~'may

it please,'' etc. 'rhe want of sufficient attention to
this point, coupled with the circumstance of the extreme
length of the sentence, the whole statement and charge of
the bill being here repeated in the form of interrogation,
and the prayer for particular relief being also included,
has occasioned great perplexity in the mind of many a
pupil, and in not a few instances, has prevented him from
ever arriving at the knowledge of the true bearing and
connection of the several members of this complicated
sentence. Nor is the pupil much assisted in this difficulty
by the usual division of a bill into nine parts, than which
nothing can be more illogical and incorrect. According to
this arrangement, to be met with in all the books, the several parts of a bill are : first, the direction or address ;
second, the parties; third, the plaintiff's case; fourth, the
charge of c·onfederacy; fifth, the pretence and charge;
sixth, that part which gives jurisdiction to the court;
seventh, the interrogating part; eighth, the prayer; ninth,
the usual prayer for a subpmna or other process. The four
last are included in the single sentence to which we have
just called the student's attention, and which are thus
presented to his mind as so many distinct and unconnected
parts; and his embarrasment is increased by finding that
in the precedents to be found in the books these several
parts are marked as distinct periods.
In order to illustrate the forgoing observations, we
shall insert here the skeleton of a bill :
To the Rt. Honorable the Earl of Eldon,
Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain :
(1.) Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, your orator, A B, of. , gent. that [at a particular
time mentioned, certain events took place which led to
the relation now existing between your orator and 0 D,
the defendant, hereinafter named.] And your orator
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further showeth unto your Lordship that [your orator and ,

the said defendant are parties to such relation, under cir-

ORIGINAL BILL IN

EQUIT~,

37

cumstances to which particular equitable incidents are

concomitant; whence arise certain duties to be performed

by the said defendant, C D.] (II) And your orator hath

accordingly, both by himself and his agents, applied to

and requested the said C D to [perform the said duties;

and your orator well hoped that such, his just and reason-

able requests, would have been complied with, as in justice

and equity they ought to have been; but now so it is, may

it please your Lordship. the said G D, combining and con-

federating with divers persons at present unknown to your

orator (but whose names, when discovered, your orator

prays he may be at liberty to insert in this, his bill, with

apt and proper words to charge them as parties defendants

hereto), and contriving how to injure and oppress your

\ orator in the premises, absolutely refuses to comply with

your orator’s aforesaid reasonable requests. ( III.) And to

countenance such, his unjust conduct, he sometimes pre-

tends [some matter of excuse to discharge him from lia-

bility;] whereas, your orator charges the contrary to be

true, and that [there are other circumstances which in-
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validate the excuse of the said defendant and corroborate

your orator’s statement] All which actings, pretences

and refusals of the said confederates are contrary to equity

and good conscience, and tend to the manifest wrong and

injury of your orator in the premises. ( IV.) In considera-

tion whereof, and for as much as your orator is without

remedy in the premises at common law, and cannot have

adequate relief except in a court of equity, where matters

of this sort are properly cognizable and relievable, to the

end that the said C D and his confederates, when discov-

ered, may, upon their several and respective corporal oaths,

according to the best and utmost of their several and re-

spective knowledge, remembrance, information and belief,

I

further s~oweth unto your Lordship that [your orator and .
the said defendant are parties to such relation, under circumstances to which particular equitable incidents are
concomitant; whence arise certain duties to be performed
by the said defendant, 0 D.] {11) And your orator hath
accordingly, both by hi1nself and his agents, applied to
and requested the said 0 D to [perform the said duties;
and your orator well hoped that such,. his just and reasonable requests, would have been complied 'vith, as in justice
and equity they ought to have been; but now so it is, may
it please your Lordship,. the said C D, combining and confederating with divers persons at present unknown to your
orator (but whose names, when discovered, your orator
prays he may be at liberty to insert in this, his bill, with
apt and proper words to charge them as parties defendants
hereto), and contriving how to injure and oppress your
' orator in the premiseR, absolutely refuses to comply with
your orator's aforesa.id reasonable requests. {III.) And to
countenance such, his unjust conJ.uct, he sometimes pretends [some matter of excuse to discharge him from liability;] whereas, your orator charges the contrary to Be
true, and that [there are other circumstances which invalidate the excuse of the said defendant and corroborate
your orator's statement.] All which actings, pretences
and refusals of the said confederates are contrary to equity
and good conscience, and tend to the manifest \Vrong and
injury. of your orator in the pren1ises. {Iv.) In consideration whereof, and for as much as your orator is without
remedy in the premises at cornmon law, and cannot have
adequate relief except in a court of equity, where matters
of this sort are properly cognizable and relievable, to the
end that the said 0 D and his confederates, when discovered, may, upon their several and respective corporal oaths,
according to the best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge, remembrance, information and belief,
'
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full, true, perfect and distinct answers make to all and
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singular the matters aforesaid; and that as fully and par-

ticularly as if the same were here repeated, and they

thereunto severally and respectively distinctly interro-

gated; and more especially that the said C D may, in

manner aforesaid, answer and set forth whether [at the

time hereinbefore in that behalf mentioned, or at some,

and what other time, certain events did not take place,

which led to the relation now existing between your orator

and the said defendant, or how otherwise; and whether

such relation does not in fact exist; and whether your

orator and the said defendant are not parties to such re-

lation, under circumstances to which particular equitable,

or some and what incidents are concomitant, or how other-

wise; and whether such duties as are hereinfore set forth

to be performed by the said defendant did not arise there-

from, or how otherwise]; and whether your orator hath

not, by himself or his agents, or how otherwise, made such

applications and requests as are hereinbefore in that be-

half mentioned, or some such or the like; or any and what

other applications and requests, in respect of ‘the several

matters aforesaid; and whether the said defendant hath
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not refused to comply therewith, and why; and whether

[such circumstances as are hereinbefore charged, for the

purpose of invalidating the excuse of the said defendant,

and corroborating your orator’s statement, are not true, or

how otherwise] ; and that the said defendant may be com-

pelled, by and under the decree and direction of this hon-

orable court, [to perform such duties as are incident to the

relation hereinbefore stated to exist between him and your

orator;] and that your orator may have such farther and

other relief in the premises as to your Lordship shall seem

full, true, perfect and distinct answers make to all and
singular the matters aforesaid; and that as fully and particularly as if the same were here repeated, and they
thereunto severally and respectively distinctly interrogated; and more especially that the said 0 D may, in
manner aforesaid, answer and set forth whether [at the
time hereinbefore in that behalf mentioned, or at some,
and what other time, certain events did not take place,
which led to the relation now existing between your orator
and the said defendant, or how otherwise ; and whether
such relation does not in fact exist; and whether your
orator and the said defendant are n<'t parties to such relation, under circumstances to which particular equitable,
or some and what incidents are concomitant, or how other.
wise; and whether such duties as are hereinfore set forth
to be performed by the said defendant did not arise therefrom, or how otherwise]; and whether your orator hath
not, by himself or his agents, or how otherwise, made such
applications and requests as are hereinbefore in that behalf mentioned, or some such or the like; or any and what
other applications and requests, in respect of "the several
matters aforesaid; and whether the said defendant hath
not refused to comply therewith, and why; and whether
[such circumstances as are hereinbefore charged, for the
purpose of invalidating the excuse of the said defendant,
and corroborating your orator's statement, are not true, or
how otherwise] ; and that the said defendant may be compelled, by and under the decree and direction of this honorable court, [to perform such duties as are incident to the
relation hereinbefore stated to exist between him and your
orator;] and that your orator may have such farther and
other relief in the premises as to your Lordship shall seem
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meet, and the nature and justice of the case may require.

89

May it please, etc.

[C'0unsel’s name.]

Pray Spa.

1).

C. D.

The above is the general form of every kind of bill, as

prepared in the draftman’s office; and with this outline

before him the pupil will be able to shape his course with-

out any diﬁiculty, in all cases, and to judge what parts are

essential and what may be omitted, according to the nature

of the subject. We shall presently advert to this point

more at large.

45, The pupil will observe that in the precedent of

the draft, the conclusion being a common and invariable

form of prayer for the subpoena, is marked by an “&c.,”

with a marginal direction to the solicitor, who is to have it

engrossed at full length, as to the names of the parties

whom he is to pray process; for none are defendants to

the suit, although mentioned in the body of the bill,unless

process of subpoena be issued against them. [a] The con-

clusion of the bill, as engrossed, is as follows: “May it

meet, and the nature and justice of the case may require.
May it please, etc.
[ Counsel's name.]
Pray Spa.

v.
0. D.
The above is the general form of every kind of bill, as
prepared in the draftman's office; and with this outline
before him the pupil will be able to shape his course without any difficulty, in all cases, and to judge what parts are
essential and what may be omitted, according to the nature
of the subject. We shall presently advert to this point
more at large.
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please your Lordship to grant unto your orator his Majes-

ty’s most gracious writ of subpoena, to be directed to the

said C D, and to the confederates when discovered, there-

by commanding them, and every of them, at a certain

day, and under a pain to be therein limited, personally to

be and appear before your Lordship, in this honorable

court, and then and there full, true, direct and perfect

answer make to all and singular the premises; and further

to stand to, perform, and abide such further order, direc-

tion and decree therein as to your Lordship shall seem

meet; [b] and your orator shall ever pray,” etc. If the

[a] 2 Dick. 707.

[b] If the bill be for discovery merely, the words in italics

are omitted. 3 Atk. 439.

.45. The pupil will observe that in the precedent of
the draft, the conclusion being a co1nmon and invariable
form of prayer for the subpmna, is marked by an- "&c.,''
with a marginal direction to the solicitor, who is to have it
engrossed at full length, as to the names of the parties
whom he is to pray process; for none are defendants to
the suit, ~.I though mentioned in the body of the bill, unless
process of subpmna be issued against them. [a] The conclusion of the bill, as engrossed, is as follows: "May it
please your Lordship to grant unto your orator his Majesty's most gracious writ of subpmna, to be directed to the
said 0 D, and to the confederates when discovered, thereby commanding them, and every of them, at a certain
day, and under a pain to be therein limited, personally to
be and appear before your Lordship, in this honorable
court, and then and there full, true, direct and perfect
answer make to all and singular the premises; and further
to stand to, perform, and abide such further order, di'i'ection and decree therein as to your Lordship shall seem
1neet,· [b] and your orator shall ever pray," etc. If the
[a] 2 Dick. 707.
[b] If the bill be for discovery merely, the words in italics

are omitted. 3 Atk. 439.
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bill seeks for an injunction, or a “ne exeat regno,” such

writ is also prayed for in the conclusion, in addition to the

writ of subpaana, for the form of which the student may

consult the books of precedents, the above being suﬁicient

for our purpose. In a certiorari bill, the only object being

to remove the proceedings from the court below, the

prayer for a subpoena is unnecessary, as the parties must

follow in the suit. [a]

46, Where the attorney general is a defendant, in-

stead of a subpana the bill prays, “ that his Majesty’s said

Attorney General, being attended with a copy of this bill,

may appear and put in his answer thereto, and may stand

to and abide,” etc.; [b] and in the case of a peer, a letter

missive is prayed, “ to be directed to the said [peer], de-

siring him to appear to and answer your orator’s said bill;

or in default thereof, his Majesty’s most gracious writ of

subpoena,” etc. -

SECTION II.

Of the first Part of a Bill; and herein of the Doctrine

of Relations.

46 5;, Having given this general view of the nature

and form of a bill, we shall now draw the student’s atten_ .
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tion to its several parts, and add a few particular observa-

tions on each. In the appendix of common forms, will be

found the different modes of address used in the several

courts of equity, and also the formal words of commence-

ment, according to the various capacities of the parties

bill seeks for an injunction, or a "ne eweat regno," such
writ is also prayed for in the conclusion, in addition to the
writ of subpmna, for the form of which the student may
consult the books of precedents, the above being sufficient
for our purpose. In a certiorari bill, the only object being
to remove the proceedings from the court below, the
prayer for a subpmna is unnecessary, as the parties must
follow in the suit. [a]

46. Where the attorney general is a defendant, instead of a subpmna the bill prays, " that his Majesty's said
Attorney General, being attended with a copy· of this bill,
may appear and put in his answer thereto, and may stand
to and abide," etc.; [ b] and in the case of a peer, a letter
missive is prayed, "to be directed to the said [peer], desiring him to appear to and answer your orator's said bill;
or in default thereof, his M~jesty's most gracious writ of
subpmna," etc.

instituting the suit.

[a] Mitf. 40.

[b] The Attorney General may refuse to answer, and no pro-

SECTION

cess of contempt can go against him. 1 Dick. 730. Davine v.

II.

Attorney Genéral. Exchequer, 1813.

Of the first Part of a Bill,· and herein of the Doctrine
of Relations.

46 a. Having given this general view of the nature
and form of a bill, we shall now draw the student's attention to its several parts, and add a few particular observations on each. In the appendix of common forms, will be
found the different modes of address used in the several
courts of equity, and also the formal words of commencement, according to the various capacities of the parties
. instituting the suit.
[a] Mitf. 40.

[b] The Attorney General may refuse to answer, and no process of contempt can go against him. 1 Dick. 730. Davine v.
Attorney General. Exchequer, 1813.
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46 b, The additions and places of abode of the com-

plainants should be specially stated, both to prevent suits

from being commenced in the names of ﬁctitious persons,

and also that the defendants may know where to resort for

redress, in case the proceedings should be deemed vexa-

tious, the practice of taking security for that purpose hav-

ing been long since disused,except where the complainant

resides out of the jurisdiction, when security for costs, to

the amount of forty pounds, will be required, on the de-

fendant’s motion. In the exchequer, in order to give the

court jurisdiction, the complainant states himself to be a

debtor and accountant to his Majesty, which is similar to

the practice at common law, and this is an averment not

allowed to be traversed, and therefore mere form. A bill

ﬁled by a Peer always commences without aﬁixing the

epithet humbly; but simply—“ complaining, showeth unto

your Lordship.” The form for infants, married women,

and lunatics, will be seen in the Appendix.

47, When the attorney general commences a suit,

either on half of the crown or those under its protection,

whether with or without a relator not personally interested,

he proceeds by way of information, which differs in no
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respect from the form of a bill, except that it does not use

the language either of complaint or petition; but merely,

“ informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B. knight,

his Majesty’s attorney general, on behalf,” etc. If the

relator be also a complainant, then the proceeding will be

both information and bill; for the form of which, as also

of informations in general, see the Appendix.

48, The two ﬁrst parts, according to our division, are

essential to every kind of billwhatever; as the ﬁrst states

the circumstances of the case, or the relative situation of

the parties, and the second sets out the injury sustained,

or the grievance likely to ensue, not remediable at com-

46 b. The additions and pla·ces of abode of .the complainants should be specially stated, both to prevent suits
from being commenced in the names of fictitious persons,
and also that the defendants may know where to resort for
redress, in case the proceedings should be deemed vexatious, the practice of taking security for that purpose having been long since disused, except where the complainant
resides out of the jurisdiction, when security for costs, to
the an1ount of forty pounds, will be required, on the defendant's motion. In the exchequer, in order to give the
court jurisdiction, the complainant states himself to be a
debtor and accountant to his Majesty, which is similar to
the practice at common law, and this is an averment not
allowed to be traversed, and therefore mere form. A bill
filed by a Peer always commences without affixing the
epithet humbly; but simply-" complaining, sboweth unto
your Lordship." The form for infants, married women,
and lunatics, will be seen in the Appendix.
47. When the attorney general commences a suit,
either on half of the crown or those under its protection
whether with or without a relator not personally interested,'
he proceeds by way of information, which differs in no
respect from the form of a bill, except that it does not use
the language either of complaint or petition; but merely,
"informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B. knight,
his Majesty's attorney general, on behalf," etc. If the
relator be also a complainant, then the proceeding will be
both information and bill ; for the form of which, as also
of informations in general, see the Appendix.
48. The two first parts, according to our division, are
essential to every kind of bill.whatever; as the first states
the circumstances of the case, or the relative situation of
the parties, and the second sets out the injury sustained,
or the grievance likely to ensue, not remediable at com-

42 EQUITY PLEADING.

mon law, which is the ground of application for the inter-

42
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ference of a court of equity. So far the bill acts the

part of a pleading, similar to the declaration at com-

mon law, and according with this view of it, is the deﬁni-

tion given in the Cursus Cancellariae; where it is said, “a

bill in equity is in nature of a declaration at common law,

wherein the complainant is to set forth the circumstances

of his case for some fraud, force, or injury done to him,

praying relief of the court, for that he has no remedy by

the common law; and also process of subpoena against the

defendant, to compel him to answer the charge of the bill.

[a] The observations we have made, therefore, in the fore-

going chapter relative to the mode of statement of injury

are entirely applicable to this part of a bill. We there

showed that the plaintiff, in complaining of a wrong done

to him, does nothing more than set forth a right of which

he has been deprived; that rights are incident to rela-

tions, and that therefore to prove a right, the relation in

Which it is founded must be thoroughly understood. Rela-

tions, again, we have seen,let in three separate considera-

tions: 1st, the parties, with their several disabilities and

liabilities in law; 2d, the subject matter or contract, with
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the circumstances uhder which it was made, and herein

also of the nature of the property in litigation; and lastly,

the legal and equitable incidents or rights, the withhold-

ing of any of which is the cause of complaint. We shall

subjoin such additional instructions with regard to the doc-

trine of relations as may be generally useful to the pupil.

49, Relations may be divided into primary or origi-

nal—sec0ndary or derivative—and collateral. The ﬁrst

are those which subsist between the original parties; the

second are such as are derived therefrom, either by the

transmission of interest or the transfer of title or liability.

[a] Ours. Can. 36.

mon law, which is the ground of application for the interference of a court of equity. So far the bill acts the
part of ~ pleading, similar to the declaration at common law, and according with this view of it, is the definition given in the Cursus Cancellarim; where it is said, "a
bill in equity is in nature of a declaration at common law,
wher~in the complainant is to set forth the circumstances
of his· case for some fraud, force, or injury done to him,
praying relief of the court, for that he has no remedy by
the common law; and also process of subpmna against the
defendant, to compel him to answer the charge of the bill.
[a] The observations we have made, therefore, in the foregoing chapter relative to the mode of statement of injury
are entirely applicable to this part of a bill. We there
showed that the plaintiff, in complaining of a wrong done
to him, does nothing more than set forth a right of which
, he has been deprived; that rights are incident to relations . and that therefore to prove a right, the relation in
whi~h it is founded must be thoroughly understood. Relations, again, we have seen, let in three separate considerations: l~t, the parties, with their several disabilities and
liabilities in law; 2d, the subject matter or contract, with
the circumstances ubder which it was made, and herein
also of the nature of the property in litigation; and lastly,
the legal and equitable incidents or rights, the withholding of any of which is the cause of complaint. We shall
subjoin such additional instructions with regard to the doc\, trine of relations as may be generally useful to the pupil.

49. Relations may be divided into primary or original-secondary or derivative-and collateral. The first
are those which subsist between the original parties; the
second are such as are derived therefrotn, either by the
transmission of interest or the transfer of title or liability.
[a] Curs. Can. 36.
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Thus there is a primary relation between the mortgagor

48
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and mortgagee; but if the mortgagor assigns his equity of

redemption, there then arises a new or secondary relation

between the mortgagee and the assignee of the equity. A

collateral relation is that which exist between two or more

derivative parties.

O_——_T

TH W

Thus in the ﬁgure above, let O and T stand for the

parties to the original relation; let T be tenant for life,

and R a remainderman; let A be an assignee, or alienee

of T’s interest; let H represent the heir at law to O; D

be his devise, and E executor. Here there will be a

1,hus there is a primary relation between the mortgagor
and mortgagee; but if the mortgagor assigns his equity of
redemption, there t.hen arises a new or secondary relation
between the mortgagee and the assignee of the equity. A
collateral relation is that which exist between two or more
derivative parties.
o______________T

secondary relation between O and A, in respect of the

privity of contract between T and A. There will be also

a secondary relation between O and R, in respect of the

prioity of estate between T and R. Between T and H

there will be a secondary relation, in respect of the privity

of blood between O and H. So between T and D, in re-

spect of the privity of interest between 0 and D; and in

like manner between T and E, on account of the privity

of representation between 0 and E. Again, H, D, and E
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on one side, and A and R on the other, stand in collateral

relations to each other. Other derivative relations might

be enumerated; but this will sufﬁce at present for

the purpose of illustration. The right understanding

of these particulars is in the ﬁrst place essential to the

determination of the necessary parties to the suit, and the

importance of this doctrine will be still further apparent

when we come to treat of Supplemental Bills and Bill of

Revivor.

.

I

m n
I

'l,hus in the figure above, let 0 and T stand for the
parties to the original relation; letT be tenant for life,
and R a remainderman ; let A be an assignee, or alienee
of T's interest; let H represent the heir at law to 0; D
be his devise, and E executor. Here there will be a
secondary relation between 0 and A, in respect of the
privity of contract between T and A. There will be also
a secondary relation between 0 and R, in respect of the
pri,vity of estate between T and R. Between T and H
there will be a secondary relation, in respect of the privity
of blood between 0 and H. So between T and D, in respect of the privity of interest between 0 and D; and in
Jike manner between T and E, on account of the privity
of representation between 0 and E. Again, H, D, and E
on one side, and A and R on the other, stand in collateral
relations to each ot~er. Other derivative relations might
be enumerated; but this will suffice at present for
the purpose of illustration. The right understanding
of these particulars is in the first place essential to the
determination of the necessary parties to the suit, and the
importance of this doctrine will be still further apparent
when we come to treat of Supplemental Bills and Bill of
Revivor.
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50, The original relation may arise, either, 1st, out

of a speciﬁc contract, the incidents of which must depend

upon the terms of agreement, as in those cases where a

speciﬁc performance is sought to be enforced; or, 2d, the

relation may be such as though arising from contract be-

tween‘ the parties, is nevertheless recognized and ascer-

tained by the law, which attaches to it certain essential’

incidents and ingredients—such as the relation of part-

nership, of mortgagor and mortgagee, and the like; or,

3d, it may be produced by the act of a third person, as in

the relation of executor and legatee; or, 4th, it may arise

by the operation of law, as, for example, the relation be-

tween tenant in dower and heir at law. '

In the first instance, as the nature of the relation is to

be collected from the words of the contract, if the agree_ -

ment be in writing, it must in general be set out verbatim

in the bill; if not in writing, then such collateral circum-

stances must be stated as raise a strong presumption in

favor of its existence. On this point of the speciﬁc per-

formance of parol agreements, various rules have been

laid down in equity, with which the student should make

himself acquainted, in order to frame his bill in cases of

50. The original relation may arise, either, 1st, out
of a specific contract, the incidents of which must depend
upon the terms of agreement, as in those cases where a
specific perfor1nance i~ sought to be enforced; or, 2d, the
relation may be such as though arising from contract between' the parties, is nevertheless recognized and ascertained by the law, which attaches to it certain essential ..
incidents and ingredients-such as the relation of partnership, of mortgagor and mort~agee, and the like; or,
3d, it may be produced by the act of a third person, as in
the relation of executor and legatee; or, 4th, it may arise
by the operation of law, as, for example, the relation between tenant in dower and heir at law.
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this nature. In the statement of speciﬁc contracts, the

agreement must also be shown to be of such a kind as not

to militate with general policy, [a] and that the stipula-

tions contained in it are such as a court of equity ought in

conscience to enforce. [b] The circumstances under which

the agreement was made, form therefore, in most instan-

ces, a material part of the statement; and every fact

should be set out, by way of inducement, tending to show

that the consideration was valid and the terms fair and

[a] 9 Ves. 608. 1 Vern. 5.

[b] 2 Anst. 543.

In the first instance, as the nature of the relation is to
be collected from the words of the contract, if the agree- ·
ment be in writing, it must in general be set out verbatim
in the bill; if not in writing, then such collateral circumstances mu.st be stated as raise a strong presumption in
favor of its existence. On this point of the specific performance of parol agreements, various rules have been
laid down in equity, with which the student should make
himself acquainted, in order to frame his bill in cases of
this nature. In the statement 9f specific contracts, the
agreement must also be shown to be of such a kino as not
to militate with general policy, [a] and that the stipulations contained in it are such as a court of equity ought in
conscience to enforce. [b] The circumstances under which
the agreement was made, form therefore, in most instances, a material part of the statement; and every fact
should be set out, by way of inducement, tending to show
that the consideration was valid and the terms fair and
[a] 9 Ves. 608. 1 Vern. 5.
[b] 2 An st. 543.

FIRST PART or A BILL. 45

-equitable; for it is a maxim, “that he that would have

45
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equity should do equity.”

In the second case above noticed, where the relation

is one recognized by law, all the legal requisites to form

such relation and the liabilities resulting from it, should

be well understood, that the draftsman may be able to

bring the case in the bill within the meaning of the law,

and show such a breach as constitutes an injury cogniz-

able in equity. As this kind of relation is founded in like

manner as the former, on the contract of the parties, it

will be subject to the same rules with regard to the equity

of consideration and origin. ‘

51, The same observations will apply to the 3d and

4th classes above enumerated, with this additional remark

-_that all the circumstances that led to the existing rela-

tion, must be succinctly alleged by way of preamble, both

for the advantage of clearness of statement, and also in

order to deduce the complainant’s title.

This last is essential to every bill, and in general, it is

to be remarked, there are four things indispensably re-

quisite to be shown in the stating part, namely, 1st, the

equitable; for it is a maxim, "that he that would have
equity should do equity."
In the second case above noticed, where the relation
is one·recognized by law, all the legal requisites to form
~uch relation and the liabilities resulting from it, should
be well understood, that the draftsman may be able to
bring the case in the bill withi11 the meaning of the law,
and show such a brea.ch as constitutes an injury cognizable in equity. As this kind of relation is founded in like
manner as the former, on the contract of the parties, it
will be subject to the same rules with regard to the equity
of consideration and origin.

complainant’s interest [a] in the thing demanded; 2d, his
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title (b) to sue; 3d, the defendant’s interest; [c] and 4th,

his liability; [d] for though there cannot be a title or a

liability without an interest, there may be an interest with-

out either. Thus, an executor, before he has proved the will,

has an interest in the testator’s chattels, but not such as

to give him a title to sue; [e] so also an assignee has an

interest in the thing assigned, although not liable to be

[a] 2 Atk. 210.

[b] 1 Vern. 105. 9 P.Wms. 371.

[c] 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 78, 2 Vern. 380.

[d] 1 Vern. 180. 1 Ves. 56.

[e] 1 P.Wms. 172, 176.

51. The same observations will apply to

th~

3d and
4th classes abov~ enumerated, with this additional ren1ark
-that all the circumstances that led to the existing relation, must be succinctly alleged by way of preamble, both
for the advantage of clearness of statement, and also in
order to deduce the complainant's title.
This last is essential to every bill, and in general, it is
to be remarked, there are four things indispensab~y requisite to be shown in the stating part, namely, 1st, the
complainant's interest [a] in the thing demanded; 2d, his
title (b) to sue; 3d, tha defendant's interest; [ c] and 4th,
his liability; [d] for though there ca~not be a title or a
liability without an interest, there may be an interest without either. Thus, an executor, before he has proved the will,
has an interest in the testator's chattels, but not such as
to give him a title to sue; [ e] so also an assignee has an
interest in the thing assigned, although not liable to be
[a] 2 Atk. 210.
[b] 1 Vern. 105. 9 P.Wms. 371.
[c] 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 78, 2 Vern. 380.
[d] 1 Vern. 180. 1 Ves. 56.
[e] 1 P.Wms. 172, 176.
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sued for breach of covenant, unless such covenant runs

with the land. [a] We do not here speak of the title or

liability with reference to those defects which are the

proper subject of abatement; but the title and liability, as

derived from the very relation itself, and which therefore

must appear on the face of it, if the relation be adequately

stated; which title Lord Coke deﬁnes to be “justa causa

possidendi quod nostrum est.” And he says: “dicitur

titulus a tuendo;” because by it a man holds and defends

his right. [b] It is necessary, however, to observe, that

the title thus deduced, must not appear by the bill to be

affected by any personal disability; and the defendant

must be liable in the court of equity where the suit is

instituted.

52, In deducing the title in the third class of origi-

nal relations, it will be seen that such a preamble is neces-

sary as will show that the person creating the relation had

the power to do so, whether by law or by express power

in a deed. In the ﬁrst case the capacity in law is all that

need be stated—as, for example, “that the testator was,

at the time of making his will, and at his death, seized of

or entitled to freehold estate, and possessed of personal
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property; and being of sound and disposing mind, made

and published his will, with the usual formalities.” With

regard to the execution of a power created by deed, it

will in general be requisite to set out the power in haac

cerba, since a question may turn on its extent or validity ;

and if the latter be likely to be contested, the preamble

should go back to the origin of the instrument containing

the power. Indeed, the student will observe that the pre-

amble must, in a great measure, depend upon his discre-

tion, always making it consistent with clearness of ex-

[a] 1 Ves. 56.

[b] Co. Litt. 345, b.

sued for breach of covenant, unless such covenant runs
with the land. [a] We do not here speak of the title or
liability with reference to those defects which are the
proper subject of abatement; but the title and liability, as
derived from the very relation itself, and which therefore
must appear on the face of it, if the relation be adequately
stated; which title Lord Coke defines to be "justa causa
possidendi quod nostrum est." And he says: '' dicitur
titulus a tuendo;" because by it a man holds and defends
his right. [b] It is necessary, however, to observe, that
the title thus deduced, must not appear by the bill to be
affected by any personal disability; and the defendant
must be liable in the court of equity where the suit is
instituted.

52. In deducing the title in the third class of original relations, it will be seen that such a preamble is necessary as will show that the person creating the relation had
the power to do so, whether by law or by express power
in a deed. In the first case the capacity in law is all that
need be stated-as, for example, "that the testator was,
at the time of making his will, and at his death, seized of
or entitled to freehold estate, and possessed of personal
property; and being of sound and disposing mind, made
and published his will, with the usual formalities." With
regard to the execution of a power created by deed, it
will in general be requi~ite to set out the power in hmc
verba, since a question may turn on its extent or validity ;
and if the latter be likely to be contested, the preamble
should go back to the origin of the instru.m ent containing
the power. Indeed, the st.u dent will observe that the preamble must, in a great measure, depend upon his discretion, always making it consistent with clearness of ex[a] 1 Ves. 56.
[b] Co. Litt. 345, b.
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planation, and such as may assist the complainant’s title,

by discovery from the defendant, if any ambiguity in the

title render such detail necessary; but upon the face of

the statement, at least a prima facie title must appear.

In like manner, the draftsman must use his discretion as

to whether the whole o1' any part of the instrument

creating the relation be set out totidem 'verbis; having

this general rule to guide him, that it is usually unneces-

sary, and therefore improper, to state more than the sub-

stance, unless where the duty claimed depends upon the

very words of the instrument.

53. With respect to relations arising by operation of

law, we need only observe that the progress of the opera-

tion should be traced from the prior relation to its subse-

quent effect, and the circumstances must be sl1oWn to be

such as that the legal results necessarily ensue.

From the foregoing remarks the student must feel

conscious how necessary it is to have a clear and just con-

ception of the nature of the relation which is to be the

subject of his statement, with all its legal and equitable

incidents, before he sits down to draw the bill; for, as the

nature of the injury must be derived from the incidents of
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the relation, so the form of the statement must depend

upon the nature of the injury ; if it be the deprivation of

a right issuing out of the express contract of the parties,

the terms of the contract will be essential; if, on the

other hand, the right demanded is one given by law, the

statement, to be adequate, must bring the case within the

relation affected by the legal or equitable incidents.

.

Sucrron 111.

Of the Second Part, 0r Statement of Injury.

54, The point next to be considered is, what circum-

planation, and such as may assist the complainant's title,
by discovery from the defendant, if any ambiguity in the
title render such detail necessary; but upon the face of
the statement, at least a prima facie title must appear.
In like manner, the draftsman must use his discretion as
to whether the whole or any part of the instrument
creating the relation be set out totidem verbis; having
this general rule to guide him, that it is usually unneces·
sary, and therefore improper, to state more than the substance, unless where the duty claimed depends upon the
very words of the instrument.

53. With respect to relations arising by operation of
law, we need only observe that the progress of the operation should be traced from the prior relation to its subsequent effect, and the circumstances must be shown to be
such as that the legal results necessarily ensue.
From the foregoing remarks the student must feel
conscious how necessary it is to have a clear and just conception of the nature of the relation which is to be the
subject of- his statement, with all its legal and equitable
incidents, before he sits down to draw the bill; for, as the
nature of the injury must be derived fro1n the incidents of
the relation, so the form of the statement must depend
upo11 the nature of the injury; if it be the deprivation of
a right issuing out of the express contract of the parties,
the terms of the contract will be essential ; if, on the
other hand, the right demanded is one given by law, the
statement, to be adequate, must bring the case within the
relation affected by the legal or equitable incidents.

III.
Of the Second Part, or Statement of Injury.
SECTION

54. The point next to be considered is, what circum-

48 EQUITY PLEADING.

stance in the case it is which produces the injury, or

48
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causes the hardship against which the complainant seeks

relief; and this must arise from the state of the relation

between the parties, either where a duty ﬂowing from it

is withheld, which, though binding in conscience, yet the

ordinary courts have notthe power to enforce; or where

the relative situation of the parties is such, whether from

fraud or accident, or any other cause, as that a manifest

wrong, or even probable injustice or inconvenience

would ensue, but for the interference and assistance of a

court of equity in compelling a discovery and supplying

the adequate remedy.

55, This statement of grievance forms the second

part of the bill, according to our division, corresponding

to the breach in the declaration at common law, and

should be made with brevity and succinctness. When

the injury sought to be redressed is occasioned by the

subtraction of a duty on the part of the defendant, this

part of the bill merely contains a statement of request

and refusal, viz : that various applications were made to

the defendant, requesting him to do justice to the com-

plainant and restore to him the right demanded, or per- '
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form the duty withheld, which nevertheless he has re-

fused to do. The refusal is most commonly ushered in by

the formal charge of confederacy, which, though usually

inserted, is altogether unnecessary, [a] as new parties

may be added at any period of the suit, without any such

charge in the bill; and, therefore, in amicable suits, the

refusal is stated without charging combination. and this

form is invariably omitted where the defendant is a peer

of the realm. [b]

56, In those cases, on the other hand, where the

[a] 1 Anstr. 81.

[b] Mitf. 33.

stance in the case it is which produces the injury, or
causes the hardship against which the complainant seeks
relief; and this must .arise (rom the state of the relation
,between the parties, either where a duty flowing from it
is withheld, which, though binding in conscience, yet the
ordinary courts have not. the power to enforce; or where
the relative situation of the parties is such, whether from
fraud or accident, or any oth~r cause, as that a manifest
wrong, or even probable injustice or inconvenience
would ensue, but for the interference and assistance of a
court of equity in compelling a discovery and supplying
the adequate remedy.

55. This statement of grievance forms the second
part of the bill, according to our division, corresponding
to the breach in the declaration at common law, and
should be made w.i.th brevity and succinctness. When
the injury sought to be redressed is occasioned by the
subtraction of a duty on the part of the defendant, this
part of the bill merely contains a statement of request
and refusal, viz : that various applications were made to
the defendant, requesting him to do justice to the complainant and restore to him the right demanded, or perform the duty withheld, which nevertheless he has refused to do. The refusal is most commonly ushered in by
the formal charge of confederacy, which, though usually
inserted, is altogether unnecessary, [a] as new parties
may be added at any period of the suit, without any such
charge in the bill; and, therefore, in amicable suits, the
refusal is stated without charging coznbination . and this
form is invariably omitted where the defendant is a peer
of the realm. [ b]

56. In those cases, on the other hand, where the
[a] 1 Anstr. 81.
[b] Mitf. 83.

THIRD PART, on PBETENCES AND CHARGES. 49

grievance arises out of the peculiar situation of the parties,

THIRD PART, OR PRETENCES AND CHARGES.

49

the complainant having explained by his statement their

relative position, goes on in this part of his bill brieﬂy to

show the nature of the difficulty resulting from it, or the

hardship likely to ensue unless a cﬁﬁ uity inter-

poses to his relief. “ To the end, th , .Qge:?;bEV..-P Here,

then, the student will observe, as no retfiﬁﬁlfi zxtated, of

course the introductory charge of confederady “has no

place; and, in like manner, as the necessity for the inter-

ference of a court of equity is embodied in the very state-

ment of grievance, the formal clause of equity, as it is

called, commencing : “ And for as much as your orator is

without remedy in the premises," is also omitted. In the

statement of the injury for which redress is sought, it is

obvious that the draftsman must be previously acquainted

with the extent‘ of the jurisdiction of the court; and to

this point the student should turn his particular attention,

in order that he may be able to set forth such a grievance

in his bill as a court of equity will take cognizance of; for

the mere averment that there is no remedy but in equity

will not avail, unless it appear also on the face of the

statement that the case is such that the court of chancery

.
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can compel a discovery or decree relief.

Sscrron IV.

Of the Third Part, or Pretences and Charges.

57, We next come to the pretences and charges, the

nature and utility of which have been already pointed out.

As the two former parts belong to a bill, as a pleading, in

common with the declaration at law, so this t/zird part has

a peculiar reference to its character as an examination.

One of the principal advantages attendant upon the mode

of proceeding in chancery, is that the complainant is en-

titled to have an answer upon oath from the defendant, as

4.

grievance arises out of the peculiar situation of the parties,
the complainant having explained by his statement their
relatiYe position, goes on in this part of his bill briefly to
show the nature of the difficulty resulting from it, or the
hardship likely to ensue unless a co ~ity interposes to his relief. "To the end, th~fQi~Ht~. Here.
then, the stu.dent will observe, as no r~~~~'i! aJt, ted, of
course the mtroductory charge of confeekk~dy .- has no
place; and, in like manner, as the necessity for the interference of a court of equity is embodied in the very statement of grievance, the formal clause of equity, as it is
called, commencing: " And for as much as your orator is
without remedy in the premises,, is also omitted. In the
statement of the injury for which redress is sought, it is
obvious that the ·draftsman must be previously acquainted
with the extent· of the jurisdiction of the court; and to
this point the student should turn his particular attention,
in order that he may be able to set forth such a grievance
in his bill as a court of equity will take cognizance of; for
the mere averment that there is no remedy but in equity
will not avail, unless it appear also on the face of the
statement that the case is such that the court of chancery
can compel a discovery or decree relief.

IV.
Of tlte Third Part, or Pretences and Charges.
SECTION

57. We next come to the pretences and charges, the
nature and utility of which have been already pointed out.
As the two form er p arts belong to a bill, as a pleading, in
common_with the declaration at law, so this third part has
a peculiar refere nce to its character as an examination.
One of the principal :;tdvantages attendant upon the mode
of proceeding in chancery, is that the complainant is entitled to have an answer upon oath from the defendant, as
4

50 .‘ EQUITY PLEADING.

to all the facts stated in the bill; but as it is a maxim in

50
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our law that no man shall be bound to criminate himself,

care must be taken that no allegation be made which

would subject the defendant, if admitted by him, to pen-

alty or forfeiture, [a] unless, indeed, the forfeiture be one

thereby accruing to the complainant himself, and that he

speciﬁcally waives his right to it, [b] for the sake of the

discovery. So far, then, as the defendant admits the facts

alleged in the bill, it precludes the necessity of having

them proved in evidence; as, on the other hand, if there

be an unequivocal denial on the part of the defendant,

two witnesses, at least, are required to establish the fact

against his oath. [c] One of the chief objects of the

draftsman’s care, therefore, should be to charge in his bill

all such material circumstances of the case as may tend to

draw forth from the defendant an admission of the princi-

pal matters, and so avoid the necessity of proving them by

depositions.

58, This, then, is the peculiar province of the charg-

ing part of the bill ; for if the same were attempted to be

done in the statement, it would interrupt its course and

render that confused, the chief quality of which should be
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clearness and intelligibility. But this, though the princi-

pal, is not the only end of the charging part, for as the

relief sought frequently consists of a variety of particulars,

the charges are sometimes made to support a part of the

prayer. Thus, the circumstances which warrant the ap-

plication for an injunction are generally stated in the

charging part. Again, if it be anticipated that the defend_ ,

ant has any matter of avoidance to set up against the

to all the facts stated in the bill ; but as it is a maxim in
our law that no man shall be bound to criminate himself,
care must be taken that no allegation be n1ade which
would subject the defendant, if admitted by him, to penalty or forfeiture, [a] unless, indeed, the forfeiture be one
thereby accruing to the complainant himself, and that he
specifically waives his right to it, [b] for the sake of the
discovery. So far, then, as the defendant admits the facts
alleged in the bill~ it precludes the necessity of having
them prov~d in evidence; as, on the other hand, if there
be an unequivocal denial on the part of the defendant,
two witnesses, at least, are required to establish _the fact
against his oath. [c] One of the chief objects of the
draftsman's care. therefore, should be to charge in his bill
all such material circumstances of the case as n1ay tend to
draw forth from the defendant an admission of the principal matters, and so avoid the necessity of proving them by
depositions.

statement of complaint, whatever will operate to rebut

[a] 1Bro. o. o. as. 1Atk. 529. 2Atk. 392. 2Ves. 109.

58. This, then, is the peculiar province of the charg-

[b] 1 Vern. 109-129. 1 Chan. Rep. 144.

[c] 2 Chan. Ca. 8. 1 Vern. 161. 3 Atk. 649, 270.

ing part of the bill ; for if the same were attempted to be
done in the statement, it would interrupt its coursd and
render that confused, the chief quality of which should be
clearness and intelligibility. But this, though the principal, is not the only end of the charging part, for as the
relief sought frequently consists of a v~riety of particulars,
the charges are sometimes made to support a part of the
prayer. Thus, the circumstances which warrant the application for an injunction are generally stated in the
charging part. Again, if it be anticipated that the defe_nd- .
ant has any matter of avoidance to set up against the
statement of complaint, whatever will operate to rebut
[a] I Bro. C. C. 98. 1 Atk. 529. 2 Atk. 392. 2 Ves. 109.
[b] 1 Vern. 109-129. 1 Chan. Rep. 144.
[c] 2 Chan. Ca. 8. 1 Vern. 161. 3 Atk. 649, 270.

THIRD PART, on PRETENCES AND crmnens. 51

that avoidance should be stated by way of charge, founded

'rHIRD PART, OR PRETENCES AND CHARGES.

51

upon the supposed reasons of the defendant for refusing

to accede to the complainant’s reasonable requests; [a]

and in this respect the charging part supersedes the use of

a special replication, and, as far as regards discovery, is

somewhat similar to a cross examination.

59, Hence we may collect, that the difference be-

tween the stating and charging parts of the bill, is, that

the ﬁrst is conﬁned to simply unfolding the nature of the

relation clearly and concisely, containing such matters of

inducement as are requisite for explanation and for de-

' ducing the title; the latter is used for the purpose of add-

ing all such further facts and allegations which cannot be

conveniently inserted in the statement, and which yet are

material, either to extract admissions from the defendant,

or to obtain collateral relief; or, lastly, to anticipate the

defence. In fact, it being a question of arrangement only,

much must beleft to the sagacity and discretion of the

draftsman in determining which part of the bill he shall

choose for making any particular statement, since the

pretences and charges are made a separate part of the bill,

more for the sake of the “ lucidus ordo” than from any
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real distinction existing, other than that we have noticed

above. [b] In many cases, therefore, this part may be

altogether passed over; and the foregoing observations

will serve to instruct the pupil when charges should be in-

troduced arid when they may be omitted.

[a] Mitt‘. 34-5. '

[0] Lord Kenyon, in the bills he drew when at the bar,

never put in the charging part, which does little more than un-

fold and enlarge the statement. Madd. Prac. 169; and Patridge

v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 574, there cited.

that avoidance should be stated by way of charge, foundeq
upon the supposed reasons of the defendant for refusing
to accede to the complainant's reasonable requests; [a]
and in this reRpect the charging: part supersedes the use of
a special replicatjon, and, as far as regards discovery, i~
somewhat similar to a cross examination.

59. Hence we may collect, that the difference between the stating and charging parts of the bill, is, that
the first is confined to simp1y unfolding the nature of the
relation clearly and concisely, containing such matters of
inducement as are requisite for explanation and for de ..
, ducing the title; the latter is used for the purpose of adding all such further facts and allegations which cannot be
conveniently inserted in the statement, and which yet are
material, either to extract admissions from the defendant,
or to obtain collateral relief; or, lastly, to anticipate the
defence. In fa?t, it being a question of arrangement only,
much must be left to the sagacity and discretion of the
d.raftsman in determining which part of the bill he shall
choose for making any particular statement, since the
pretences and charges are made a separate part of the bill,
more for the sake of the "' lucidus ordo " than from any
real distinction existing, other than that we have noticed
above. {b] In many cases, therefore, this part may be
altogether passed over; and the foregoing observations
will serve to instruct the pupil when ch.arges should be introduced a~d when they may be omitted.
[a] Mitf. 34-5.
[b] Lord Kenyon, in the bills he drew when at the bar,
never put in the charging part, which does little more than unfold and enlarge the statement. Madd. Pr~c. 169; and Patridge
v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 574, there cited.
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SECTION V.

Of the Fourth, or Interrogating Part, and Prayer.

SECTION

60, Of the conclusion (which, as we have elsewhere

v.

remarked, is but a single sentence), the groundwork is

the prayer for a subpoena, adding a statement of the pur-

Of the Fourth, or Interrogating Part, and Prayer.

poses for which the writ is required. These are in ordi-

nary bills: ﬁrst, that the defendant may be compelled to

60. Of the conclusion (which, as we have elsewhere

attend, in order to answer distinctly the several points of

the bill; and, second, that upon a view of the case the

court may interpose its authority to prevent or redress

immediate wrong; or it may decide upon the ultimate

claims of the parties, and enforce its decree by process of

execution.

61, By the words of the bill, the defendant is re-

quired to give “full, true, perfect and distinct answers,

upon oath, to all and singular the matters stated and

charged in the bill, as if he were distinctly interrogated to

each-;” and this he must do, whether there be interroga-

tories or not. At ﬁrst view, therefore, the repetition of

the whole bill by way of interrogation would appear a

very useless prolixity. But experience has proved the

utility of this practice beyond cavil; for the contrary
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method would not fail to produce still greater expense and

remarked, is but a single sentence), the gro!lnd \Vork is
the prayer for a aubpmna, adding a statement of the purposes for which the writ is required. These are in ordinary bills: first, that the defendant may be compelled to
attend, in order to answer distinctly the several points of
the bill ; and, second~ that upon a view of the case the
court may interpose its authority to prevent or redress
immediate wrong; or it may decide upon the ultimate
claims of the parties, and enforce its decree by process of
executi0n.

delay to the parties, by occasioning frequent and nu mer-

ous exceptions and amendments. The statement, must of

necessity be direct and positive; and if the defendant

thought it his interest to do so, he might content himself

with answering it according to the letter. But in most

instances such a mode of answering would be perfectly

evasive, and leave the substance pf the charge quite un-

touched. [a] Thus, for instance, if the defendant were

charged with having received a speciﬁc sum of money at

[a] Mitf. 36.

61. By the words of the bill, the defendant is required to give "full, true, perfect and distinct answers,
upon oath, to all and singular the matters stated and
charged in the bill, as if he were distinctly interrogated to
each·;" and this he must do, whethel' there be interrogatories or not. At first view, therefore, the repetition of
the whole bill by way of interrogation would appear a
very useless prolixity. But experience has proved the
utility of this practice beyond cavil; for the contrary
method would not fail to produce still greater expense and
delay to the parties, by occasioning frequent and numerous exceptions and amendments. The statement, must oi
necessity be direct and positive; and if the defendant
thought it his interest to do so, he might content himself
with answering it according to the letter. But, in most
instances such a mode of answering would be perfectly
evasive, and leave the substance pf the charge quite untouched. [a] Thus, for instance, if the defendant were
charged with having received a f:pecific sum of money at
[a]

Mitf. 36.

rooms, on INTERROGATING PART. 53

a particular time, although he may have actually received

the money, yet he might with strict truth deny his having

:FOURTH, OR INTERROGATING PART.
received the precise sum, or at the time, or in the manner

53

speciﬁed. The possibility of evasion is, however, obviated,

by putting the statement into the form of an interroga-

tory, with all the concomitant alternatives : as,“ whether

the defendant did not receive that particular sum, or

some, and what other sum of money, at the particular

time mentioned, or at some and what other time, and in

the manner speciﬁed, or how otherwise.”

62- The great object of the interrogating part of the

bill is, therefore, to preclude evasiveness in the answer;

and the whole attention of the draftsman must be turned

to this single point of putting the question in every variety

of form, to elicit a full and deﬁnite reply, and to prevent

the defendant’s having any loophole to escape upon a

negativepregnant. In fact, this part of the bill is alto-

gether subservient to the oﬂice which the bill performs, of

an examination, and should therefore omit nothing essen-

a particular time, although he may have actually received
the money, yet he might with strict truth deny his having
received the precise sum, or at the time, or in the manner
specified. The possibility of evasion is, however, obviated,
by putting the statement into the form of an interrogatory, with all the concomitant alternatives: as,'' whether
the defendant did not receive that particular sum, or
some, and what other sum of money, at the particular
time mentioned, or at some and what other tiJne, and in
the manner specified, or how otherwise."

tial to the proof and elucidation of the statement; but as

the substance of the bill is, in fact, the thing to be an-

swered, and the interrogatories are only permitted for the
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sake of convenience, no question can be put which is not

immediately dependent on, or relevant to, a particular

statement or charge in the bill. [a]

63, With the foregoing reservation, however, what-

ever may be important to the complainant as matter of

discovery to support his case, without his being compelled

to resort to extraneous evidence, may and ought to be in-

terrogated to, since one of the principal ends of a bill

taken as an examination, is‘ to supersede the necessity of‘

proof. Thus in a bill for an account, the nature, value,

and amount of the property charged to have come into the

[a] Mitf. 35_6. 4 Bro. C. C. 458. 6 Ves. 62_3. 11 Ves. 273.

62. The great object of the interrogating part of the
bill is, therefore, to preclude evasiveness in the answer;
and the whole attention of the draftsman must be turned
to this single point of putting the question in every variety
of form, to elicit a full and definite reply, and to prevent
the defendant's having any loophole to escape upon a
negative pregnant. In fact, this part of the bill is alto. gether subservient to the office which the bill performs, of
an examination, and should therefore omit nothing essential to the proof and elucidation of the· statement; but as
the substance of the bill is, in fact, the thing to be answered, and the interrogatories are only permitted for the
sake of convenience, no question can be put which is not
immediately dependent on, or relevant to, a particular
statement or charge in the bill. [a]
63. With

t~e

foregoing reservation, however, whatever may be important to the complainant as matter of
discovery. to support his case, without his being compelled
to resort to extraneous evidence, may and ought to be interrogated to, since one ?f the principal ends of a bill
taken as an examination, i~ to supersede the necessity of
proof. Thus in a bill for an account, the nature, value,
and amount of the property charged to have cotne into the
[a]

Mitf.. 35-6. 4 Bro. C. C. 458. 6 Ves. 62-3. 11 Ves. 273.
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defendant’s hands may be inquired into, and how every
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part has been disposed of; and if any remains in the de-

fendant’s hands, how it is employed; and every other cir-

cumstance which may be of service in taking the account

required. [a]

64, This is, however, only subsidiary to the decree,

and therefore the bill goes on to state, as the secondpur-

pose for which the writ is prayed, that the defendant may

be compelled to account under the decree of the court, in

nearly the same words. We have thought it right to make

defendant's hands may be inquired into, and how every
part has been disposed of; and if any remains in the defendant's hands, how it is employed ; and every other circumstance which may be of service in taking the account
required. [a]

this remark here, because it is apt to appear strange to

the pupil that in one sentence the defendant is called

upon to account with the complainant,-and in the next,

almost the same terms are used, that an account may be

taken under the direction of the court. But the foregoing

observations will have explained that there are two pur-

poses or ends for which the writ of subpoena-is required:

ﬁrst, for discovery ; and second for the interference of the

court, expressed by its order or decree; and that each of

these are distinct.

65, We now come to the latter purpose, the state-

ment of which is usually, though improperly, the “prayer
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for relief.” On examining the structure of a bill, the stu-

dent will see that the only prayer contained in it is that

for the subpoena, and that the clause of which we are now

treating is inserted in order to show to the court how far,

and in what respect, its assistance is required. This is es-

sential, in order to point out to the court and opposite

party the deﬁnite object for which the bill is ﬁled, that the

former may know‘ distinctly what it is called upon to

decide, and the latter what to defend.

. 66, At common law, the settled forms of action ren-

[a] 10 Ves. 290. 11 Ves. 301.

64. This is, however, only subsidiary to the decree,
and therefore the bill goes on to state, as the second purpose for which the writ is prayed, that the defendant may
be compelled to account under the decree of the court, in
nearly the same words. We have thought it right to make
this remark here, because it is apt to appear strange to
the pupil that in one sentence the defendant is called
upon to account with the complainant,. and in the next,
almost the same terms are used, that an account may be
taken under the direction of the court. But the foregoing
observations will have explained that there are two purposes or ends for which the writ of subpmna -is required:
first, for discovery ; and second for the interference of the
court, expressed by its order or decree ; and that each of
these are distinct.

65. We now come to the latter purpose, the statement of which is usually, though itnproperly, the'' prayer
for relief." On Pxamining the structure of a bill, the student will see that the only prayer contained in it is that
for the suhpmna, and that the clause of which we are now
treating is inserted in order to ~ho\v to the court how far,
and in what respect, its assistance is required. rfhis is essential, in order to point out to the court and opposite
party the definite object for which the bill is filed, that the
former may know distinctly \vhat it is called upon to
decide, and the latter what to defend.
66. At comn1on law, the settled forms of action renLa]

10 Ves. 290.

11 Ves. 301.

FOURTH, on INTERROGATING PART. 55

der this part unnecessary in the declaration, as every case

FOURTH, OR INTERROGATING PART.

has its express remedy provided; but it is otherwise in

55

equity, where the mode and degree of relief cannot, from

the nature of the thing, be bounded or prescribed by any

determinate rules, but must be adjusted to the circum-

stances of every individual case, “secundum mquum et

bonmn.” In the former instance, the premises allowed,

the law draws the inevitable conclusion ; in the latter, the

inference is deduced from reason and conscience. It is

therefore proper that the complainant in his bill shall not

leave this inference to be vaguely collected from a diffuse

and sometimes indeterminate statement; but that the

party who is aggrieved should himself set forth the nature

of the redress which he seeks; and it is sometimes ma-

terial, even as a medium of construction, for explaining

equivocal charges in the body of the bill. [a] \

67, The relief sought, again, subdivides itself into

two kinds: ﬁrst, the collateral and auxiliary assistance of

the court for the redress of immediate and prevention of

threatening injury, pending a course of litigation, or the

avoiding a probable future grievance—such as an injunc-

tian, a “ne eoceat regno,” a commission to examine wit_'
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nesses who are ‘abroad, in aid of a trial at law, and the ex-

amination of witnesses “ in perpetuam rei memoriam.”

- The second species of relief is that which is properly so

called, and is founded upon the decree of the court, pro-

nounced upon hearing and deciding on the ultimate claims

of the respective parties.

der this part unnecessary in the declaration, as every case
has its express remedy provided; but it is otherwise in
equity, where the mode and degree of relief cannot, from
the nature of the thing, be bounded or prescribed by any
determinate rules, but must be adj nsted to the circumstances of every individual case, " secundum mquu,m et
bonum." In the former instance, the premises allowed,
the law draws the inevitable conclusion; in the latter, the ·
inference is deduced from reason and conscience. It is
therefore proper that the complainant in his bill shall not
leave this inference to be vaguely collected from a diffuse
and sometimes indetertninate statement; but that the
party who is aggrieved should himse]f set forth the nature
of the redress which he seeks ; and it is sometimes material, even as a medium of construction, for explaining
·
equivocal charges in the body of the bill. [a]

'68, A bill may be framed for all or any of these pur-

poses conjointly, as for an answer and injunction, or an

answer, injunction and decree; only it is to be observed

that such original bills as call for the decree of the court

[a] 18 Ves. 80.

67 .. The relief sought, again, subdivides itself into
two kinds: first, the col.lateral and auxiliary assistance of
the court for the redress of in1mediat.e and prevention of
threatening injury, pending a course of litigation, or the
avoiding a probable future grievance-such as an injunctian, a'' ne exeat regno,'' a commission to examine wit-·
nesses who are ·abroad, in aid of a trial at law, and the examination of witnesses '"in perpetuam rei tnemoriam."
. The second species of relief is that which is properly so
called, and is founded upon the decree of the court, pronounced upon hearing and deciding on the ultimate claims
of the respective parties.

68. A bill may be framed for all or any of these purposes conjo'intly, as for an answer and injunction, or an
answer, injauction and decree; only it is to be observed
that sllch original bills as call for the decree of the court
[a] 18 Ves. 80.
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are alone termed bills for relief In many instances a

56
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complainant is entitled to a discovery, and even to the col-

lateral aid of the court by injunction, or an order for com-

mission, etc., where the court could not decree relief; and

in such case care must be taken not to frame the bill as a

bill for relief, for otherwise it would be demurrable. .[a]

Hence the student must be acquainted with the nature

and extent of the authority of a court of equity, as well as

with the subjects of its jurisdiction ; that from the one he

may learn what injuries the court can redress, from the

other, the manner of effecting it. Upon this, and the na-

ture of the injury sustained, or the grievance complained

of, must depend the form of the remedy to be applied. If

it be an injury arising from the subtraction of a duty, the

direct and substantial relief will be a decree for the restor-

ation of the right (wherever that can be effected), accom-

panied by such ancdlary directions as will tend to effectu-

ate that object. If the assistance of the court he required

to redress a grievance, or remove a‘ diﬁiculty ﬂowing out

of the relative situation of the parties, then such relief

must be sought as accords with the practice of the court,

ascertained by a series of decisions in similar or analogous
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cases.

69, After the statement of the particular relief

sought, there is always added a general suggestion that

the complainant “may have such further or other relief

in the premises as the nature and circumstances of the

case may require;” and the court, acting upon this sug-

gestion, will vary the relief according to its discretion, so

as to meet the justice of the case; [b] provided, such relief

[a] 2 Bro, C. C. 319. 6 Ves. 62. 11 Ves. 509. 2 Ves. &

Beames, 328.

[b] 2 Ves. Jun. 401. 5 Ves. 495.

are alone termed billa for relief. In many instances a
complainant is entitled to a discovery, and even to the collateral aid of the court by injunction, or an order for commission, etc., where the court could uot decree relief; and
in such case care must be taken not to frame the bill as a
bill for relief, for otherwise it would be detnnrrable. .[a]
Hence the student must be acquainted with the nature
and extent of the authority of a court of equity, as well as
with the subjects of its jurisdiction; that from the one he
may learn what injuries the court can redress, from the
other, the manner of effecting it.. Upon this, and the nature of the injury sustained, or the grievance complained
of, must depend the form of the remedy to be applied. If
it be an injury arising from the subtraction of a duty, the
direct .and substantial relief will be a decree for the restoration of the right (wherever that can be effected), accompanied by such anc,llary directions as will tend to effectuate that object. If the assistance of the court be required
to redress a grievance, or remove a· difficulty flowing out
of the relative situation of the parties, then such relief
must be sought as accords with the practice of the court,
ascertained by a series of decisions in similar or analogous
cases.

69.

After the statement of the particular relief
sought, there is always added a general suggestion that
the complainant "may have such further or other relief
in the premises as the nature and circumstances of the
case may require;'' and the court, acting upon this suggestion, \viii vary the relief according to its discretion, so
as to meet the justice of the case ; [ b] provided, such relief
[a]

2 Bro, C. C. 319.

6 Ves. 62.

Beames, 328.
[b]

2 Ves. Jun. 401.

5 Ves. 495.

11 Ves. 509.

2 Ves. &
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be not incompatible with that sought by the bill; [a] and

FOURTH, OR lNTERROGATlNG :I?AltT.

the reason of this last rule is, that as the relief required

57

must grow out of the statement of the injury sustained, of

the nature of which, therefore, it will be a fair construc-

tion, it would be absurd as well as unjust towards the

-defendant to make a decree in favor of the complainant

inconsistent with his own case. But there is an exception

to this rule in the case of an information by the attorney

general, suing on behalf of a charity, [b] or where a bill

is ﬁled by an infant; [c] in the former instance, because

the interest of the charity ought not to suffer from the ne-

glect or default of a public ofﬁcer; in the latter, because

an infant, having no discretion of his own, the court is

bound to protect his rights, without any regard to mistake

or error in point of form. The draftsman should therefore

use the utmost caution in this part of the bill; and if he

doubts the complainant’s title to the relief he wishes to

pray, the bill may be framed with a double aspect, that if

the court determines against him in one view of the case,

it may yet afford him assistance in another. [d]

[a] 2 Atk. 141. 1 Ves. Jun. 426. 3 Ves. 416. 12 Ves. 48.

13 Ves. 114.
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[b] l Atk. 355. 2 Ves. 426. 11 Ves. 247, 367.

[c] 1Atk. 6.

[d] Mitf.31. 2Atk.325. 6Ves.53.

be not incompatible with that sought by the bill; [a] and
the reason of this last rule is, that as the relief required
must grow out of the statement of the injury sustained, of
the nature of which, therefore, it will be a fair construction, it would be absurd as well as unjust towards the
. defendant to make a decree in favor of the complainant
inconsistent with his own case. But there is an exception
to this rule in the case of an information by the attorney
general, suing on behalf of a charity, [b] or where a bill
is filed by an infant; [ c] in the former instance, because
the interest of the charity ought not to suffer from the neglect or default of a public officer; in the latter, because
an infant, having no discretion of his own, the court is
bound to protect his rights, without any regard to mistake
or error in point of form. The draftsman should therefore
use the utmost caution in this part of the bill ; and if he
doubts the complainant's title to the relief he wishes to
pra.y, the bill may be framed with a double aspect, that if
the court determines against him in one view of the case,
it may yet afford him assistance in another. [d]
[a] 2 Atk. 141. 1 Ves. Jun. 426. 8 Ves. 416.
13 Ves. 114.
[b] 1 Atk. 855. 2 Ves. 426. 11 Ves. 247, 367.
[o] 1 Atk. 6.
[d] Mitf. 31. 2 Atk. 325. 6 Ves. 58.

12 Ves. 48.

CHAPTER III.

OF SECONDARY BILLS.

.

70, Having thus gone through the several parts of

an ordinary bill, it only remains to notice some peculiari-

ties in the structure of such bills as are not original, but

which are the consequence of, or have some reference to,

a former bill; and the peculiarities we shall point out in

each, will at the same time be illustrative of the general

doctrine.

71, In the progress of a suit, circumstances may

CHAPTER III.

arise Which will cause such a change in the state of the

relation between the parties as to render it necessary to

OF SECONDARY BILLS.

add new incidents to the former relation, or to state an

entirely new relation, which will, however, have a refer-

ence to the former, inasmuch as it grows out of the former

subject of litigation. The same may likewise occur after

the termination of a suit, and before the execution of the

decree. In any of these cases a new bill must be ﬁled,

which, as it of course refers to the former bill, and the

subsequent proceedings thereon, is therefore distinguished

from the original bill, and termed “ not original.” So far

as such bill merely adds new incidents to a still subsisting
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relation, it is supplemental; where it states a new relation

between new parties, it is either a revivor, or in the nature

of revivor, or supplement.

72, We have already seeh that the use of a supple-

mental bill is either, 1st, to supply the place of amend-

ment at that state of the proceedings when amendment .

70. Having thus gone through the several parts of
an ordinary bill, it only remains to notice some peculiarities in the structure of such bills as are not original, but
which are the consequence of,. or have some reference to,
a former bill ; and the peculiarities we shall point out in
each, will at the same time be illustrative of the general
doctrine.
71. In the progress of a suit, circumstances may
arise which will cause such a change in the state of the
relation between the parties as to render it Q.ecessary to
add new incidents to the former relation, or to state an
entirely new relation, which will, however, have a referer,ce to the former, inasmuch as it grows out of the former
subject of litigation. The same may likewise occur after
the termination of a suit, and before the execution of the
decree. In any of these cases a new bill must be filed,
which, as it of course refers to the former bill, and the
subsequent proceedings thereon, is therefore distinguished
from the original bill, and termed ''not original.'' So far
as such bill merely adds new incidents to a still subsisting
relation, it is supplemental; where it states a new relation
between new parties, it is either a revivor, or in the nature
of revivor, or Bupplement.

72. We have already seen that the use of a supplemental bill is either, 1st, to supply the place of amendment at that state of the proceedings when amendment
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will not be permitted, o1', 2d, to add such cirotitrilsﬁrinjie\

which have occurred subsequent to the ﬁling of the origi-

nal bill, as may either have caused a change in the terms

of the relation subsisting between ‘the original parties,

and. consequently in the rights and duties ﬂowing from it;

or an alteration in the parties, by means of which new

parties to the suit must be brought before the court.

From this circumstance of the alteration of the parties to

the relation, the principal diﬁiculty arises as to when a

suit becomes abated, and when merely defective, and con-

sequentlyin what cases a supplemental bill will suﬁice.

We shall here, therefore, endeavor to apply the principles

•

we before laid down concerning relations, as an attempt

at a solution of the present diﬁiculty.

Au i‘sqppzg

.

Sscrrou I.

Of Abatement, and the Distinction between Suits abated,

and those become merely defective.

73, All persons who have such an interest in the
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matters in litigation, as that their rights might be affected

by the decree‘, should strictly be parties to the suit. [a]

This is the general rule adopted by a court of equity,

which, as it does not conﬁne its decree to the mere decision

of the question at issue between the principal parties, but

determines all points of controversy which may arise out

of the principal question, and gives direction thereupon,

which may affect persons remotely or consequentially con-

cerned in interest, will not make such decree, unless the

:1:

-•
c.:a

II.

a

-•
.:

persons so concerned are brought before the court, to

assert or defend their particular rights. [b]

[a] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 2 Atk. 296, 515. 7 Ves. 563. 1 Meriv.

262. 16 Ves. 325.

[b] 3 P. Wms. 333. Mit. 134.

•
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\.
}'~
will not be permitted, or, 2d, to add such ciffitrms~
which have occurred subsequent to the filing of tb.e btig ..
"'
nal bill, as may either have caused a change in the terms
of the relation subsisting between 'the original parties,
and. consequently in the rights and duties flowing from it;
or an alteration in the parties, by means of which new
parties to the suit must be brought before the court.
From this circumstance of the alteration of the part-ies to
the relation, the principal difficulty arises as to when a
suit becomes abated, and when merely defective. apd consequently in what cases a supplemental bill will suffice.
We shall here, therefore, endeavor to apply the principles
we before laid down concerning relations, as an attempt
at a solution of the present difficulty .

SECTION

I.

Of Abatement, and the Distinction between Suits abated,
and those become merely defective.
73. All persons who have such an interest in the
matters in litigation, as that their rights might be affected
by the decree, should strictly be parties to the suit. [a]
This is t.he general rule adopted by a court of equity,
which, as it does not confine its decree to the mere decision
of the question at issue between the principal parties, but
determines all points of controversy which may arise out
of the principal question, and gives direction thereupon,
which may affect persons rernotely or consequentially concerned in interest, will not make such decree, unless the
persons so concerned ar~ brought before the court, to
assert or defend their particular rights. [b]
[a] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 2 Atk. 296,515. 7 Ves. 563. 1 Meriv.
262. 16 Ves. 825.
[b] 3 P._Wms. 333. Mit. 134.
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74, This rule, however, is not so strict but that it
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- may in some cases, be dispensed with—as where, from the

multitude of the parties, it would be inconvenient or im-

74. This rule, however, is not so strict but that it.

practicable—“ the court preferring to go as far as possible

towards justice, rather than to deny it altogether.” [a]

So, where the interest of the party is very remote, [b] or

his rights depend upon the establishment of prior claims,

[c] or where there is already before the court a person

competent to protect them, and in general it may be put

negatively, that none are required to be parties who are

not bound by the decree, [d] as, on the other hand, none

are bound by the decree who are not parties to the suit.

[6]

75, Thus, then, all persons whose rights are neces-

sarily involved in the litigation before the court, are

necessary parties. But their rights must ﬂow from some

relation existing between them and the principal parties

to the suit. Relations, we have seen, are either, ﬁrst,

original; or, second, derivative; or, third, collateral. [f ]

It is clear that all those who are parties to the original re-

lation must also be parties to the suit commenced by any

of them touching such relation, or the incidents belonging

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to it, unless such parties as may be passed over from re-

moteness of interest—as a remainder-man, after a vested

estate of inheritance. [g] So all derivative parties, so far

as their newly acquired rights may be affected by the

question between the original parties, or their acquisition

of new rights may affect the original rights. So, likewise,

[a] 16 Ves. 329: per Ld. Eldon, C.

[b] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 166. Mitf. 139.

[e] Mitf. 142. 2 Vern. 527. Amb. 564. 16 Ves. 327.

[d] 3 P. \Vms. 310, in note.

[e] 1 Ball. & Beatty, 447.

[f] Vide ante, p. 198.

Lg] Mitf. 141.

. may in some cases, be dispensed with-as where, from the
multitude of the parties, it would be inconvenient or itnpracticable-" the court preferring to go ~s far as possible
towards justice, rather than to deny it altogether." [a]
So, where the interest of the party is very remote, [ b] or
his rights depend upon the establishment of prior clain1s,
[c] or where there is already before the court a person
competent to protect them, and in general it may be pnt
negatively, that none are required to be parties who are
not bound by the decree, [d] as, on the other hand, none
are bound by the decree who are not parties to the suit.
[e]
75. Thus, then, all persons whose rights are necessarily involved in the litigation before the court, are
necessary parties. But their rights must flow from some
relation existing between them and the principal parties
to the suit. Relations, we have seen, are either, first,
origi'i~Jal,· or, second, derivative,· or, third, collateral. [f]
It is clear that all those who are parties to the original relation must also be parties to the suit commenced by any
of them touching such relation, or the incidents belonging
to it, unless such parties as may be passed over from remoteness of interest-as a remainder-man, after a vested
estate of inheritance. [g] So all derivative parties, so far
as their newly acquired rights may be affected by the
question between the original parties, or their acquisition
of new rights may affect the original rights.. So, likewise,
taJ 16 Ves. 329: per Ld. Eldon, C.
[b] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 166. Mitf. 139.
[c] Mitf. 142. 2 Vern. 527. Amb. 564. 16 Ves. 327.
[d] 3 P. 'Vms. 310, in note.
[e] 1 Ball. & Beatty, 447.
[j] Vide ante, p. 198.
Lg] Mitf. 141.
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if a derivative party commence a suit against any of the

61

original parties, it may be necessary to bring his collater-

als before the court, if their collateral rights may be en-

dangered or called in question by the suit—as where the

devisee is compelled to make the heir-at-law a party when

he claims to have the will established. [a] It is upon col-

lateral rights that cross_bills are generally ﬁled.

76, We have thus far ascertained, at least in gen-

eral terms, what parties ought to be named in the original

bill; and if any such should be omitted, they may be

added at any period afterwards, by way of amendment.

[b] But where any of the parties to the original relation

come into existence after the bill is ﬁled—as on the birth of

if a derivative part.y commence a suit against any of the
original parties, it may be necessary to bring his collaterals before the court, if their collateral rights may be endangered or called in question by the suit-as where the
devisee is compelled to make the heir-at-law a party when
he claims to have the will established. [a] It is upon collateral rights that cross-bills are generally filed.

a tenant in tail, [c] or where the derivative relation, which

makes the addition of a new party necessary, is created

subsequent to the commencement of the suit; or if the

collateral relation accrues by an event subsequent, there

must be a supplemental bill to bring such new parties

before the court. [d] This is, however, only in case the

new parties are required to be added merely to the origi-

nal suit, and who should have been named as parties in

the original bill, or might have been made parties by
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amendment afterwards, had such parties been in exist-

ence, or had the derivative or collateral relation occurred

before the bill was ﬁled; and this is the true test for ascer-

taining when new parties may be added by supplement

merely.

77- ‘ Abatement is either of the suit, or as to a party.

A suit is said to abate when, in consequence of some

event, there is no longer any person before the court, by

[a] 2 Ves. 431.

[b] Vide anteI p. 65_6.

[c] Mitt‘. 49.

[d] Ante, p. 137.

76. We have thus far ascertained, at least in general ·terms, what parties ought to be named in the original
bill; and if any such should be omitted, they may be
added at any period afterwards, by way of amendment.
[b] But where any of the parties to the original relation
come into existence after the bill is filed-as on the birth of
a tenant in tail, [c] or where the derivative relation, which
makes the addition of .a ne\v party necessary, is created
subsequent to the commencement of the suit; or if the
collateral relation accrues by an event subsequent, there
must be a supplemental bill to bring such new parties
before the court. [d] This is, however, only in case the
new parties are required to be added merely to the original suit, and who should have been named as parties in
the original bill, or might have been made parties by
amendment afterwards, had such parties been in existence, or had the derivative or collateral relation occurred
before the bill was filed; and this is the true test for ascertaining when new parties may be added by supplement
merely.

77. ' Abatement is either of the suit, or as to a party.
A suit ·is said to abate when, in consequence of some
event, there is no longer any person before the court, by
[a]

2 Vee. 431.

[b] Vide ante, p. 65-6.
[c]
[ d]

Mitf. 49.
Ante, p. 137.
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or against whom the proceedings can be carried forward.

. 62
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Abatement as to a party is, where the interest and title,

or liability of the party, having ceased, it is no longer

necessary to have such party before the court. When, in

consequence of some derivative relation, a new party is

required to be substituted in the room of one of the origi-

nal parties, and not added only, it is clear, that the substi-

tution works an abatement, as far as regards the original

party. Now, derivative relations are produced, either,

ﬁrst, by the death of a party; second, by a voluntary

transfer ofinterest; third, by the act oflaw; or, lastly, by

succession.

78, As to the first, it is obvious that where derivative

rights have devolved upon a new party by the death of

an original party, there is necessarily an abatement as to

the party, and the substitution of the new party will be a

revivor as to him; but unless the deceased had been a sole

complainant or defendant, even though he be a principal

party, the suit has not abated by the death, because there

are still before the court parties, by or against whom the

proceedings may be carried forward. Nevertheless, if

in such case the interest of the deceased party is trans-
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mitted to his representatives, so that it is necessary to

have such representatives before the court, the suit be-

comes to that extent defective, and can only be continued

by a revivor as to the representatives of the deceased

party. [a]

79,' A derivative relation, by the voluntary act of

the party, can only be created by an assignment of inter-

est in the matters in litigation; if it be an assignment of

part only of his interest, the new party, in respect of his

new rights, ought to be added to the suit, by way of sup-

plement; and here it is clear there is no abatement. If

' [a] Boddy v. Kent, 1 Meriv. 564.

or against whom the proceedings can be carried forward.
Abatement as to a p"arty is, where the interest and title,
or liability of the party, having ceased, it is no longer
necessary to have such party before the court. When, in
consequence of so1ne derivative relation, a new party is
required to be substituted in the room of one of the original parties, and not added only, it is clear, that the ~ubsti
tution works an abatement, as far as regards the original
party. Now, derivative relations are produced, either,
:first, by the death of a party; second, by a voluntary
transfer of" interest; third, by the act of law; or, lastly, by
succession.

78. As to the first, it is obv!ous that where derivative
rights have devolved upon a new party by the death of
an original party, there is necessarily an abatement as to
the party, and the substitution of the new party will be a
revivor as t.o him; but unless the deceased had been a sole
complainant or defendant, even though he be a principal
party, the suit has not abated by the death, because there
are still before the court parties, by or against whom the
proceedings may be carried forward. Nevertheless, if
in such case the interest of the deceased party is transmitted to his representatives, so that it is necessary to
have such representatives before the court, the suit becomes to that extent defective, and can only be continued
by a revivor as to the representatives of the ~eceased
party. [a]

79. · A derivative relation, by the voluntary act of'
the party, can only be created by an assignn1ent of interest in the matters in litigation ; if it be an assign n1en t of
part only of his interest, the new party, in respect of his
new rights, ought to be added to the suit, by way of supplement'; and here it is clear there is no abatement. If
[a]

Boddy v. Kent, 1 Meriv. 564.

or ABATEMENT. 63

63

the assignment be of the party’s whole interest, as it is no

OF ABATEMENT.

longer necessary to have such party before the court,

there will be an abatement as to the party whenever the

assignee is substituted, but not until then, for, in effect, if

the alienation of the propertypendente lite be not dis-

closed, the suit will proceed without the addition or sub-

stitution of the derivative parties, who will, notwithstand-

ing, be bound by the decree, since they thus tacitly submit

to purchase the property, under all its circumstances of

hazard, and subject to the event of the suit. [a] If, there-

fore, their newly acquired rights are materially affected

by the decree, their only remedy will be an original bill,

something in the nature of a cross bill. [b] On the other

hand, if their newly acquired rights so far affect the origi-

nal rights as that the decree cannot be put in force without

making them parties, on this fact being discovered, they

must be added by supplemental bill, to carry the decree

in to execution. [c] '

80, Thus, though when a party assigns his whole in-

terestpendente lite, and the assignee is made party to the

suit in his room, there is an abatement as to the party as-

signor; yet in no case, even where the party assigning his
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whole interest is sole complainant, does such assignment

cause ipso facto an abatement of the suit; for an abatement

of the suit only happens where there is no longer any per-

son before the court, by or against whom the proceedings

can be carried forward. But we have just seen that the

suit may be proceeded with, notwithstanding the assign-

ment of the party’s entire interest. Indeed, the principle

[a] “Pendente lite nihtl innovetur.” Oo. Litt. 344, b. and

ride 2 Atk. 174. Ambl. 676. 11 Ves. 195. 2Ves. & Beames, 204,

the assignment be of the party's whole interest, ns it is no
longer necessary to have such party before the court,
there will be an abatement as to the party whenever the
assignee is substituted, but not until then, for, in effect, if
the alienation of the property pendente lite
not disclosed, the suit will proceed without the addition or substitution of the derivative parties, who \\·ill, notwithstanding, be bound by the decree, since they thus tacitly submit
to purchase the property, under all its circumstances of
hazard, and subject to the event of the suit. [a] If, therefore, their newly acquired rights are materially _affected
by the decree, their only retnedy will be an ~riginal bill,
something in the nature of a cross bill. [b] On the other
hand, if their newly fl.Cquired rights so far affect the original rights as that the decree cannot be put in force without
making them parties, on this fact being discovered, they
must be added by supplemental, bill, to carry the decree
in to execution. [c]

be

ct seq.

[b] Mitf. 58. 2 Atk. 174. 3 Atk. 57.

[c] Mitt‘. 57.

80.

Thu~ 1

though when a party assigns his whole in- ·
terest pendente lite, and the assignee is made party to the
suit in his rconi, there is an abatement as to the party assignor; yet i~ no case, even where the party assigning his
whole interest is sole complainant, does such assignment
c~use ipso facto an abatement of the suit; for an abatement
of the suit only happens where there is no longer any person before the court, by or against \Vhom the proceedings
can be carried forward. But we have just seen that the
suit may be proceeded with, notwithstanding the assignment of the party's entire interest. Indeed, the principle
[a] "Pendente lite nihil innovetur.'' Co. Litt. 344, b. and
vide 2 Atk. 174. Ambl. 676. 11 Ves. 195. 2 Ves. & Beames, 204,
et seq.
[b] Mitf. 58. 2 Atk. 174. 3 Atk. 57.
[c] Mitf. 57.
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is carried to such an extent that it seems a man may bring

two bills at his own expense, making use of the name of

his assignor in one; nor can the court say he shall be

stopped in that one. [a]

81, If, indeed, the suit be proceeded with, notwith-

standing the assignment, and such assignment beknown,

the want of interest may be used in the defence as a plea

in bar; and, therefore, if the assignment be on the part of

is carried to such an extent that it seems a man may bring
two hills at his own expense, making use of the name of
his assignor in one ; nor can the court say he shall be
stopped in that one. [a]

a sole complainant, the suit in his name will necessarily

be rendered ineffectual, not because there is no longer

before the court a person competent to conduct it, but

because the cause of action is transferred to another.

This, though it in effect puts an end to the suit, is not

however, an abatement. and if three terms elapse without

any further proceeding, the bill may be dismissed. The

assignee of the complainant may, in the meantime, how-

-ever, commence a new suit in respect of his acquired in-

terest, which will have a reference, so far, to the original

proceedings, as that he may crave the beneﬁt of them.

The bill necessary to be ﬁled by the assignee of a sole

complainant, therefore, will be an original bill, in the na-

ture of a supplemental bill. [b]
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82, If the assignment be on the part of a sole defend-

ant, though there is an abatement as to the party, there is

. no abatement of the suit, and consequently the complain-

ant may ﬁle a bill, stating the change of interest which

has occurred, and substituting the assignee as the new de-

fendant; but such bill being only in continuation of the

former, will be supplemental merely, though in the nature

of a hill of revivor, so far as regards the abatement as to

the party.

[a] Ambl. 546.

[b] Mitf. 51.

EQ. Pn.—l'l.

81. If, indeed, the suit. be proceeded with, notwithstanding the assignment, and such assignment be .known,
the want of interest may be used in t-he defence as a plea
in bar; and, therefore, if the assignment be on t.he part of
a sole co1nplainant, the suit in his name will necessarily
be rendered ineffectual, not because there is no longer
before the court a person competent to conduct it, but
because the cause of action is transferred to another.
This, though it in effect puts an end to the suit, is not
however, an abatement, and if three terms elapse without
any further proceeding, the bill may be dismissed. The
assignee of the complainant may, in the tneantime, how. ever, commence a new suit in respect of his acquired interest, which will have a reference, so far, to the original
proceedings, as that he may crave the benefit of thetn.
The bill necessary to be filed by the assignee of a sole
complainant~ therefore, will be an or1ginal bill, in the nature of a supplemental bill. [ b]

82. If the assignment be on the part of a sole defendant, though there is an abatement aJ to the party, there is
. no abatement of the suit, and consequently the complainant may file a bill, stating the change of interest which
has occurred, and substituting the assignee as the new defendant; but such bill being only in cor1tinuation of the
former, will be supplemental merely, though in the nature
of a bill of revivor, so far as regards the abatement as to
the party.
[a] Ambl. 546.
[b] Mitf. 51.
EQ. PL.-17.
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83, This difference between a sole complainant and
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a sole defendant is father accounted for on this principle,

that the defendant shall not be allowed to-take advantage

83. This difference between a sole complainant and

of his own act to bar the complainant’s right during the

pendency of a suit, but the suit will continue against the

assignee of the interest, who takes it with all the liabili-

ties attached. [a] The distinction between the marriage

of a feme plaintiff and a feme defendant, as it effects the

suit, rests upon similar grounds. If a feme plaintiff‘ mar-

ries pendente lite, although her interest in the subject of

litigation be not gone, yet she voluntarily deprives her-

self of all title to sue alone, in consequence of which the

suit becomes abated, and the husband, jure uxoris, to-

gether with the wife in respect of the interest remaining in

her (being but one personin contemplation of law), must

be substituted for the feme sole complainant, by revivor.

[b] On the other hand, a feme sole defendant cannot by

her own voluntary act discharge herselffrom liability; [c]

but such liability is annexed to the person of her husband,

who should therefore -be named.in all subsequent proceed-

ings; [d] and such is manifestly no abatement of the

suit. '
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84, In general terms, it may be stated, that no cir-

cumstance causes an abatement of a suit, which would

not be valid as a plea in abatement, although such circum-

stance may produce an abatement as to a party, and

although the suit may thereby be barred. It is a want of

attention to this distinction between a suit being abated

and a suit being barred, which has caused all the un-

[a] Ambl. 676. 2 Ves. & Beames, 200.

[b] 1 Vern. 318. 1 Ves. 182.

[0] Beames’ Pleas, 283. Gilb. For. Rom. 174, 175.

[(1] Ibid.

5

~

sole defendant is father accounted for on this principle,
that the defendant shall not be allowed to· take advantage·
of his own act to bar the complainant's right during the
pendency of a suit, but the suit will continue against the
assignee of the interest, who ta~es it with all the liabilities attached. [a] The distinction between the marriage
of a feme plaintiff and a feme defendant, as it effects the
suit, rests upon similar grounds. If a feme plaintiff ~arries pendente lite, although her interest in the subject of
litigation be not gone, yet she voluntarily deprives herself of all title to sue alone, in consequence of which the
suit becomes abated, and the husband, jure uworia, together with the wife in respect of the interest remaining in
her ·(being but one person "in contemplation of Jaw), must
be aubatit.uted for the feme sole complainant, by revivor.
[b] On the other hand, a feme sole defendant cannot by
her own voluntary act discharge herselffrom liability; [c]
but such liability is annexed to the person of her husba~d,
who sho~ld therefore pe named .in all sub~quent proceed·ings; [d] aud such is manifestly no abatement of the
suit.

.

84. In general terms, it may be stated, that no circumstance causes an abatement of a suit, which would
not be valid ~s a plea in abatement, although such circumstance may produce an abatement aa to a party, and
although the suit may thAreby be barred. It is a want of
attention to this distinction between a suit being abated
and a suit being barred, which has caused all the unAmbl. 676. 2 Ves. & Beames, 200.
1 Vern. 318. 1 Ves. 182.
[ c] Beames' Pleas, 283. Gil b. For. Rom. 174:, 175.
[d] Ibid.
5

[a]
[b]

•
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certainty and contradiction as to the effect of bankruptcy,

or insolvency, pending a suit. [a]

85, The property of a bankrupt, or insolvent, is, by

law, transferred to assignees, chosen in a particular way,

who hold such property in trust for the beneﬁt of the

creditors, and ultimately for the bankrupt or insolvent. [b]

This transfer of property'produces the third class of deri-

vative relations above enumerated, namely, by act of law.

Now, bankruptcy, or insolvency, can only be taken advan-

tage of by plea in bar, [c] and consequently they cause'

no abatement of the suit. [d] Nor do they even, strictly

speaking, produce an abatement as to the party, for as the

assignees are in the character of trustees, they hold the

property committed to them, not in their own right, but \

I in the right of the bankrupt or insolvent, and are the rep-

resentatives of whatever interest remains in him. That

some interest continues in him is clear, for after payment

of his debts he will be entitled to the surplus of property,

if any; [e] and in some instances the bankrupt is per-

mitted to follow up the suit in his own name, [f] though

in such case he must bring the assignees before the court.

[9] In all cases, therefore, even where the bankrupt or
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insolvent is the sole complainant, his assignees may come

before the court and have the beneﬁt of the former pro-

[a] Vide Beames’ E1. of Pleas, 286, et seq., and the cases

there cited.

[b] 6 Ves. 485. 15 Ves. 8.

[c] Mr. Beames classes bankruptcy and insolvency among

pleas to the person ; in which he professes to follow Lord Redes-

dale. (El. Pleas, 120.) But Lord Redesdale expressly makes it

a plea in bar, under the head of want of interest. Mitf. 189; and

see the next chapter.

[d] Cooper, Tr. 75.

[e] 15 Ves. 8.

[f] Mitf. 52. 1 Atk. 263.

[g] 18 Ves. 424.

certainty and contradiction as to the effect of bankruptcy,
or insolvency, pending a snit. [a]
85. 'The property of a bankrupt, or insolvent, is, by
I a w, transferred to assignee~, chosen in a particular way,
who hold such property in trust for the benefit of the
creditors, and ultimately for the banl\:rupt or insolvent. [b]
This transfer of pro~erty ·produces the third class of derivative relations above enumerated, namely~ by act of law.
Now, bankruptcy, or insolvency, can only be taken advantage of by plea ·in bar, [c] and consequently they cause·
no abatement of the suit. [d] Nor do they even, strictly
speaking, produce an abatement as to the party, for as the
assignees are in the character of trustees, they hold the
property committed to them, not in their own right, but
in the right of the bankrupt or insolvent, and are the representatives of whatever interest remains in him. That
some interest continues in him is clear, for after payment
of his debts he will be entitled to the surplus of property,
if any; [e] and in some instances the bankrupt is permitted to follaw up the suit in his own name, [f] though
in such case he must bring the assignees be~ore the court.
[.q] In all cases, therefore, even where the bankrupt or
insolvent is the sole complainant, his assignees may come
before the court and have the benefit of the former pro[a] Vide Beames' El. of Pleas, 286, et Beq., and the cases
there cited.
[b] 6 Ves. 485. 15 Ves. 8.
[c] Mr. Beames classes bankruptcy and insolvency among
pleas to the person ; in which. he professes to follow Lord Redesdale. (El. Pleas, 120.) But Lord Redesdale expressly makes it
a plea in bar, under the head of want of interest. Mitt. 189; and
see the next chapter.
[ d] Cooper, 'l,r. 75.
[e] 15 Ves. 8.
[/] Mitf. 52. 1 Atk. 263.
[g] 18 V es. 424.
~
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in merely in a representative character, it is rather a

change of persons than of parties to the suit, which re-

mains exactly in the same condition as before. For the

same reason, if any parties, suing or sued en auter droit,

are changed or removed, their successors in the same right

continue the litigation by supplement only. [b]

86- The last species of derivative relations men-

tioned above is that which accrues by succession, or where

a new party comes in to the same interest, but by a dif-

ferent title—as in the case of succession to a beneﬁce.

This must happen either by the death or removal of the

former party‘. On the principles already established, it

is clear that in case of death the suit is abated; in case of

removal, the suit is barred; and in all cases there is an

abatement as to the party when the successor is substi-

tuted. Here, therefore, the parties must commence the

proceedings de now, and the original proceedings will be

of no further avail than that, on being referred to, they

may be a groundwork for the court to adopt similar pro-

ceedings in the new suit. [c] Such original bill is there-

fore said to be in the nature of a supplemental bill.
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.

SECTION II.

Of the Form and Structure of Supplemental Bills.

87, The subject of -every kind of bill, is the state-

ment of some grievance or hardship, arising out of the

relative position of the parties, and the grounds on which

it calls upon the court for relief. Now, in a supplemental

bill, the grievance complained of is, that there exists.

[a] Coop. Tr. 76; and see 1 Ves. & Beames, 500. See 1

Atk. 263. 4 Ves. 387. '

[b] 1 Atk. 88. 3 Atk. 218.

[c] Mitf. 57; and see 9 Ves. 37 to 67.

ceedings, by supplemental bill; [a] for as they come
in merely in a representative character, it is rather a
change of persona than of parties to the suit, which remains exactly in the same condition as before. For the
same reason, if any parties, suing or sued en auter droit,
are changed or removed, their successors in the same right
cont.i~ue the litigation by supplement ~nly. fb]
86. The last species of derivative relations mentioned above is that which accrues by succession, or where
a new party comes in to the same interest, but by a different title-as in the case of succession to a benefice.
This must happen either by the death or removal of the
former party·. On the principles already established, it
is clear that in case of death the suit is abated ; in case of
removal, the suit is barred; and in all cases there is an
abatement as to the party when the successor is aubati ·
tuted. Here, therefore, the parties must commence the
proceedings de novo, and the original proceedings will be
of no further avail than that, on being referred to, they
may be a groundwork for the court to adopt similar proceedings in the new suit. [ c] Such original bill is therefore said to be in the nature of a supplemental bill.
SECTION

II.

Of the Form and Structure of Supple1nental Billa.

87. The subject of· every kind of bill, is the statement of some grievance or hardship, arising out of the
relative position of the parties, and the grounds on which
it ca.lls upon the court for relief. Now, in a supplemental
bill, the grievance complained of is, that there exists .
La] Coop. Tr. 76; and see 1 Ves. & Beames, 500. See 1
Atk. 268. 4 Ves. 387.
·
[b] 1 Atk. 88. 3 Atk. 218.
[c] Mitf. 57; and see 9 Ves. 37 to 67.
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of which complete justice cannot be attained; but which,

nevertheless, cannot, from the nature of it, or from the

state of the proceedings, be remedied in the ordinary way

of amendment.

88, We have seen that the bill should, in all cases,

commence by stating the relation between the parties;

and next deduce therefrom cause of complaint. In a

supplemental bill, the cause of complaint grows out of the

position of the parties to the original suit, and therefore

the statement of the relation in a supplemental bill, will

be a statement of the original bill, and of the proceedings

thereon; the statement of grievance will be of the new

matter which causes the defect in the original suit. This

is alwaysintroduced by the words: “ and your orator fur-

ther showeth, by way of supplement, to your Lordship.”

The bill then proceeds to pray for a subpoena, to the end

that the defendant may answer the new supplemental

matter thus put in issue, and that the court may grant

further relief, grounded on the supplemental statement;

or if the defect in the suit arises from a change of parties,

a subpwna is prayed against the new parties, to the end
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that they may answer the premises, and that the com-

plainant may have the beneﬁt of the former proceedings

as against them, and the same relief as he would be en-

titled to against the original parties.

89, Here, it is obvious, the third part of the bill, ac-

cording to our division, that which contains the pretences

and charges, need in no case be inserted, unless where the

supplemental matter seeks for further discovery; and the

formal clause of equity, which suggests the jurisdiction

of the court, is of course unnecessary, since the supple-

mental bill is only in continuation of the proceedings al-

ready before the court. Indeed, it has been shown, in a

some defect in the suit already before the court, by means
of which cotnplete justice cannot be attained; but which,
nevertheless, cannot, from the nature of it, or from the
state of the proceedings, be remedied in the ordinary way
of amendment.

88. We have seen that the bill should, in all cases,
commence by stating the relation between the parties;
and next deduce therefrom cause of complaint. In a
supplemental bill, the cause of complaint grows out of the
po~ition of the parties to the original suit, and therefore
the statement of the relation in a supplemental bill, will
be a statement of the original bill, and of the proceedings
thereon; the statement of grievance will be of the new
matter which causes the defect in the ?riginal suit. This
is always· introduced by the words.: ,~,and your orator further showeth, by way of supplement, to your Lordship."
lhe bill then proceeds to pray for a auhpmna, to the end
that the defendant may answer the new supplemental
matter thus put in issue, and that the court may grant
further relief, grounded on the supplemental statement;
or if the defect in the suit arises from a· change of parties,
a aubpmna is. prayed against the new parties, to the end
that they may answer the premises, and that the complainant may have the bene~t of the former proceedings
as against them, and the same relief as he would be entitled to against the original parties.

89. Here, it is obvious, the third part of the bill, according to our division, that which contains the pretences
and charges, need in no case be inserted, unless where the
supplemental matter seeks for further discovery ; and the
formal cfause of equity, which suggests the jurisdiction
of the court, is of course unnecessary; since the supplemental bill is only in continuation of the proceedings already before the court. Indeed. it has been shown, in a
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former page, that these parts are not essential,even to the

original bill; and thus a supplemental bill is, in all res-

~ORM
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pects, analogous in its structure to an ordinary bill, and

V‘.-

corroborates the principles we have before laid down con-

' cerning bills in general.

Sscrron III.

Of the Form and Structure of Bills of Revivor, and of

Bills in the Nature of Bills of Revivor.

90, In those cases where a bill of revivor may be

ﬁled, the hardship complained of is, that by the abate-

former page, that these parts are not essential, even to the
original bill; and thus a supp)emental bill is, in all r~s-_
pects, analogous in its structure to an ordinary bill, and
corroborates the principles we have before laid down con. cer~ing billR in ~eneral.

ment of the suit, the complainant would be compelled to

renew the same proceedings against persons who stand in

'precisely the same relation as the parties to the original

SECTION

suit, and against whom, therefore, he has the same claims,

III.

unless the court shall apply a remedy, by allowing the

original proceedings to be revived, for or against the new

parties. To make out such relation, therefore, the bill of .

revivor must state theoriginal bill, and the proceedings

upon it; and further, that the new parties hold exactly

the same place in the original relation as the persons

through whom they derive, and therefore are invested
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with similar rights and duties.

91, This is always the case where the new parties

come in after abatement, by the act of law—such as the

the heir at law, who comes in as the representative of the

deceased, in regard to his real estate; the executor or ad-

ministrator, who represents him as far as regards the per-

sonality; ‘ and the husband,jure uacoris, who must join

with the feme plaintiff to sustain the suit. In all these

cases, therefore, the relation will be suﬂiciently made out

. to give a title to revivor, by merely stating that the new

party is the heir .at law, or executor, or administrator, or

~nd

Structure of Billa of Revivor, and of
Bills in the Nature of Billa of RevivO'I\

Of the Form

90. In those cases where a bill of revivor may be
filed, the hardship complained of is, that by the abatement of the suit, the_ complainant would be compelled to
renew the same proceedings against persons who stand in
precisely the same relation as the parties to the original
suit, and against whom, therefore, he has the same claims,
unless the court shall apply a re~edy, by allowing the
original proceedings to be revived, for or against the new
parties. To make out such relation, therefore, the bill of
revivor must state the· original bill, and the proceedings
·upon it; and further, that the new parties hold exactly
the same place in the original relation as the persons
through whom they derive, and therefore are. invested
with similar rights and duties.

.

91. This is always the case where the new parties
come in after abatement, by the aqt of law-:such as the
the heir at law, who comes in as the representative of the •
deceased, in regard to his r~al est~te; the executor or administrator, who represents him as far as regards the personality;·· and the husband,ju1'e uxoris, who m~st join
with the feme plaintiff to sustain the suit. In all these
cases, therefore, the relation will be sufficiently made out
to give a title to revivor, by merely stating that the new
party is the heir _at law; or executor; or administrator, or
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the husband of the feme plaintiff, and there is no question

70
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put in issue but as to the person of the party. This is the

case of a bill of revivor, properly so called, which there-

upon proceeds to state, “ that the complainant is, as he is

advised, entitled to have the said suit revived against the

defendant, and restored to the same plight and conditiou

as previously to, and at the time of the abatement and

therefore prays a subpoena against the defendant to ap-

pear and show cause, if he can, why the suit and proceed-

ings should not stand and be revived against him, to the

end that the suit may be revived.”

92, When the new party comes in after abatement,

not by the act of law, but by the act of the part;/—as in

the case of la devisee, who comes in under the will of the

testator—to make out such a relation as will entitle to re-

vive, it will be necessary to go one step farther, and to

show not only the state of the former proceedings, and

that the new party is the devisee, but also that the act of

the party, by which the rights and duties have devolved

the husband of the feme plaintiff, and there is no question
put in issue but as to the person of the party. This is the
case of a bill of revivor, properly so called, which thereupon proceeds to state, '" that the complainant is . as he is
ad vised, entitled to have the said suit revived against the
defendant, and restored to the same plight and condition
as previously to, and at the time of the abatement and
therefore prays a aubpmna against the defendant to ap·
pear and show caus~, if he can, why the suit and proceedings should not stand and be revived against him, to the
end that the suit may be revived."

upon him, is valid ; and here, it is manifest, a considerable

question is put in issue, until which is disposed of, either

92. When the new party comes in after abatement,

by admission or by proof, the title to revive is not fully
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established. This, therefore, is no longer a bill of revivor

merely, but an original bill in the nature of a bill of re-

vivor. This kind of bill, then, after showing the abate-

ment and the transmission of interest to the new party,

proceeds to state that, notwithstanding such abatement,

the complainant is, as he is advised, entitled to have the

same relief against the defendant as might have been de-

creed between the parties in the original suit; and then

expressly charges the validity of the instrument by which

the interest of the new party has. been transmitted.

93, Here we are furnished with an exempliﬁcation

of what we have laid down in a former part of this chap-

not by the act of law, but by the act of the party-- as in
the case of 'a devisee, who comes in under the will of the
testator-to mal{e out such a relation as will entitle torevive, it will be necessary to go one step farther, and to
show not only the state of the former proceedings, and
that the new party is the devisee, but also that the act of
the party, by which the rights and duties have devolved
upon him . is valid; and here, it is manifest, a considera~le
question is put in issue, until which is disposed of, either
by admission or by proof, the title to revive is not fully
estabJished. This, therefore, is no longer a bill of revivor
merely, but an or·iginal bill in the natu1·e of a bill vf revivo1'. This kind of bill, then, after showing the abatement and the translnission of interest to the new party,
proceeds to st.ate that, notwithstanding such abatement,
the cotnplainant is, as he is advised, entitled to have the
same relief against the defendant as n1ight have been decreed between the parties in the original suit; and then
expressly charges the validity of the instrument by which
the interest of the new party has. been transmitted.

93. Here we are furnished with an exemplification
of "'·hat \Ve have laid ·down in a former part of this chap-

ORIGINAL BILL IN THE NATURE OF A SUPPLEMENTAL BILL.

' ter. concerning the nature and use of the charging part

of a bill. Thus, the relation is here sufﬁciently made out,

ORIGINAL BILL IN THE NATURE OF A SUPPLEMENTAL BILL.
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by merely showing the abatement and devise, so as to

give a prima facie title, which is the proper function of

the stating part of the bill; and the charge is introduced

to anticipate and controvert the defence which may be set

up, viz: that although such a devise was made, yet that it

was not valid and effectual in law (as, for instance, that

the testator was not empowered to dispose of his real es-

tate by will) ; which brings the point at once to issue be-

tween the parties; and such, we have seen, is the peculiar

province of the charging part. ‘

94, The bill next goes on to pray for a subpoena, in

the common form, to the end that the defendant may an-

swer the premises, and that the same beneﬁt may be had

- of the old suit as if it had not abated, or that the defen-

dant may show good cause to the contrary.

95, A supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of

revivor, is similar in principle to this last, except that, not

being the consequence of an abatement of the suit, it

partakes somewhat of the qualities of a supplemental

and not an original bill.

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Sscrron IV.

Of the Form and Structure of the Original Bill in the

Nature of a Supplemental Bill.

96, In the bills we have just described, the mere

statement of a valid transmission of interest to the new

party is sufﬁcient to establish such a relation as will give

a title to the beneﬁt of the former proceedings, because

the new parties to such bills are.derivative parties, by

privity of blood, or representation, or contract; and in

such cases the derivative interest carries along with it the

ter,. concerning the nature and use of the chargin.q part
of a bill. Thus, the rel~tion is here sufficiently made out,
by Ine~ely showing the abate1nent and devise, so as to
give a prima facie title, which is the proper function of
the stating part of the bill ; and the charge is introduced
to anticip.ate and controvert the defence which 1nay be set
up, viz: that although such a devise was made, yet that it
was not valid and effectual in law (as, for instance, that
the testator was not empowered to dispose of his real estate by will) ; which brings the point at once to issue between ·the parties; and such, we have seen, is the peculiar
province of the charging part.

94. The bill next goes on to pl'ay for a aubpmna, in
. the common form, to the end that the defenda.nt may answer the premises, and that the same benefit may be had
·of the old suit as if it had not abated, or that the defendant rnay show good cause to the contrary.

95. .A supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of
.revivor, is similar in principle to this last, except that, not
being the consequence of an abatement of the suit, it
partakes somewhat of the qualities of a supplemental
and not an original bill.
SECTION

IV.

Of tn.e Form and Structure of the .Or(qinal Bill in the
Nature of a Supplemental Bill.

96. In the bills we have just

des~ribed,

the mere
statement of a valid transn1ission of interest to the new
party is sufficient to. establish such a relation as will give
a title to the benefit of the former proceedings, because
the new parties to such bills are. derivative parties, by
privity of blood, or representation, or contract,· and in
such cases the derivative interest carries along with it the
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original title and liability. But where the new parties
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are derivative by privity of estate only—as in the case of

a successor to a beneﬁce, or of a remainder-man to a ten-

ant in tail, the acquisition of interest is not accompanied

with either the old title or the old liability; but a new

title, and a new liability will spring from the possession

of the estate, which may, perchance, be similar to the for-

mer, as arising out of the same matter of litigation.

97, In such case, therefore, there must be a new

suit altogether, and if in the new suit the injury com-

plained of, and the redress sought, be similar to the former

bill, in general the complainant will have the beneﬁt of

the former proceedings, so far as to have the new suit

considered as supplemental to the original suit. To obtain

this end, however, it will not be enough to show that there

original title and liability. But where the new parties
are derivative by privity of estate only-as in the case of
a successor to a benefice, or of a remainder-man to. a tenant in tail, the acquisition of interest is not accompanied
with either the old title or the old liability; but a new
title, and a new liability will spring from the possession
of the estate, which may, pe~cltance, be similar to the former, as arising out of the same matter of litigation.

has been a transmission of interest, but it will be neces-

sary to state such a new relation as will prove that the

97. In such case, therefore, there must be a new

new title, or the new liability, is similar to the old, and

that the complainant is in consequence entitled to similar

relief; or, in other words, that the new suit is the same in

substance as the original one, and therefore may be made

supplemental to it. This bears a strong analogy to the
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practice of consolidating suits, which is done on special

motion for a reference to the master, to see if two suits

\are for the same purpose. [a]

98, The Original Bill in the nature of a Supple-

mental Bill, states, therefore, the original bill at full

length, with the proceedings. upon it; the manner in

which the succession of interest has accrued; next, the

circumstances which make the relation similar; and,

ﬁnally, it prays for a subpaena against the defendant, to

the end that he may answer the premises,‘and that the

[a] 16 Ves. 344.

suit altogether, and if in the new suit the injury compl.ained of, ~nd the redress sought, be similar to the former
bill, in general the complainant will have the benefit of
the for1ner proceedings, so far as to have the new suit
considered as supplemental to the original suit. To obtain
this end, however, it will not be enough to show that thet;e
has been a transmission of interest, but it will be necessary to state such a new relation as will prove that the
new title, or the new liability, is similar to the old, and
that the complainant is in consequence entitled to similar
relief; or, in other word~, that the new suit is the same in
substance as the original one, and therefore may be made
supplemental to it. This bears a strong analogy to the
practice of consolidating suits, which is done ori special
motion for a reference to the tnaster, to see if two suits
..are for the same purpose. [a]

98. 'The Original Bill in the natu'l'e of a Supplemental Bill, states, therefore, the original bill at full
length, with the proceedings upon it; the manner in
which the succession of interest has accrued; next, the
circurnstances '\Vhich make the relation similar; and,
finally, it pr~ys for a subp(JJna against the defendant, to
tlte end that he may answer the premises,.and that the
[a] 16 Ves. 344.
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complainant may havesimilar relief against him to that

73

which was prayed in the original bill.

.

SECTION V.

Form and Structure of Bills in the Nature of Original

Bills.

complainant may have· sin1ilar relief against hiJn to that
which was prayed in the original bill.

99, We shall now brieﬂy notice the structure of the

remaining bills of such nature, that though they are

SECTION

strictly not original bills, yet the injury they complain of

v.

proceeds out of a former suit. - These are cross_bills-bills

of review—bills to set aside a decree obtained by fraud-

bills to suspend a decree, and bills to carry a decree into

execution.

100, A cross-bill is a species of defence used for the

purpose of obtaining a discovery necessary to the de-

fence, [a] or when it would be too late to use the same

defence by way of plea ; [b] or, lastly, to obtain some re-

lief founded on the collateral claims of the party defen-

dant to the original suit. [c]

101, In the ﬁrst of these cases, the former suit

causes the relation on which is founded the right to dis-

covery; and, consequently, that suit and the proceedings

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

upon it must be stated in the cross-bill. The discovery,

when obtained, if material, must be added to the original

Fo1 m and Structure of Billa in the Nature of Original
Billa.
1

99. We shall now

b~iefly

notice the structure of the
remaining bills of such nature, that thou~h they are
strictly not original bills, yet the injury they complain of
proceeds out of a former suit.. These _are cross-bills-bills
of review-bills to set aside a decree obtained by fraudbills to suspend a decree, and bills to carry a decree into
execution.

answer by way of supplement; for the answer to the

cross-bill cannot be read as a defence at the hearing of the

original cause. [d]

102, In the second instance, the cross_bill is in the

nature of a ple puisdarrein continuance—as, for example,

[a] Mitf. 64. 3 Atk. 812. Mos. 382.

[b] Mitf. 64. 3 Oh. Rep. 19.

[c] 2 Cox, 78.

[cl] 2 Ves. & Beames, 16.

100. A cross-bill is a species of defence used for the
purpose of obtaining a discovery necessary to the defence, [a] or when it would be too late to use the same
defence by way of plea; [b] or, lastly, to obtain some re·
lief founded on the collateral claims of the party defendant to the original suit. [c]

101. In the first of these cases, the former suit
causes the relation on which is founded the right to discovery; and, consequently, that suit and the proceedings
upon it must be stated in the cross-bill. The discovery,
when obtained, if material, must be added to the original
answer by way of supJ?lement; for the answer to the
cross-bill cannot be read as a defence at the hearing of the
original cause. [ d]

102. ·In the second instance, the cross-bill is in the
nature of aple puia.dar-rein continuance-as, for example,
[a] Mitf. 64. 3 Atk. 812. Mos. 382.
[b] Mitf. 64. 3 Ch. Rep. 19.
[c] 2 Cox, 78.
(dl 2 Ves. & Beames, 16.
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where some occurrence has happened after the cause is at
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issue, which would have been a good ground of plea in

bar—such as a release from the plaintiff. Here the state-

ment of relation is of the former bill and proceedings,

and the new occurrence which creates the bar; the injury

is, that the suit is notwithstanding proceeded with, and

that the complainant, in the cross-bill, cannot use the de-

fence as a plea in bar; and he therefore prays a subpoena,

to the end that the premises may be answered and that

the new defence may be declared a sufﬁcient bar to any

further proceedings ; and that, therefore, the original bill

may be forthwith dismissed with costs. This kind of

cross bill is necessary, in order to put the new defence in

issue, without which the court could have no judicial

cognizance of it at the hearing. [a]

103, A cross-bill, ﬁled for the last purpose above

mentioned, viz: for collateral relief, differs in no respect

from the common form of an original bill, but must state

the collateral relation—the injury sought to be redressed,

in which part is generally included the reference to the

former bill; pretences and charges, when necessary, being

for the most part, pretences of some of the allegations in
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the original bill, and charges to the contrary; and, lastly,

the prayer for subpoena, to the end that the defendant may

answer the premises, and the‘court may decree such relief

as the nature of the case may require. As a cross_bill is

considered merely as a species of defence, [b] and con-

cerns matters already in litigation before the court, it will

not be necessary, at least as against the complainant to

the original suit, to show any ground of equity to support

the jurisdiction of the court. [c]

[a] 3 Ch. Rep. 19.

[b] 3 Atk. 812. Mos. 382.

[c] Hardr. 160.

where some occurrence has happened after the cause is at
issue, which would have been a good ground of plea in
bar-such as a release from the plaintiff. Here the statement of relation is of the former bill and proceedings,
and the new occurrence which creates the bar; the injury
is, that the suit is notwithstanding proceeded with, and
that the complainant, in the cross- bill, cannot use the defence as a plea in bar; and he therefore prays a subpmna,
to the end that the premises may be answered and that
the new defence rnay be declared a sufficient bar to any
further proceedings ; ·and that., therefore, the original bill
may be forthwith dismissed with costs. This kind of
cross bill is necessary, in order to put the new defence in
issue, without which the court could have no judicial
cognizance of it at the hearing. [a]

103. A cross-bill, filed for the last purpose above
mentioned, viz: for collateral relief, differs in no respect
from the common form of an original bill, but must state
the collateral reiation-the injury sought to be redressed,
in which part is generally included the reference to the
former bill; pretences and charges, when necessary, being
for the most part, pretences of some of ~he allegations in
the original bill, and charges to the contrary; and, lastly,
the prayer for subpmna, to the end that the defendant may
answer the premises, and the• court may decree such relief
as the na,ture of the case may require. As a cross-bill is
considered merely as a species of defence, [ b] and concerns matters already in litigation before the court, it will
not be necessary, at least as against the complainant to
the original suit, to show any ground of equity to support
the jurisdiction of the court. [ c]
[a] 3 Ch. Rep. 19.
[ b] 3 Atk. 812. Mos. 382.

[c]

Hardr. 160.

BILLS IN THE NATURE or oaremnn BILLS. 75

104. A bill of review is either on error apparent, or
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on discovery of new matter. When it is brought for error

apparent, after reciting the former proceedings, and the

substance of the decree pronounced in which the error

appears, it proceeds to state that “the said decree has

since been duly signed and enrolled, and which said de-

cree the complainant humbly insists is erroneous, and

ought to be reviewed, reversed and set aside, for many

apparent errors and imperfections, inasmuch as it ap

pears,” etc. Then, after showing the errors relied on, a

subpoena is prayed, to the end that the statement may be

answered, and that the decree may be reviewed, reversed

and set aside, and no further proceedings taken thereon.

105, When the bill of review is brought on the dis-

covery of new matter, after stating the enrollment of the

decree, the bill proceeds: “ and your orator showeth unto

your Lordship, by leave of this honorable court, ﬁrst had

and obtained for that purpose, by way of supplement,

that since the signing of the said decree, your orator has

discovered, as the fact is,” etc., stating the new matter

relied on as a ground for reviewing and reversing the

decree. “And your orator is advised and humbly insists,‘
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under the circumstances aforesaid, that the said decree, in

consequence of the discovery of such new matter as

aforesaid, ought to be reviewed and reversed.” It next

prays a subpoena, to the end that the defendant may an-

swer, and that the decree may be set aside; and that fur-

ther directions be added, if required, on the supplemental

matter, and for such general relief as the circumstances of

the case may require.

106, A bill to impeach a decree on the ground of

fraud, is in many respects similar to the last ment1oned,only

the circumstances explanatory of the fraud charged must

be stated by way of inducement to the relation arising

104. A bill of review is either on error apparent, or
on discovery of new matter. When it is brought for error
apparent, after reciting the former proceedings, and the
substance of the decree pronounced in which the error
appears, it proceeds to state that "the said decree has
since been duly signed and enrolled, and which said decree the .complainant humbly insists is erroneous, and
ought to be reviewed, reversed and set aside, for many
apparent errors and imperfections, inasmuch as it ap
pears," etc. Then, after showing the errors relied on, a
aubpmna is prayed, to the end that the staternent may be
answered, and that the decree may be reviewed, reversed
and set aside, and no further proceedings taken thereon.

105. When the bill of review is brought on the discovery of new matter, after stating the enrollment of the
decree, the bill proceeds: " and your orator showeth unto
your Lordship, by leave of thi8 honorable court, first had
and obtained for that purpose, by way of supplement,
that since the signing of the said decree, your orator has
discovered, as the fact is,'' etc., stating the new matter
relied on as a ground for reviewing and reversing the
decree. ''And your orator is advised and humbly insists;
under the circumstances aforesaid, that the said decree, in
consequence of the discovery of such new matter as
aforesaid, ought to be reviewed and reverRed." It next
prays a subpcena, to the end that the defendant may answer, and that the decree may be set aside; and that further directions be added, if required, on the supplemental
matter, and for such gen~ral relief as the circumstances of
. the case may require.

106. A bill to impeach a decree on the gro·und of
fraud, is in many respects similar to the last ment1oned,only
the circumstances explanatory of the fraud charged must
be stated by way of inducement to the relation arising
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out of the proceedings, and the decree alleged to be fraud-
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ulantly obtained. The complainant must then set out the

circumstances of fraud under which the decree was ob-

tained, and that having lately discovered the same, he

applied to the defendant for redress, and not to insist on

the decree. The injuw complained of is, the defendant’s

refusal to comply with this request; to which is always

added a pretence to the validity of the decree (which an-

ticipates the defence), and a charge to controvert it;

together with whatever other charges may corroborate

the statement of fraud. The subpoena is prayed to the

end that the defendant may put in his answer, and that

the decree may be set asideand declared fraudulant and

void; and for such other relief as the case may require.

107- The remaining two species of bills above

enumerated, viz: bills to suspend, and bills to carry a de-

cree into execution, are merelyin the nature of a petition

in the cause; only thatthe cause being concluded by the

pronouncing of the ﬁnal decree, the parties must again be

brought before the court by an original bill.

. In the former, the complainant must show the special

circumstances on.which he grounds his title to have the
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decree suspended; and then state that he is, as he is ad_ >

vised, entitled to have the decree, or part of it, suspended

out of the proceedings, and the decree alleged to be fraudulantly obtained. The complainant muRt then set ou~ the
circumstances of fraud under which the decree was obtaiPed, and that having lately discovered the same, he
applied to the defendant for redress, and not to insist on
the decree. The injury complained of is, the defendant's
refusal to comply with this request; to which is always
added a pretence to the validity of the decree (which anticipates the defence), and a charge to controvert it;
together with whatever other charges 1nay corroborate
the statement of fraud. 'rhe subp(8na is prayed to the
end that the defendant may put in his answer, and that
the decree may be set aside· and declared fraudulant and
void; and for such other relief as the case may require.

as against him, upon such equitable terms as he thereby

oifers, and so pray accordingly.

In the latter, the complainant must set out a sufﬁcient

reason why the decree has not been carried into execu-

tion, and also the circumstances which impede the execu-

tion of it at the time of ﬁling the bill; and state that

though “ he is desirous of having the said decree forth-

with carried into execution, yet, thatfrom the circum-

stances aforesaid, he is advised that the same cannot be

done without the assistance of the court; ” which he prays

107. The ren1aining two species of bi~ls above
enumerated, viz : bills to suspend, and bills to carry a decree into eaJecution, are merely 'in the nature of a petition
in the cause; only that the cause being concluded by the
pronouncing of the final decree, tht) parties must again be
brought before the court by an original bill.
In the former, the complainant must show the special
circumstances on.which he grounds his title to have the
decree suspended; and then state that he is, as he is advised, entitled to have the decree, or part of it, suspended
as against him, upon such equitable terms as he thereby
offers, and so pray accordingly.
In the latter, the complainant must set out a sufficient
reason why the decree has not been carried into execution, and also the circumstances which impede the execution of it at the time of filing the bill ; and state that
though "he is desirous of having the said decree forthwith carried into execution, yet, that. from the circumstances aforesaid, he is advised that the same cannot be
done without the assis.tance of the court;" which he prays
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accordingly, ". and that the defendant may be ordered to

do and concur in all necessary acts for that purpose.”
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.

108, We have thus endeavored to explain in gen_ ‘

eral terms the form and structure of a bill in chancery, so

that the student may be at no loss to apply the general

accordingly,'' and that the defendant may be ordered to
do and concur in all necessary acts for that purpose.,'

. . principles to the particular case which comes before him;

and we have also pointed.out the ‘peculiarities in the

frame of secondary bills, which, however, form no excep-

tion to the general rules, but are rather particular in-

stances illustrative of the universal theory. As informa-

tions differ in no respect from ordinary bills, but in their

form, we have not thought it necessary to give them a

separate consideration. It only remains for us at present

to add such orders in chancery as relate to the mere

drawing of the bill.

109, .~1n Lord Bacon’s Ordinances, published in open

court in the year 1618, the 55th and 56th sections are as

follows: “ 55. If any bill, answer, replication, or rejoin-

der, shall be found of an immoderate length, both the

party, and the counsel under whose hand it passed, shall

be ﬁned.” “ 56. If there be contained in any bill, an-
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swer, or other pleadings or interrogatory, any matter

libellous or slanderous against any one that is not party to

the suit, or against such as are parties to the suit, upon

matters impertinent, or in derogation of the settled au-

thorities of any of his Majesty’s ‘courts, such bills,

answers, pleadings, or interrogatories, shall be taken off

the ﬁle and suppressed, and the parties severally pun-

ished by commitment or ignominy, as shall be thought ﬁt,

for the abuse of the court; and the counselors at law who

have set their-hands, shall likewise receive reproof or

punishment, if cause be.”

108. We have thus endeavored to explain in gen- ·
eral terms the form and structure of a bill in chancery, so •
that the student may be at no loss t.o apply the general
principles to the particular case which comes before him;
and we have also pointed. out the ·pecutiarities in the
frame of secondary bills, which, however, form no exception to the general rules, but are rather particular instances illustrative of the universal theory. As informations differ in no respect from ordinary bills, but in their ·
form, we have not thought it necessary to give them a
separate consideration. It only. remains for us at present
to add such orders in chancery as relate to the mere
· drawing of the bill.

109. .-ln Lord Bacon's Ordinances, published in open
court in the year 1618, the 55th and 56th section~ are as
follows : " 5o. If any bill, answer, replication, or rejoinder,. shall be found of an immoderate length, both the
party, and the counsel under whose hand it passed, shall
be fined." "56. If there be contained in any bill, answer, or other pleadings or interrogatory, any matter
libellous or slanderous against any one that is not party to
the suit, or against such as are parties to the suit, upon
matters impertinent, or ip derogation of the set~led authorities of any of his Majesty's ·courts, such bills,
answers, pleadings, or interrogatories, shall be taken off
the file and suppressed~ and the parties severally punished by commitment or igno1niny, as shall be thought fit,
for the abuse of the court; and the counselors at law who
have set their. hands, shall likewise receive reproof or
punishment, if cause be."
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110, These regulations were further enlarged by
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Lord Coventry in the orders published by him, A. D. 1635,

and subsequently adopted by Lord Clarendon, in 1661.

110. 'rhese regulations were further enlarged by

In the collection of rules and orders that go under his

name, under the title “Bills," it is ordered, “That no

counsellor do put his hand to any bill, answer, or other

pleading. unless it be drawn, or at least perused by him-

self in the paper draft, before it be engrossed (which they

shall do well for their own discharge to sign also after

perusal), and counsel are to take care that the same be

not stuffed with repetition of deeds, writings, or records

in [me verba ; but the effect and substance of so much of

them only as it is pertinent and material to be set down;

and that in brief terms, without long and needless tra-

verses of points not traversable, tautologies, multiplica-

tion of words, or other impertinencies, occasioning need-

less prolixity; to the end, the ancient brevity and suc-

cinctness in bills and other pleadings may be restored and

observed; much less may any counsel insert therein

matter merely criminous or scandalous, under the penalty

of good costs to be laid on such counsel, to be paid to the

party grieved, before such counsel be heard in court.”
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“ If there be matter scandalous in a bill, a master of

chancery is to expunge it, and to tax costs for the party

scandalized; but if on such reference the master reports

the bill not scandalous, the party procuring such refer-

ence shall pay costs to the plaintiff for such his reference.”

Lord Coventry in the orders published by him, A. D. 1635,
and subsequently adopted by Lord Clarendon, in 1661.
In the collection of rules and orders that go under his
name, under the title "'Bills,'' it is ordered, "That no
counsellor do put his hand t0 any bill, answer, or other
pleading. unless it be drawn, or at least perused by himself in the paper draft, ~efore it be engrossed (which th9y
shall do well for their own discharge to sign also after
perusal), and counsel are to take care that the same be
not stuffed with repetition of deeds, writings, or records
in luBe verba; but the effect and substance of so much of
them only as it is pertinent and material to be set down ;
and that in brief terms, without long and needless traverses of points not traversable, tautologies, multiplication of words, or other impertinencies, occasioning needless prolixity; to the end, the ancient brevity and succinctness in bills and other pleadings may be restored and
ob~erved; much less may any counsel insert therein
matter merely criminous or scanrlalous, under the penalty
of good costs to be laid on such counsel, to be paid to the
party grieved, before such counsel be heard in court."
'"If there be matter scandalous in a bill, a master of
chancery is to expunge it, and to tax costs for the party
scandalized; but if on such reference the master reports
the bill not scandalous, the party procuring such reference shall pay costs to the plaintiff for such his reference."

CHAPTER IV.

PLEAS AND DEMURRERS.

111, We now come to those pleadings which are

used on the defence, and which either submit to answer

and contest the suit, or which show some reason why the

defendant is not called upon to answer; as that the court

has notjurisdiction ,‘ or that the suit has abated, or is.de-

fectire, or barred. When the defendant submits to con-

test the suit, he puts in an answer; he shows cause against

answering by either demurrer or plea. As the plea in bar

CHAPTER IV.

likewise contests the suit, so far as it insists that the cause

of action either never existed, or is gone; so, in many

PLEAS .AND DEM:URRERS.

cases, where the defendant does not require to protect

himself from discovery, or that he must answer as to other

particulars, he may insist upon the bar by answer, as

, effectually as by plea. [a] As pleas and demurrers are

used as objections to the being compelled to answer, we

shall commence our observations with them, and after-

wards treat of the form and general requisites of' an-

swers.

Sncrron I.

Of the General Nature of the Defence by Plea or

' Demurrer,
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112, In a preceding chapter we have pointed out the

distinction between pleas and demurrers in.‘ equity, and

their analogy to the same species of defence at common

law; and it there appears that the essential difference be-

[a] Mitf. 249. 1 Atk. 54. 2 P. Wms. 145.

111. We now come to those pleadings which are
used on the defence, and which either submit to answer
and contest the suit, or which sho\V some reason why the
defendant is not called upon to answer; as that the court
has not jurisdiction; or that the su~t has abated, or is. defective, or barred. When the defendant submits to con ..
test the suit, he .put.s in an answer,· he shows cause against
answering by either demurrer or plea. As the plea in bar
liltewise contests the suit, so far as it insists that the cause
of action either never existed, or is gone ; so, in many
cases, where the defendant does not require to protect
himself from discovery, or that he must answer as to other
particulars, he may insist upon the bar by answer, as
. effectually as by plea. [a] As pleas and demurrers are
used as objections to the being compelled to answer, we
shall commence our observations with them, and afterwards treat of the form and general requisites of answers.
SECTION

I.

Of the General Nat~~re of the .Defence by Plea or
.Demurrer.
112. In a preceding chapter \Ve have pointed out the
distinction between pleas and demurrers in .. equity, and
their analogy to the same species of defence at common
law; and it there appears that the essential difference be[ a]

Mitf.. 249. 1 Atk.

•

54~

2 P. Wms. lotS .
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tween a plea and a demurrer is, that the latter is merely
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an issue in law on the complainant’s own showing; the

tween a plea and a demurrer is. that the latter is merely
an issu,e in law on the complainant's own showing; the
former always puts matter of .fact, as well as of law, in
issue. Hence, wherever the objection to answer is founded
on a matter of fact not admitted by the bill, and which,
therefore, may be disputed, advantage of such objection
must be taken by plea, in order that the complainant may
have an opportunity to reply, and so take issue upon it.
If the objection is apparent on the face of the adverse
pleading, and therefore no que~tion of fact can arise, the
defendant may
.. demur. With the restriction just mentioned; the objections taken, both by plea and demurrer,
are the same; so that in this point of view, the ensuing
observations will apply equally to both.

former always puts matter of fact, as well as of law, in

issue. Hence, wherever the objection to answer is founded

on a matter of fact not admitted by the bill, and which,

therefore, may be disputed, advantage of‘ such objection

must be taken by plea, in order that the complainant may

have an opportunity to reply, and so take issue upon it.

If the objection is apparent on the face of the adverse

pleading, and therefore no question of fact can arise, the

defendant may-demur. With the restriction just men-

tioned; the objections taken, both by plea and demurrer,

are the same; so that in this point of view, the ensuing

observations will apply equally to both.

113, The student will recollect that we formerly

laid down the propositions of a bill to be: 1st, That from

the relation stated accrues the right to disc0r;er_1/, and such

relief as is prayed for; 2d, That the relation stated is that

which actually exists, and that these propositions admit

of any defence which either, ﬁrst, denies the right either

to discovery, or relief, or both ; or second, denies the rela-

tion ; or third, invalidates the relation, or bars the right.
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114, First, as to the denial of the right. This is

analogous to the ﬁrst mode of defence at law, mentioned

113. The student will recollect that we formerly

in the chapter before alluded to, which. admitting the facts

of the case, denies the inference or the rule of law sought

laid down the propositions of a bill to be: 1st, That from
the relation stated accrues the right to discmJery, and such
relief as is prayed for; 2d, That the relation stated is that
which actually exists, and that these propositions admit
of any defence which either, first, denies the right either
to discovery, or relief, or both ; or second, denies the relation ; or tldrd, invalidates the relation, or bars the right.

‘ , as we have seen, constitute a de-

murrer. ner, this defence in equity, while it

takes this ent in the bill as true, yet insists that

the facts, even as stated by the complainant himself, do

not give him a right to discovery or to relief.

.

115, In equity there are many cases where, though

the court will not assume a jurisdiction to give relief, yet

the complainant will be entitled to a discovery in aid of

I/

1/

114. First, as to the denial of the right. This is
analogous to the first mode of defence at law, mentioned
in the chapter before alluded to, which. admitting the facts
of the case, denies the inference or the rule of law sought
to be established, w · , as we have seen, constitute a demurrer. In li ~
ner, this defence in equity, while it
takes L1e s at ent h1.. the bill as true, yet insists that
the facts, e~en as Rtat:ed by the complainant hi~self, do
not give him a right to discovery or to relief.
115. In equity there are many cases where, though
the court will not assume a jurisdiction to give relief, yet
the complainant will be entitled to a discovery in aid of
•
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thejurisdiction of other courts. [a] In such cases, how-

81

ever, the bill must be a bill of discovery only; and if it

should seek any relief beyond the mere collateral relief

of an injunction, or a commission to examine witnesses,

[b] and the like, it may be demurred to. [c] In other in-

stances the court will not interfere even for the purpose

of discovery; and if the bill should state a case not en-

titling the complainant to discovery, it may be demurred

to as a bill of discovery merely. [/1] But discovery being,

as before stated, incidental to relief where the complain-

ant has a right to the assistance of the court, no demurrer

will hold to the discovery, [e] unless, indeed, it be to a

point which might subject the defendant to penalties or

‘ forfeiture, which is a good ground of demurrer: or if he

does not think proper to defend himself from the discov-

ery, by demurrer or plea, according to the circumstances

of the case, he may by answer insist that he is not obliged

to make the discovery. [f]

116, Second: The defence in equity, which denies

the relation assumed, or, in other words, denies the truth

of the facts stated in the bill, is analogous to the plea of

the general issue stated at common law, and is taken ad-
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vantage of by way of answer, which puts the complain-

ant on the necessity of proving the allegations denied, if

material to support his case. In like manner, the same

defence, and with a similar analogy to common law, may be

[a] Mitf. 42, 149. 2 Ves. 398.

[b] 1 Bro. C. C. 471. 2 Ves. Jun. 514.

[c] Mitf. 149, and the cases there cited. See also, 6 Ves. 62 ,

11 Ves. 509. 2 Ves. & Beames, 328.

[d] Mitf. 150.

[e] Ibtd, and see Forest’s Rep. in Exchequer, 129. 6 Ves.

37-8. 1 Swanst. 29-1.

[f] Mitf. 163, 249. 3Bro. 0. 0. 40. 3P. Wms. 238. 10 Ves.

450 .

6

. the jurisdiction of other courts. [a] In such cases, however, the bill must be a bill of discovery only; and if it
should seak any relief beyond the mere collateral relief
of· an injrinction, or a coin mission to examine witnesses,
[b] and tlie like, it may be demurred to. [o] In other instances the court will not interfere even for the purpose
of discovery; and if the bill should state a case not entitling the complainant to discovery, it may be demurred
to as a bill of discovery merely. [d] But discovery being,
as before stated, incidental to relief where the complainant has a right to the assistance of the court, no demurrer
will hold to the discovery, [e] unless, indeed, it be to a
pOint which might RUbject the defendant to penalties or
. forfeiture, whirh is a good ground of demurrer: or if he
does not think proper to defend himself from the discovery, by demurrer or plea, according to the circumstances
of the case, he may by answer insist that he is not obliged
to make the discoverf". [f]
116. Second: The defence in equity, which d~nies
the relation assumed, or, in other words, denies the truth
of the facts stated in the bill, is analogous to the plea of
the general issue stated at common law, and is taken advantage of by way of answer, which puts the complainant on the necessity of proving the allegations denied, jf
material to support his case. In like manner, the same
defence, and with a similar analogy t~ comtnon law, may be
[a]

Mitf. 42, 149. 2 Ves. 398.

[b] 1 Bro. C. C. 471. 2 Ves. Jun. 514.
[c] Mitf. 149, and the cases there oited. See also, 6 Ves. 62,
11 Ves. 509. 2 Ves. & Beames, 328.
[d] Mitf. 150.
[ e] Ibid, and see Forest's Rep. in Exchequer, 129. 6 Vee.
37-8. 1 Swanst. 294.
[/] Mitf. 163. 249. 3 Bro. C. C. 40. 8 P. Wme. 288. 10 Vee.
400.

6
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made by denying some particular fact on which the whole

82

EQUITY PLEADING.

relation, and consequently the right, is founded. This

last is used by plea, the negative averments of which

must be supported by answer also, for the reasons assigned

in a previous chapter.

117, Third: The defence which invalidates the rela-

tion, or bars the right, is similarin all respects to a special

plea in bar, at common law. To invalidate the relation,

therefore, some new matter must be stated, which may

show that the parties were incapacitated from contracting

the relation, or are incapable to continue it ; or that the

subject matter was insuﬁicient or illegal, or had undergone

some alteration; or that the right, being incidental, had

not accrued—as where a condition precedent had not been

performed. Again, new matter may be stated to show

that the right, though once existing, is barred by the act

of theparty, by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act 0f

Gad, or unavoidable calamity. In all these cases, as new

matter must be put in issue, the defence must be by plea.

118, It is to be observed, that according to the ﬁrst

proposition of the bill stated above, the right of which we

here speak and which the defence either denies or invali-
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dates, is the right to discovery and relief, which may be

termed the general right, to contra-distinguish it from the

particular rig/zts ﬂowing from the relation sought to be

established, and which are included in the relief required.

It is clear that the right to discovery and relief involves

the consideration of the mode of applying for redress,

since, if this latter be defective, the court will not inter-

fere, at least, until the defect be remedied. All those ob-

jections, therefore, which we have noticed before [a] as

the subject of pleas in abatement, and to the jurisdiction,

made by denying some particular fact on \Vhich the whole
relation, and consequently the right, is fot1nded. '!"his
last is used by plea, the negative averments of \Vhich
must be supported by answer also, for the reasons assigned
in a previous ch~pter.

117. Third: The defence whieh invalidates the relation, or hars the right, is similar in all respects to a special
plea in bar, at common law. To invalidate the relation,
therefore, some new matter must be stated, whicl1 1nay
show that the pa1'tiea \Vere incapacitated from contracting
the relation, or are incapable to continue it; or that the
subject matter was insufficient or illegal, or had undergone
some alteration ; or that the rig4t, being incidental, had
not accrued-as where a condition precedent had not been
performed. Again, new matter may be stated to show
that the right, though once existing, is barred by the act
of the party, by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act of
God, or unavoidable calamity. In all these cases, as new
matter must be put in issue, ~he defence must be by plea.

are equally applicable as modes of defence in equity,

[a] Cap. 1, Sec. 1.

118. It is to be observed, that according to the first
proposition of the bill stated above, the ri,qht o.f which we
here speak and which the defence either denies or invalidates, is the right to diacovery and relief, which may be
termed the general right, to contra-distinguish it from the
particular rights flowing from the relat.ion sought to be
established, and which are included in the relief required.
It is clear that the right to discovery and relief involves
the consideration of the mode of applying for redress,
since, if this latter be defective, the court will not interfere, at least, until the defect be remedied. All those objections, therefore, which we have noticed before [a] as
the subject of pleas in abatement, and to the jurisdiction,
are equally applicable as modes of defence in equity,
[a]

Cap. I, Sec. 1.
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whether by demurrer or plea. In point of fact, there is
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this distinction to be taken between those modes of de-

83

fence as used at common law, and as used in equity: that

in the former case, general demurrers and pleas in bar are

considered as effective answers to contest the suit; in

equity, as has been already stated, pleas and demurers of

all kinds are more in the nature of exceptions to answer-

ing or contesting the suit, either because the court has not

jurisdiction, or the suit has abated, or is defective, or

barred. And this difference arises from the double char-

acter as formerly noticed, which is sustained by the an-

swer in equity—-it being a pleading so far as it denies, and

a proof so far as it admits, the allegations of the bill.

119. There is a close afﬁnity between the method of

the Roman law and that adopted by the common law of

England. Our trial byjury is, in reality, nothing more

than giving judges, under the Roman law, after the pre-

liminary pleadings have been decided by the court; and,

in many cases, the law is so interwoven with the fact, that

the jury are, of necessity, the judges of both; and in one

case more particularly, that of libel, by express act of

parliament. In like manner, in equity, the masters in
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chancery,. who were anciently the counsel and assistants

whether by demurrer or plea. In point of fact, there is
this distinction to be taken between those modes of defence as used at common law, and as used in equity: that
in the former case, general demurrers and pleas in bar are
considered as effective answers to contest the suit; in
equity, as has been already stated . pleas and demurers of
all kinds are more in the nature of exceptions to answer·
ing or contesting the suit, either because the court has nat
juriadiotion, or the suit has abated, or is defective, or
barred. And this difference arises from the double character as formerly noticed; which is sustained by the answer in equity-it being a pleading so far as it denies, and
. a proof so far as it admits, the allegations of the bill.

to our clerical chancellors, were some of them given as

judges; and this is the foundation of the judicial authority

of the master of the rolls, who is the head of the masters

in chancery, and, as such, entrusted with the keeping of

the rolls of the court, whence he derives his name. [a]

So, also, at the present day, all matters of account and

such like are at once referred to a master, to be decided by

him. Anciently, when the cause was remitted, to the

master of the rolls, he used to examine the witnesses him-

[ct] Vide Sir Jos. Jekyll’s Treaties on the Judicial Author-

ity of the Master of the Rolls.

119- There is a close affinity between the method of
the Roman law and that adopted by the.common law of
England. Our trial by jury is, in reality, nothing more
than giving judges, under the Rornan law, after the preliminary pleadings have been decided by the court; _and,
in many cases, the law is so interwoven with the fact, that
the jury_ are, of necessity, the judges of .both; and in one
case more particularly, that of libel, by express act of
parliament. In like manner, in equity, the masters in
chancery,, who were anciently the counsel and assistants
to our clerical chancellors, were sotne of them given as
judges; and ~his is the foundation of the judicial authority
of the master of the rolls, who is the head of the masters
in chancery, and, as such, entrusted with the keeping of
the rolls of the court, whence he derives his name. [a] .
So, also, at the present day, all matters of account and
such like are at once referred to a master, to be decided by
him. Anciently, when the cause was remitted, to the
master of the rolls, he used to examine the witnesses himVide Sir Jos. Jekyll'~ 'rreaties on the Judicial Author·
ity of the Master of the Rolls.
(a]
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self; but in course of time that duty devolved upon ofﬁce-

84
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ers deputed by him, and thence called examiners [a] (for

which reason he has the nomination to that appointment

to this day); and hence this proceeding in chancery is still

a remnant of the practice of giving judges to inquire into

matters of fact, although the court retains to itself the

ultimate decision of the cause upon the proofs and argu-

ments at the hearing.

.

Sscrrtm II.

Of the subject matter of Pleas and Demurrers, both to the

Discovery and Relief.

120, Having th-us made it appear that in equity, at

least, demurrers and pleas are used for the purpose of

showing that the suit ought not to be further contested, it

self; but in course o~ tin1e that duty devolved upon officeers deputed by him, and thence called examiners [a] (for
which·reason he ha~ the nomination to that appointment
to this day); and hence this proceeding in chancery is still
a remnant of the practice of giving judges to inquire into
matters of fact, although the court retains to itself the
ultimate decision of the cause upon the proofs and arguments at the hearing.

remains now to see what objections will be deemed avail-

able to that end. It has been already shown that what-

SECTION

ever objection holds against the relief sought by a bill, is

II.

equally valid against the discovery prayed by the same

bill,the latter being incidental to the former. But as bills

are sometimes ﬁled for discovery only, there are some ob-

jections which extend to mere discovery. We shall,
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therefore, take each in its turn ; and ﬁrst of the ob-

jections to relief.

I. It is material to observe here, that as pleas in

equity may be either in abatement or in bar, since the

right to discovery and relief may be met by objections

that go in abatement as well as in bar, so demurrers also,

which deny that right, may be sustained on either of those

grounds. It is different, however, as to answer, because

the want of relation is an objection in bar, and conse-

quently, the answer, the use of which is to deny, or inval-

[a] Ibid.

_Of the subject matter of Pleas and Demurrers, both to the
Discovery and Relief.
120. Having thus made it appear that in equity, at
least, demurrers and pleas are used for the purpose of
showing that the suit ought not to be further contested, it
remains now to see what objections will be deemed available to that end. It has been a~ready shown that whatever objection holds against the relief sought by a bill, is
equally valid again~t the discovery prayed by the. samebill, the latter being incidental to the former. But as bills
are sometimes filed for discovery only, there are some objections which extend to mere discovery.
We shall,
therefore, take each in its turn ; and first of the objections to relief.
· I. It is material to observe here, that as pleas in
equity may be either in abatement or in bar, si~ce the
right to discovery and relief may be met by objections
that go in abatement as well as in bar, so demurrers also,
which deny that right . may be sustained on either of those
grounds. It is different, however, as to answer, because
the want of relation is an objection in bar, and consequently, the answer, the use of which is to deny, or inval[a]

Ibid.
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idate the relation, is in bar only, [a] and cannot insist

DISCOVERY AND RELIEF.

85

upon an objection in abatement.

121, The annexed synopsis will exhibit, at one view,

all the modes of defence to the relief, ‘which may be used

in equity; any of which may be taken advantage of, as

preliminary objections, by plea or demurrer, to the de-

fendant’s answering or contesting the suit, with the ex-

ception ofxthat mode which denies the relation.; which,

being in reality the very Zitis contestatio itself, must be

done by answer, unless where the same thing can be

effected by means of the negative plea. It was formerly,‘

indeed, matter of doubt how far the negative plea ought to

be allowed in equity [b] since it was thought that the

answer was the most ﬁtting mode of contesting the

idate the 'relation, is in bar only, [aJ and cannot insist
upon an objection in abatement.

121. The annexed synopsis will exhibit, at one view,
all the modes of defence to the relief, .,vhich may be used
in equity; any of which may be taken advantage of, as
prelin1inary objections, by plea or demurrer, to the defendant's answering or cor~testing the suit, with the ex·
ception of that mode which denies the relation·; which,
being in reality the very litis contestatio itself, must be
done by answer, unless \Vhere the same thing can be
effected by means of the ne.qative plea. It was formerly;
indeed, matter of doubt how far the negative plea ought to
be allowed in equity [b] since it was thought that the
an~wer was the most fitting mode of contesting the
character in which the complainant sued, and o.n which
his supposed claim was founded. But it has since been
determined, and justly, that the negative plea is good;
for otherwise, any person assuming a fictitious character
might force a discovery from a defendant, to which, in his
real capacity, he would have no right. [c] For it is an invariable rule. that when a defendant does not plead or demur, but submits to ans\ver, he must answer fully. [d]
I

character in which the complainant sued, and on which

his supposed claim was founded. But it has since been

determined, and justly, that the negative plea is good;

for otherwise, any person assuming a ﬁctitious character

might force a discovery from a defendant, to which, in his

real capacity, he would have no right. [c] For it is an in-

variable rule. that when a defendant does not plead or de-

mur, but submits to answer, he must answer fully. [d]
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122, II. We next come to those objections which

hold even to discovery, without any relief being prayed;

and ﬁrst, We may lay it down as a general rule, that, what-

ever objections are valid to avoid a discovery, are a forti-

ori good as against relief; or negatively, that where there

[a] "An answer is that which the defendant pleadethI or

saith in bar, to avoid the plaintiﬁ"s bill or action, either by con-

fessing, and avoiding, or traversing and denying, the material

parts thereof.” West’s Symb. 104. Hinde, 196.

[b] Beames’ Pleas, 123, et seq. and Mitf. 187, 188.

[0] Ibid.

[d] Mazzaredo v. Maitland, 3 Madd. Rep. 70. And see 11

Ves. 395, and 16 Ves.. 382.

122. II. We next come to those objections which
hold even to discovery, without any relief being prayed.;
and first, we may lay it down as a general rule, that, what.ever objections ar~ valid to avoid a discovery, are a forti·
ori good as a~ainst relief; or negatively, that where there
[a] "An answer is that which the defendant pleadeth, ?r
saith in bar, to avoid the plaintiff's bill or action, eit~er by confessing, and avoiding, or traversing and deuying, the material
parts thereof." W~qt's Syn1b. 104. Hinde, 196.
[b] Beames' Pleas, 19.3, et seq. and Mitf. 187, 188. ·· ·
[c] Ibid.
[d] Mazzaredo !'· Maitland, 3 Madd. Rep. 70. And see 11
Ves. 395, and 16 Ves. 382.
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is no objection to relief, there can be none to discovery,
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unless where such discovery might subject the party to a

penalty or forfeiture. But the converse of this proposi-

tion does not hold; for there may be no objection to the

discovery and yet an objection to the relief; or, in other

words, that which is an objection to a bill for relief, may

yet be no objection to a bill of discovery. For as a bill

for a mere discovery seeks no decree, so want of equity or

want of proper parties would be no objection. [aj But as

the discovery in a bill for relief is only subsidiary to the

relief, if there be a valid objection to the latter, the dis- -

covery, though otherwise proper. must fall with it. [b]

Care must be taken, therefore, that the bill do not pray

relief when the complainant has a right only to discovery.

[c] And it appears that even where the answer to a bill

of discovery might furnish ground for supposing that re-

lief was in equity, not in law, yet that the bill cannot be

amended by adding a prayer for relief, but that it would

be better to direct the complainant to pay the costs and

bring a new bill; and if in that cause any useis to be made

of the discovery given by the ﬁrst answer, to let it be read

as an answer to a bill of discovery, as evidence, not as
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part of the defence, or admission, upon which the bill

proceeds. [d] .

123, A bill of mere discovery is always brought in

support of defence of a civil suit, either in the court itself

or in some other court. In this respect, therefore, the

[a] Mitf. 163.

[b] Mitf. 149. Beames’ Pleas, 250, and the cases there cited.

See also 3 Meriv. 175. 1 Ves. & Beames, 539.

[0] But a mere prayer for general relief, or for the collateral

relief of an injunction, commission, and the like, will not ren-

der a bill of discovery demurrable. 2 Ves. jun. 514.

l [d] See the observations of Lord Eldon, in Butterworth v.

Bailey,l5 Ves. 358.

is no objection to relief, there can be none to discovery,
unless where such discovery might Muhject the party to a
penalty or forfeiture. But the converse of this proposition does not hold ; for there may be no objection to the
discovery and yet an objection to the relief; or, in other
words, that which is an objection to a bill for relief, may
yet be no objection to a bill of discovery. ~,or as a bill
for a mere discovery seeks no decree, so want of equity or
want of proper parties would be no objection. [a] But as
the discovery in a bill for reliet is only subsidiary to the
relief, if there be a valid objection to the latter, the dis. ·
covery, though otherwise proper . must fall with it.. [b]
Care must be taken, therefore, that the bill do not pray
relief when the cotnplainant has a right only to discovery.
[c] And it appears that even where the answer to a bill
of discovery might furnish ground for supposing that relief was in equity, not in law, yet that the bill cannot be
amended by adding a prayer for relief, but that it would
be better to direct the complainant to pay the costs and
bring a new bill; and if in that cause any use is to be made
of the discovery given by the first answer, to let it be read
as an answer to a bill of discovery, as evidence, not as
part of the defence, or admission, upon which the bill
·
proceeds. [d]

123. A bill of mere discovery is al\vays brought in
support of defence of a civil suit, either in the court itself
or in some other court. In this respect, therefore, the
[a] Mitf. 16~l.
[b] 1\Iitf. 149. Bearnes' Pleas, 25~, and the cases there cited.

See also 3 Meriv. 175. 1 Ves. & Bean1es, 539.
[c] But a mere prayer for general relief, or for the collateral
relief of an injunction, commission, and the like, will not render a bill of discovery demurrable. 2 V~s. jun. 514.
'
[ d] See the observations of Lord Eldon, in Butterworth v.
Bailey,l5 Ves. 358.
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court of equity assumes a jurisdiction to compel discovery,

87

even where it has not authority to extend relief. Conse-

quently, the want of equity will be no good ground to

avoid an answer. But if a mere discovery be sought,

where the court has not even jurisdiction to that extent-

as if the discovery be sought in aid of a court of criminal

jurisprudence, [a] or of a court which has itself authority

to compel the discovery, [b] the defendant may plead or

demur to the jurisdiction.

124. All pleas to the person extend to the discovery,

as well as to relief; for they are objections to show that

the complainant cannot institute a suit in any court. But,

on the other hand, no plea in abatement, on the ground of

the mode of proceeding being defective, can be used as

an objection to a bill of discovery; because such a bill

seeks no decree from the court. Multifariousness ought,

perhaps, to be made an exception. [c] that the defendant

may not be uselessly harrassed.

125, Next, as to the objections in bar. As the dis-

covery is only for the purpose of obtaining relief, either

in the same or in another court of justice, any objection

which shows that the complainant can have no right to
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relief, either in the same or any other court, will bar his

right to discovery. All the objections in bar for relief,

therefore, in equity, will be equally valid against discov-

ery in aid of relief there. [d] Yet there is one seeming

exception to this rule, namely, as to the objection which

denies that the defendant has such an interest as can

make him liable; for persons, not otherwise interested,

[al 2 Ves. 398.

[b] 1 Atk. 288. 1 Ves. 205. 2 Ves. 451.

cou.rt of equity assumes a jurisdiction to compel discovery,
even where it has not authority to extend relief. Consequently, the want of equity will be no good ground to
avoid an answer. But if a mere discovery be sought,
where the court has not even jurisdiction to that extentas if the discovery be sought in aid of a court of criminal
jurisprudence, [a] or of a court which has itself authority
to compel the di~covery, [b] the defendant may plead or
demur to thejurisdiction.

·124. All pleas to the person extend to the discovery,
as well as to relief; for they are objections to show that
the complainant cannot institute a suit in any court. But,
on the other hand, n~ plea in abatement, on the ground of
the mode of proceedin,q being defective, can be used as
an objection to a bill of discovery; because such a bill
seeks no decree from the court. Multifariousness ought,
perhaps, to be made an exception . [c] that the defendant
may not be uselessly harrassed.

[c] Mitt‘. 163.

[d] 2 Ves. 71. 3 Meriv. 175. 1 Ves. & Beames, 539. And

125. Next, as to the objections in bar. As the dis·

see Lord Alvanley‘s observations, in 3 Ves. 347.

covery is only for the purpose of obtaining relief, either
in the same or· in another court of justice, any objection
which shows that the complainant can have· no right to
relief, either in the same or an.v other court, will bar his
right to discovery. All the objections in bar for relief,
therefore, in equity, will be equally valid against discovery in aid of relief there. [d] Yet there is one seeming
exception to this rule, namely, as to the objection which
denies that the defendant ltas such. an interest as can
make !tim liable; for per~ons, not otherwise interested,
[aj

2 Ves. 398.

[b] 1 Atk. 288. 1 Ves. 205. 2 Ves. 451.
[ c] :Mitf. 163.
[d] 2 Ves-. 71. 3 Meriv. 175. I Ves. & Beames, 539.

see Lord Alvanley's observations, in 8 Ves. 347.

And
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are frequently made parties for the mere purpose of dis-
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covery; such as the oﬂicers of the corporation (which, as

it answers under seal, cannot be indicted for perjury) or

attorneys, auctioneers, agents and arbitrators, when

charged with being parties to a fraud. But further, if the

complainant has no right of action in any other court, he

can have no title to discovery in this ; and the want of

. such right may be pleaded in bar, or objected by demurrer.

[a] And even though the complainant should have such

right, yet if the defendant has an equal claim to protec-

tion—as where he is a purchaser for valuable considera-

tion, without notice, the court will not interpose, even to

compel a discovery. This last plea, therefore, is equally a

bar to discovery, in aid of the jurisdiction of other courts,

as it is to relief, and consequently to discovery, in this. [b]

126, There are yet some objections peculiar to dis-

covery, asregarded in the light of an examination. Thus,

a defendant may refuse to answer any question that

would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, [c] unless

such forfeiture be waived by the person competent to do

so, [d] or that would cause a breach of the conﬁdence re-

posed in him, as counsel, attorney, or arbitrator. [e] And
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this arises from the peculiar nature of a bill, which is both

a pleading and an examination. The objections on such

grounds may be taken to the bill, iI1 its character of a

are frequently made parties for the mere purpose of discovery; such as the officers of the corporation (which, as
it answers under seal, cann~t be indicted for perjuty) or
attorneys, auctioneers, agents and arbitrators, when
charged with being parties to a fraud. But further, if the ·
complainant has no right of acti_on in any other court . he
can have no title to discovery in this; and the want of
such right may be pleaded in bar, or objected by demurrer.
[a] And even though the complainant should have such
right, yet if the defendant has an equal claim to pro.tection-as where he is a pu1'chaser for valuable consideration, without notice, the court will not interpose, e\en to
compel a discovery. This last plea, therefore, is equally a
bar to discovery, in aid of the jurisdiction of other courts,
as it is to relief, and consequently to discovery, in this. [b]

pleading, by plea or demurrer; but as it is also on exami-

nation, the defendant may, without demurring or plead-

126. There are yet some objections peculiar to dis-

[a] Mitfl 152. 3 Bro. C. C. 154. 3 Ves. jun. 494. 13 Ves.

240. '

[bl 2 Cha. Ca. 72. 1 Vern. 27. 1 Ventr. 198. 2 Ves.jun.

454.

[c] 1 Bro. C. C. 98. 1 Atk. 529. 2 Ves. 389. 2 Atk. 392.

[d] 1 Vern. 109, 129, 306. 1 Chan. Rep. 144. 2 Atk. 393.

[e] Cha. Ca. 277. Finch. Rep. 82.

covery, as·regarded in the li~ht of an examination. Thus,
a defendant may refuse to answer any question that
would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, [c] unless
such forfeiture be waived by the person competent to do
so, [d] or that would cause a breach of the confidence reposed in him, as counsel, attorney, or arbitrator. [e] And
this arises from the peculiar nature of a bill, which is both
a pleading and an exa1nination. The objections on such
grounds may be taken to the bill, in its character of a
pleading, by plea or demurrer; but as it is also on examination, the defendant 1nay, without demurri~g or plead[a]

Mitf~ 152.

3 Bro. C. C. I54.

3 Ves. jun. 494.

I3 Ves.

~0.

[bl 2 Cha. Ca. 72. I Vern. 27. 1 Ventr. 198. 2 Ves. jun.
454.
[ c]

[d]
[e]

I Bro. C. C. 98. 1 Atk. 529. 2 Ves. 389. 2 Atk. 392.
I Vern. 109, 129, 306. 1 Chan. Rep. 144. 2 Atk. 393.
Cha. Ca. 277. Finch. Rep. 82.
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ing, decline answering to the objectionable parts. [a]

89

And this is the only exception to the general rule that

when a defendant submits to answer, and neither pleads

ing, decline answering to the objectionable parts. [a]
And this is the only ~xception to the general rule that
when a defendant submits to answer, and neither pleads
nor demurs, he must answer fully. [h] For reasons
grounded on similar principles, if the discovery sought be
immaterial to the relief required, either in the same or
another court, the bill, which seeks such discovery, may
be demurred to; or matter may be pleaded to show that
the discovery, when obtained, would be immaterial. [c]

nor demurs, he must answer fully. [h] For reasons

grounded on similar principles, if the discovery sought be

immaterial to the relief required, either in the same or

another court, the bill, which seeks such discovery, may

be demurred to; or matter may he pleaded to show that

the discovery, when obtained, would be immaterial. [c]

SECTION III.

Of the Defence to Bills not Original.

127; The objections which are peculiar to the bills

not original, are chieﬂy in the nature of objections to the

form of proceeding—as where a devisee ﬁles a bill of re-

vivor, [d] when, as we have before seen,‘ his proper course

would be by original bill, in the nature of a bill of revivor:

or where a complainant states, by way of supplemental

bill, facts which might have been added by amendment;

[e] or amends his original bill by adding new facts which

had occurred sinc-e the institutin of the suit, and which

therefore are the subject of supplemental matter'only. [f]

SECTION

128, So, in like manner, if a person not a party or

III.
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privy to the original suit brings a bill of review, the de-

O.f the Defence to Bills not Ori.qinal.

fendant may demur; or if such bill be brought against a

[a] Mitf. 163, 249. 3Br0. 0. o. 40. 2P. Wins. 238. 10 Ves.

450.

127.· The objections which are peculiar to the bills

[b] 3 Madd. Rep. 70.

[c] Mitf. 155, 156. 1 Bro. C. C. 96. 2 Atk. 387, 394. 2 Ves.

jun. 396.

[d] 1 Cha. Ca. 174.

[e] 3 Atk. 817. 2 Mad. Rep. 240.

U] 1 Atk. 291.

,

not original, are chiefly in the nature of objections to the
forni of proceeding-as where a devisee files a bill of revivor, [d] when, as we have before seen,' his proper course
would be by original bill, in the nature of a bill of revivor:
or where a ·complainant states, by way of supplemental
bill, facts which might have been added by amendfi:lent;
[ e] or amends his original bill by adding new facts which
had occurred sinoe the institution of the suit, and which
therefore are the subject of supplemental matter· only. [f]

128. So, in like manner, if a person n<;>t a party or
privy to the original suit brings a bill of review, the defendan.t may demur; or if such bill be brought against a
[a]

Mitf. 163, 249. 3 Bro. C. C. 40. 2 P. W1ns. 238. 10 Ves.

450.

3 Mad d. Rep. 70.
[c) Mitf. 155, 156. 1 Bro. C. C. 96. 2 Atk. 387, 394. 2 Ves.

[ b]

jun. 396.
[d] 1 Chn. Ca. 174.
[e] 8 Atk. 817. 2 Mad. Rep. 240.
l!] 1 Atk. 291.
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defendant not a party to the original bill. [a] But any

90

~QUITY

l?LE.ADING.

matter which shows that the right, though existing at the

time when the original bill was ﬁled, had been subse-

quently barred—as by release, ﬁne, and non-claim, [b]

statute of limitations, [c] or decree enrolled twenty years

-—]d] may be pleaded against the secondary bill. Where-

ever new matter is introduced, either by supplement or in

a bill of review, such new matter is liable to any objec-

tion which might be 1nade to it, if stated in the original

bill. [e]

129, The proper defence to a bill of revivor is by

plea or demurrer, because if the party makes the same

objection by. answer, it cannot be determined till the hear-

ing. Nevertheless, if at the hearing it does not appear

that the complainant had a title to revive, although the

defendant did not take advantage of the objection in any

manner, he shall gain nothing by his bill. [f]

130, The regular defence to a bill of review for error

apparent, is to plead the decree in bar to the new suit,

and demur to opening the enrolment, [g] on the ground

that the errors assigned are not such as to entitle the com

plainant to have the decree reviewed, much less reversed.

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

The ﬁrst question therefore, is, whether the enrolment

should be opened, and the decree reviewed, and this is

argued apon the demurrer, when nothing can be read but

what appears upon the face of the decree; if the demurrer

[a] Gilb. For. Rom. 186. 1 Chan. Ca. 123.

[b] 2 Vern. 190.

[c] 1 P. \Vms. 742.

[d] 5 Brown. P. C. 466. 6 Brown. P. C. 395. 1 Vern. 287.

1 Ves. & Beames. 536.

[e] Mitf. 236.

[f] 3 P. Wms. 348.

[g] 1 Vern. 392. 2 Atk. 534.

EQ. PL.——l9.

defendant not a party to the original bill. [a] But any
matter which shows that t~e right, though existing at the
time when the original bill was filed, had been subsequently barred-as by release, fine, and non-claim, [b]
statute of limitations, [c] or decree enrolled twenty years
-]d] may be pleaded against the secondary bill. Whereever new tnatter is introduced, either by supplement or in
a bill of review, such new matter is liable to any objection which might be made to it, if stated in the original
bill. [e]

129. The proper defence to a bill of revivor is by
plea or demurrer, because if the party makes the same
objection by· answer, it cannot be determined till the hear.
ing. Nevertheless, if at the hearing it does not appear
that the co1nplainant had a title to revive, although the
defendant did not take advanta~e of the objection in any
manner, he shall gain nothing by his bil1. [f]

130. The regular defence to a bill of review for e;v,.or
apparent, is to plead the decree in bar to the new suit,
and demur to opening the enrolment, [.q] on the ground
that the errors assigned are not such as to entitle the com
plainant to have the decree reviewed, much less reversed.
The first question therefore, is, whether the enrolment
should be opened, and the decree reviewed, and this is
argued apon the demurrer, w~en nothing can be read but
what appears upon the face of the decree; if the demurrer
[a]

[b]
[c]
[d]

1 Ves. &
[ e]
[f]
[g]

Gilb. For. Rom. 186. I Chan. Ca. 123.
2 Vern. 190.
1 P. 'Vms. 742.
5 Brown. P. C. 466. 6 Brown. P. C. 395. 1 Vert:~. 287.
Beames. 536.
Mitf. 236.
3 P. Wms. '348.
1 Vern. 392. 2 Atk. 534.
EQ. PL.-19.
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be overruled, then arises the second question, whether the

decree ought to be reversed; and the complainant is at

:bEFENCE

or

BittS NOT ORiGINAL.
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liberty to read bill and answer, or any other evidence, as

at a rehearing, the cause being equally open. [a]

131, The plea of the decree is proper in this case,

and because it is the very foundation of the defence which .

is provable by the record; and although it appears on

the face of the bill, yet it is there sought to be impeached

on the ground of error apparent, which error being a

question of law only, is rightly denied by demurrer; as

likewise in a similar manner, when a bill is brought to set

aside a decree on the ground of fraud, the decree itself is

pleaded in bar, and the fraud, which is a question of fact,

is denied by answer, in support of the plea, as well as by

negative averments in the plea.

132, Where a bill of review is brought on discovery

of new matter, a case can scarcely occur where it will be

necessary to plead or demur, as the leave of the court

must be had before the bill is ﬁled. The fact of the dis-

covery, however, may be contradicted by plea, or traversed

by answer; and, in general, the new matter is liable to

any objection which would have been good ground of de-
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fence to it in the original bill. [12].

133, A demurrer for want of equity will not hold to

a cross bill, for the defendant being drawn into court by

the complainant in the original bill, he may avail himself

be overruled, then arises the second question, whether the
decree ought to be reversed; and the complainant is at
liberty to read bill and answer, or any other evidence, as
at a rehearing, the cause being equally open. [a]

131. The plea of the decree .is proper in this case,
and because it is the very foundation of the defence which .
is provable by the record; and although it appeat·s on
the face of the bill, yet it is there sought to be impeached
on the ground of error apparent, which error being a
question of law only, is rightly denied by demurrer; as
likewise in a similar manner, when a bill is brought to set
aside a decree on the ground of fraud, the decree itself is
pleaded in bar, and the fraud, which is a question of fact,
is denied by answer, in support of the plea, as well. as by
negative averments in the plea.

of the assistance of the court, without being obliged to

show a ground of equity to support its jurisdiction. [c]

For the same reason, such bills are not liable to any ob-

jections to the person, except the informality of the bill

132. Where a bill of review is brought on discovery
of new matter, a case can scarcely occur where it will be

[a] 1Atk.290.

[b] Mitf. 236.

[0] Hard. 160. 3Atk.812.

necessary to plead ·or demur, as the leave of the court
must be had before the bill is filed. The fact of the discovery, however, may be contradicted by plea, or traversed
by answer ; and, in general, the new matter is liable to
any objection which would have been good ground of defence to it in the original bill. [b].

133. A demurrer for want of equity will not hold to
a cross bill, for the defendant being drawn into court by
the complainant in the original bill, he may avail himself
of the assistance of the court, without being obliged to
show a ground of equity to support its jurisdiction. [c]
For the same reason, such bills are not liable to any objections to the person, except the informality of the bill
[a] 1 Atk. 290.
[b] Mitf. 236.
[ c] Hartl. 160. 8 Atk. 812.

92 EQUITY PLEADING.

being exhibited in the name of a person who is incapable

92
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of instituting a suit alone. [a]

.

SECTION IV.

Of the General Form and Structure of Pleas and

being exhibited in the name of a person who is incapable
of instituting a snit alone. [a]

Demurrers.

134, Our next consideration will be, as to the form

SECTION

and general requisites of pleas and demurrers. The de-

IV.

fendant being called upon by the subpana to answer the

interrogatories in the bill, must do so or show good cause

to the contrary; the office of pleas and demurrers is to

Of the General Form and Structure of Pleas and
Dem1.trrers.

state such cause. Hence the substance of all pleas and

demurrers is, in effect, nothing more than the statement,

134. Our next consideration will be, as to the form

with certainty and precision, of some of those objections

which. are to be found in the synopsis of the modes of de-

fence, “ wherefore the defendant demands the judgment

of the court, whether he shall be compelled to answer and

contest the suit; and prays to be dismissed, with his

reasonable costs.”

135, Thus the derhurrer contends that the case

made by the bill (admitting it for the sake of argument

to be correct), [b] is yet not such as to entitle the com-
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plainant to an answer, [c] either because the case, as

stated, does not contain some essential ingredient neces-

sary to establish the right, or because some fact is therein

stated which operates as an avoidance to the right. [d]

Again. the plea admits, for the sake of argument, that the

facts stated in the bill are true, [e] and that the legal in-

ference drawn is correct; but it avers that there are

other circumstances connected with the case which dis-

[a] Hinde. 190.

[b] 2 Ves. Jun. 95.

and general requisites of pleas and demurrers. rThe defendant being called upon by the subpmna to answer the
interrogatories in the bill, must do so or show good cause
to the contrary; the office of pleas and demurrers is to
state such cause. Hence the substance of all pleas and
demurrers is, in effect, nothing more than the statement,
with c,ertainty and precision, of some of those objections
which. are to be found in the synopsis of the modes of defence, "wherefore the defendant demands the judgment
of the court, whether he shall be compelled to answer and
contest the suit; and prays to be distnissed, with his
reasonable costs."

[c] 3 Meriv. 503.

[d] 3 Ves. 255.

[e] 2 Atk. 51,

135. 'rhus the de~urrer contends that the case
made by the bill (admitting it for the sake of argument
to be correct), [b] is yet not such as to entitle the complainant to an answer, [c] either because the case, as
stated, does not contain some essential ingredient necessary to establish the right, or becaule some fact is therein
stated which operates as an avoidance to the right. [d]
Again, the plea ad1nits, for the sake of ar.qument, that the
facts stated in the bill are true, [ e] and that the ~egal inference drawn is correct; but it avers that there are
other circumstances connected \Vith the case which dis ..
[a] Hinde. 190.
[b] 2 Ves. Jun. 95.
[c] S Meriv. 503.
[d]

[ e]

3 Ves. 255.
2 Atk. 51,
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place the equity, [a] or which, in other words, by chang-

ing the nature of. the relation between the parties, avoid

FORM AND STRUCTURE OF PLEAS AND DEMURRERS.
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the right established by the bill. The negativeplea '

differs only in this, that instead of averring new facts, it

denies some one essential position of the bill, admitting,

for the sake of argument, that all the rest of the facts

relied upon are true.

136, From this view it is apparent that the essential

part of a plea or demurrer is the assignment of the reasons

on which the defendant relies for not answering; and this

is the substance and body of the pleading, which consists

of the enumeration of the causes of demurrer, or the aver-

ment of the facts which constitute the plea. There are,

besides, a formal commencement and conclusion, each of

which performs distinct funct.ions, and therefore the plead-

ing may, with suﬁicient convenience, be devided into three

parts: ﬁrst, the commencement; second, the body; and,

third, the conclusion. We shall here subjoin the skeleton

form of a demurrer, and of a plea, and then add some re-

marks upon each part in its order.

137, The Demurrer of C. D., Defendant, to the Bill

of Complaint of A. B., Complainant.
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[A] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing

or acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in

the said complain'ant’s bill contained to be true, in such

manner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth

demur thereto; [B] and for cause of demurrer showeth,

that [the said complainant hath not by his own showing

made out a case which establishes his right, title, or inter-

est; or that he hath admitted and acknowledged, by his

said'bill, certain facts which, by the known rules of the

law, avoid his right to an answer.] [C] Wherefore, and

for divers other defects and causes of demurrer appearing

[a] 1 Bro. C. C. 417. 1 Atk. 54. 3 Atk. 341. 15 Ves. 376.

place the equity, [a] or which, in other words, by changing the nature of. the relatiol1 between the parties, avoid
the right established by the bill. Th·e negative· plea
differs only in this, that instead of averring new facts, it
denies some one essential position of the bill, admitting,
for the sake of argument, that all the rest of the facts
relied upon are true.

136. From this view it is apparent that the essential
part of a plea or demurrer is the assignment o~ the reasons
on which the defendant relies for not anHwering; and this
is the substance and body <?f the pleading, which consists
of the enumeration of the causes of dem?..errer, or the averment of the facts which constitute the plea. There are,
besides, a· formal commencement and conclusion, each of
which performs distinct functions, and therefore the pleading may, with sufficient convenience, be devided into three
parts: first, the commencement; second, the body; .and,
third, t~e conclusion. We shall here subjoin the skeleton
form of a demurrer, and of a plea, and then add sotne re ..
marks upon each part in its order.

137. The Demurrer of 0. D., Defendant, to the Bill
of Complaint of A. B., Complainant.

fA] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing
or acknowleJging all or any of the matters and things in
the said comp~ainant's bill contained to be true, in such
manner and for1n as the same are therein set forth, doth
demur thereto; [B] and for cause of demurrer showeth,
that [the said complainant hath not by his own showing
made out a case which establishes his right, title, or interest; or that he hath admitted and acl{rio,vledged, by his
said· bill, certain facts which, by the. known rules of the
law, avoid his right to an answer.] [0] Wlierefore, and
for divers other defects and causes of dem).lrrer appearing
[a] 1 Bro. C. C. 417. 1 Atk. 54.

3 Atk. 341. 15 Ves. 376.
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in the said complainant’s said bill, this defendant doth
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demur thereto, and humbly demands the judgment of this

honorable court whether he shall be compelled to make

any answer to the said bill; and prays to be hence dis-

missed, with his reasonable costs in this behalf most

wrongfully sustained.

The Plea of C. D., Defendant, to the Bill of Complaint

of A. B., Complainant.

[A] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing

or acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in

the said complainant’s bill contained, to be true, in such

in the said complainant's said bill, thie defendant doth
den1ur thereto, and humbly demands the judgment of this
honorable court whether he shall be compelled to make
any answer to the said bill ; and prays to be hence dismissed, with his t·easonable costs in this behalf most
wrongfully sustained.

manner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth

plead to the said bill; [B] and for plea saith, that [there

are certain incidents affecting the relation between the

parties, omitted (or song/at to be invalidated) in the said

The Plea of C. D., Defendant, to the Bill of Complaint
of A. B., Complainant.

bill, but which, when stated (or discharged from impeach-

ment), show that this defendant ought not be compelled

to answer the said bill]; and this defendant avers [all

necessary circumstances to avoid ambiguity and exclude

unfavorable construction]. [C] All which matters and

things this defendant doth aver to be true; and therefore

he doth plead the same to the said bill as aforesaid, and
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humbly demands the judgment of this honorable court

whether he shall be compelled to make any further or

other answer to the said bill; and prays to be hence dis-

missed, with his reasonable costs in this behalf most

wrongfully sustained.

SECTION V.

Of the Commencement.

138, [1] As to the commencement: We see that

both pleas and demurrers begin with a protestation against

confessing the facts, as stated in the bill,- to be true. This

[A] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing
or acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in
the said complainant's bill contained, to be tt·ue, in such
manner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth
plead to the said bill ; [ B] and for plea saith~ that [there
are certain incidents affecting the relation between the
parties, omitted (or sou.qht to be invalidated) in the said
bill, but which, when stated (or discn.arged from impeach1nent), show that this defendant ought not be compelled
to answer the said bill]; and this defendant avers [all
necessary circumstances to avoid ambiguity and exclude
unfavorable construction]. [0] All which matters· and
things this defendant doth aver to be true; and therefore
he doth plead the same to the said bill as aforesaid,.and
humbly demands the judgment of this honorable court
whether he shall be compelled to make any further or
other answer to the said bill ; and prays to be hence dis·
missed, with his reasonable costs in this behalf 1nost
wrongfully sustained.

SECTION

V.

Of the Commencement.

138. [1] As to the commencement: We see that
both pleas and demurrers begin with a protestation against
confessing the facts, as stated in the ~ill,. to be true. This

or THE COMMENCEMENT. 95

is a form frequently used at common law, when the party

OF THE COMMENCEMENT.

pleading wishes to avoid the inference that he admits any-

95

thing which he has not an opportunity of putting in issue

in that cause; and Lord Coke therefore deﬁnes it to be '

“ the exclusion of a conclusion.” [a] The use of the pro-

testation of the commencement of the plea and demurrer

in equity is to save the defendant from being concluded

by his implied admission of the truth of the facts stated

in the bill, and is a kind of declaration in limine that such

facts are only admitted for the sake of the argument; for

if subsequently his plea or demurrer should be ,overruled

on argument, he is then to make a new defence, and may

by answer deny or explain away the statement, which the

plea or demurrer had by implication allowed. [b]

139, Aprotestando to the same effect is not neces-

sary at common law, because there the plea in bar or de-

murrer, being an effective litis contestatio, is conclusive

either way; and the plea in abatement (on which, being

overruled, thejudgment is respondent auster) [c] does not

bring into question the merits of the case, and, conse-

quently, neither admits nor denies the facts stated in the

declaration. But, as we have already seen, in equity,
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pleas and demurrers are more in the nature of objections

to answer, and proceed upon the ground that, even grant-

ing that the complainants statement be true, still there is

some reason, either apparent or stated, in the plea, why

he has not the right to dicovery, or to the relief as prayed.

140, If the demurrer or plea be allowed, therefore,

it is in effect the decision of the court, that the com-

plainant has no right to discovery or relief, and conse-

quently the bill is dismissed. [d] In case, however, it be

[a] C0. Litt. 124, b.

[b] Mitf. 14.

[0] 2 Saund. 211. a. n. [3]

[d] 3 P. Wms. 95. Mitf. 175.

is a form frequently us.ed at con1mon law, when the party
pleading wishes to avoid the inference that he admits any ..
thing which he has not an opportunity of putting in issue
in that cause; and Lord Coke therefore defines it to be ~··/ "'the exclusion of a conclusion." [a] The use of the protestation of the commencement of the plea and demurrer
in equity is to save the defendant from being concluded
by his implied admission of the truth of the facts stated
.in the bill, and is a kind of declaration in limine that such
facts are only admitted for the aake of th.e a?Y}U/In.ent; for
if subsequently his plea or demurrer should be .overruled
on argument, he is then to make a new defence, and may
by answer deny or explain away the statement, which the
plea or demurrer had by implication allo\ved. [b]
139. Aproteatando to the same effect is not necessary at cornmon law, because there the plea in bar or demurrer, being an effective litis conteBtatio, is conclusive
either way; and the plea in abatement (on which, being
overruled, the judgment is reapondent auater) [ c] does not
bring into question the merits of the case . and, consequently, neither admits nor denies the facts stated in the
declaration. Bu~, as we have already seen, in equity,
pleas and demurrers are more in the nature of objections
to answer. and proceed upon the ground that, even ,qranting tn.at the complainant'a statement be true, still there ~s
some reason, either apparent or stated, in the plea, why
he has not the right to dicovery, or to the relief as prayed.
140. If the demurrer or plea be allowed, therefore,
it is in effect the decision of the court, that the complainant bas no right to discovery or relief, and consequently the bill is dismissed. [d] In case, however, it be
[a]
[b]
[c]
[d]

Co. Litt. 124, b.
Mitf. 14.
2 Saund. 211. a. n. [3]
3 P. Wms. 95. Mitf. 175.
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not a dismissal on the merits, such dismissal will not pre-
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clude the complainant trom bringing a new bill, when the

disability is removed, or informality rectiﬁed; [a] and if

this latter can be effected by amendment, the court might

make a special order to that effect, without dismissing the

bill. [b] On the other hand, with respect to a plea, though

the opinion of the court on argument should be favorable

to the defendant, this does not terminate the proceedings ;

for, though the~ reasoning in law may be correct. the facts

on which the rule of law is founded, may be untrue; to

put which in issue, the complainant may reply, even after

the plea has been allowed; [c] and if at the hearing it

shall appear that the defendant has not proved his case,

the plea is of no avail, and the defendant must answer

interrogatories to supply the place of that discovery to

which the complainant, but for the plea, would have been

entitled by answer. [d]

141, From the complex nature of a bill in equity, it

is obvious that the same defence may not be applicable to

every part, but that it may be expedient to demur, or

plead to one part of the bill, and answer to the rest; or to

demur, plead, and answer to different parts; and some-
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times it may be necessary to have separate demurrers or

separate pleas to distinct portions of the bill. Whenever,

therefore, the demurrer or plea does not extend to the

whole bill, it should clearly express what part of the bill

it is intended to cover, and what it is the party refuses to

answer, [e] otherwise the court would be put to great

difficulty, and be obliged to refer to the ‘bill and answer,

to ascertain how far the pleading was meant to go; as, on

[a] Ibid.

[b] Mitf. 13, n, (p) 175.

[c] Mitf. 244. Beames’ Pleas. 317.

[d] 2 Ves. 247.

[e] 2 Ves. 108, 450.

not a dismissal on the merits, such dismissal will not preclude the complainant from bringing a new bill, when the
disability is removed, or informality rectified; [a] and if
this latter can be effected by amendment, the court might
make a special order to that effect, without dismissing the
bill. [b] On the other hand~ with respect to a plea, though
the opinion of the court on argument should be favorable
to the defendant, this does not tern1inate the proceedin~s ;
for, though the· reasoning in law may be correct,. the facts
on which the rule of law is founded, may be untrue; to
put which in issue, the complainant may reply, even after
the plea has been allowed; [ c] and if at the hearing it
shall appear that the defendant has not proved his case,
the plea is of no avail, and the defendant must ans·wer
interrogatories to supply the place of that discovery to
which the complainant, but for the plea, would have been
entitled by answer. [d]

141. From the con1plex nature of a bill in equity, it
is obvious that the satne defenc.e may not be applicable to
every part, but that it may be expedient to demur, or
plead to one part of the bill, and answer to the rest; or to
demur, plead, and answer to different .parts; and sometimes it may be necessary to have separate detnurrers or
separate pleas to distinct portions of the bill. Whenever,
therefore, the demurrer or plea does not extend to the
whole bill, it should clearly express what part of the bill
it is intended to cover, and what it is the party refuses to
answer,· [ e] otherwise the court would be put to great
difficulty, and be obliged to refer to the ·bill and answer,
to ascertain how far the pleading was meant to go; as, on
[a]
[b]

Ibid.
Mitf. 13, n, (p) 175.
[c] Mitf. 244. Beames' Pleas. 317.
[d] 2 Ves. 247.
[e] 2 Ves. 108, 450.
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the other hand, in case of a reference of the answer to a
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master, upon exceptions, he would be at a loss to deter-

mine, precisely, whether the answer was sufficient or not.

[a] And it would not be enough, in such case, to say that

the defendant answers to such and such facts, and pleads

or demurs to all the rest of the bill; for a pleading of this

sort would be overruled for being too general. [b] It is in

the commencement of the plea or demurrer, immediately

after the protestation, that the statement is introduced of

What part of the bill is sought to be covered by the plead-

ing. The commencement in such case runs thus: This

defendant, by protestation, etc., doth demur (or plead) to

so much and such part of the said bill as prays, etc., (or

seeks a discovery from the defendant, whether, etc.”)

142, Great care, however, must be taken not to

make the demurrer extend to any part of the bill to which

it will not be a good defence; for a demurrer cannot be

good in part, and bad in part; [c] that is, if there be any

part of the bill sought to be covered by the demurrer, to

which the demurrer does not extend, the whole demurrer

must be overruled; [d] because the court will not be at

the trouble of examining to which part of the bill the de-
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murrer is applicable ; yet the defendant is not thereby

barred of his defence, because he may afterwards, with the

the other hand, in case of a reference of the answer to a
master, upon exceptions, he would be at a loss to determine, precisely, whether the answer was sufficient or not.
[a] And it would not be enough, in such case, to say that
the defendant answers to such and such facts, and pleads
or demurs to all the rest of the bill; for a pleading of this
sort would be overruled for being too general. [b] It is in
the commencement of the plea or demurrer, immediately
after the protestation, that the statement is ~ntroduced of
what part of the bill is sought to be covered by the pleading. The commencement in such case runs thus: This
defendant, by protestation, etc., doth demur (or plead) to
so much and such part of the said bill as prays, etc., (or
seeks a discovery from tlte defendant, whether, etc.")

leave of the court, ﬁle a new demurrer of less extent. [e]

But if a defendant has demurred to part only ofa bill, and

answered other parts, it is no objection to the allowance

of the demurrer that it is equally applicable to the whole

of the bill. [f] So, where there are separate demurrers to

[a] 2 Sch. & Lefr. 207.

[b] Ibid. and ride 3 Atk. 70. Mos. 40. 1 Ves. & Beames'

[c] 1 Atk. 451. 2 Atk. 388. 5 Ves. 173.

[d] 17 Ves. 280. 1 Swanst. 304. '

[6] Mitf. 14. 11 Ves. 68.

[f] 1 Cox, 416.

7

514.

142. Great care, however, must be taken not to
make the de1nurrer extend to any part of the bill to which
it will not be a good defence; for a demurrer cannot be
good in part, and bad in part; [c] that is, if there be any
part of the bill sought to b~ covered by the demurrer, to
which the demurrer does not extend, the whole demurrer
must be overruled; [d] because the court will not be at
the trouble of examining to which part of the bill the demurrer is applicable; yet the defendant is not thereby
barred of his defence, because he may afterwards, with the
leave of the court, file a new demurrer of less extent. [e]
But if a defendant has demurred to part only of a bill, and
answered other parts, it is no objection to the allowance
of the demurrer that it is equally applicable to the whole
of the bill. [f] So, where there are separate demurrers to
[a] 2 Sch. & Lefr. 207.
[b] Ibid. and vide 3 Atk. 70.

Mos. 40.

514.

[c] 1 Atk. 451. 2 Atk. 388. 5 Ves. 178.
[d] 17 Ves. 280. 1 Swanst. 304.
e] Mitf. 14. 11 Ves. 68.
[/] 1 Cox, 416.

r

7

1 Ves. & Beames'
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distinct parts of the bill, one demurrer may be overruled

upon argument and another allowed. [a]

143, But with respect to pleas, the rule is different;

for a plea may be good in part and bad in part; [b] or,

distinct parts of the bill, one demurrer may be overruled
upon argument and another allowed. [a]

in other words, if the plea cover too much, it will never-

theless be allowed to the eactent to which it is applicable,

[c] and the reason that the rule with regard to demurrers

does not extend to pleas, is that the latter, being special

answers to the bill, as we have seen by the deﬁnition

formerly quoted, it may conveniently enough be ascer-

tained to what part of the bill the plea is an answer, and

whether any other part requires a further defence. In-

deed, the usual course in such case is to allow the plea to

stand for an answer, with liberty to except. [d]

.

Sscnox VI.

Of the Body, and herein of Averments and lntendments.

144, II. The body of the pleading consists of the

assignment of the various causes of demurrer, or the state-

ment of those facts which constitute the plea. A de-

murrer is the negation of the rule of law laid down in the

ﬁrst proposition of the bill, namely, that the right to dis-
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covery and relief results from the relation assumed; or

143. But with respect to pleas, the rule is different;
for a plea may be .r;ood in part and bad in part,· [ b] or,
in other words, if the plea cover too much, it will nevertheless be allowed to the eaJtent to which it is applicable,
[c] and the reason that the rule with regard to demurrers
does not extend to pleas, is that the latter, being special
ansu:ers to the bill, as we have seen by the definition
formerly quoted, it may conveniently enough be ascertained to what part of the bill the plea is an answer, and
whether any other part requires a further defence.. Indeed, the usual course in such case is to allow the plea to
sta~d for an answer, with liberty to except. [d]

rather, since the causes of demurrer must be assigned, it

is a negative proposition that from the Complainant’s own

showing, he has not the right to discovery and relief, either

because the relation stated by him is not adequate, or

SECTION

VI.

because there are some of the objections to answering

which are classiﬁed in the Synopsis, apparent on the face

of the bill. Thus, an issue in law is joined, not in the

[a] Mitf. 174. 3 P. Wms. 158. 1 Atk. 544.

[b] 4 Bro. C. O. 254. 8 Ves. 403. 11 Ves. 70.

[c] Mitf. 240. 2Atk. 284.

[d] 6Ves. 580.

Of the Body, and herein of Averments and Intendments.
144. II. The body of the pleading consists of the
assignment of the various causes of demurrer, or the statement of those facts which constitute the plea. A demurrer is the negation of the rule of law laid down in the
first proposition of the bill, namely, that the right to discovery and relief results from the relation assumed ; or
rather, since the causes of demurrer must be assign~d, it
is a negative proposition that from the Complainant's own
showing, he has not the right to discovery and relief, either
because the relation stated by him is not adequate, or
because there are some of the objections to answering
which are classified in the Synopsis, apparent on the face
of the bill. Thus, an issue in law is joined, not in the
[a] Mitf. 174. 8 P. Wms. 158. 1 Atk. 544.
[b] 4 Bro. C. C. 254. 8 Ves. 408. 11 Ves. 70.
[c] Mltf. 240. 2 Atk. 284.
[d] 6 Ves. 580.
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ﬁrst instance on the complainant’s right, 5 ~the

first instance on the complainant's right,~. the
validity of the causes assigned; and if any o~\b.;~~i~
be allowPd on argument, the right is necessart1j-Vg6ti~! :1~: 1

validity of the causes assigned; and if any 0 osgoaiﬂés

be allowed on argument, the right is necessarilyl'§:€frlel*3.' .1

145, The statement of the causes of demurrer, there-

fore, will be nothing more than a reference to the bill, and

...

an enumeration of the objections appearing on the face of

'I

two questions: whether the objection, as stated, really

~

exists; and whether such objection is valid. The ﬁrst is,

generally, a question of the adequateness of the relation

stated by the bill; the latter is a question on the rule of

law; and the defendant should, in assigning the causes of

demurrer, clearly point out the nature of the objection

which he takes, and how it appears on the adverse

pleading.

146, It is a general rule, that a speaking demurrer

is bad; i. e., when it contains argument in the body of it;

if, for instance, the demurrer say, “in or about the year

1770. which is upwards of twenty years before the bill

ﬁled.” [a] A demurrer, also, to anything but what ap-

pears on the face of the bill,‘ is considered a speaking
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demurrer. [b]

147, The defendant may show as many causes of

demurrer as there are objections apparent in the bill. [c]

in which respect a demurrer differs from a plea, which

must not (at least without the leave of the court) be

double; [d] and the reason of this difference is, that one

of the principal advantages of a plea being to save the

parties the expense of going into an examination at large,

[a] 2 Ves. jun. 83.

[b] 2 Ves. 245.

[c] 3 Mad. Rep. 8.

[d] 2 Eq. Abr. 176.

& Beames, 153, 155.

1 Atk. 54. 1 Bro. C. O. 404, and 2 Ves.

•

·"'

145. The statement of the causes of demurrer, there-

it, on which the defendant means to rely. Hence arise

:r:

--•

c~

u..
Q

->•

fore, will be nothing more than a reference to the bill, and
an enumeration of the objections appearing on the face of
it, on which the defendant means to rely. Hence arise
two questions: whether the objection, as stated, really
exists; and whether such objection is valid. The first is,
generally, a question of the adequateness of the relation
st~t.ed by the bill ; the latter is a question on the rule of
law; and the defendant should, in assigning the causes of
demurrer, clearly point out the nature of the objection
which he takes, and how it appears on the adverse
pleading.

146. It is a general rule, that a speaking dem·urrer
is bad; i. e., when it contains argument in the body of i~;
if, for instance, the demurrer say, ''in or about the year
1770, which is upwards of twenty yea1"8 before the bill
filed." [a] A demurrer, also, to anything but what appears on the face of the bill,· is considered a speaking
demurrer. [b]

147. The defendant may show

~s

tnany causes of
detnurrer as there are objections apparent in the bill. [c]
in which respect a demurrer differs from a plea, which
must not (at least without the leave of the· court) be
double; [ d] and the reason of this difference is, that one
of the principal advantages of a plea being to save the
parties the expense of going into an examination at large,
[a]
[b]

2 Ves. jun. 83.

2 Ves. 245.
[c) 3 Mad. Rep. 8.
[d) 2 Eq. Abr. 176. 1 Atk. 54. 1 Bro. C. C. 404, and 2 Ves.

& Beames, 158, 155.
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that end would be frustrated by permitting the defendant
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to put in issue a variety of facts constituting distinct bars,

any of which would have been sufficient; but demurrers

put no facts in issue, and may therefore take every avail-

able exception which can be used on the argument; and

even causes of demurrer may be stated ore tenus, although

not set out in the pleading; [a] but nevertheless, only to

the extent of the demurrer on the record. [b] For example :

if the demurrer be to the discovery, the defendant cannot

ore tenus demur to the examination of witnesses de bene

esse: and much less shall he be allowed to demur at the

bar, when he has only pleaded, and there is no demurrer

in court. [c]

148, As a demurrer collects the negative rule of law

from the complainant’s own statement, so the plea, on the

other hand, deduces the same conclusion from a new state-

ment by the defendant. The body of the plea, therefore,

will consist of a statement of the facts from which the con -

clusion in objection to answering is drawn, [d] and the de-

fendant, in effect, makes out a collateral case, founded on

some one of the modes of defence stated in the Synopsis. >

149, The collateral case made by plea, may, like
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the statement of a bill, be resolved into two propositions,

of which one states the rule of law, viz.: 1st, That cer-

tain incidents arfectiny the relation, avoid the complain-

ant’s right to discovery or relief; the other avers the facts.

2d, That such incidents are attached to the relation in

question. Hence arise two questions : the ﬁrst a question

of law, as to the validity of the objection relied on; the

other a question of fact, as to the truth of those allega-

[a] 1 Vern. 78. 3 P. Wms. 370.

[b] 17 Ves. 213.

[c] 1 Vern. 78.

[d] 3 Atk. 558.

that end would be frustrated by permitting the defenuant
to put in issue a variety of facts constituting distinct ba:rs,
any of which would have been sufficient;. but demurrers
put no facts in issue, and 1nay therefore take every available exception whi.ch can be used on the argument; and
even causes of demurrer may be stated ore tenus, although
not set out in the pleading; [a 1 but nevertheless, only to
t.he extent of the dernurrer on the record. [b] For example:
•
if the demurrer be to the discovery,
the· defendant cannot
ore tenus demur to the examination of witnesses de bene
eaae: and much less shall he be allowed to demur at the
ba~, when he has only pleaded, and there is no demurfer
in court. [c]
148. As a demurrer collects the negative rule of law
from the complainant's own statement, so the plea, on the
other hand, deduces the same conclusion from a new statement by the defendant. The body of the plea, therefore,
will consist of a statement of the facts from which the con.
elusion in objection to answering is drawn, [d] and the defendant, in effect, makes out a collateral case, founded on
some one of the modes of defence stated in the Synopsis. .

149. The collateral case made by plea, may, like
the statement of a bill, be resolved into two propositions,
of which one states the rule of law, viz.: 1st, That cer-

tain incidents affecting tlte relation, avoid the complainant's right to discovery or relief; the other avers the facts.
2d, That such incidents are attacked to the relation in
question. Hence arise two questions: the first a question
of law, as to the validity of the objection relied on; the
other a question of fact, as to the truth of those allega[a] 1 Vern. 78. 3 P. Wms. 370.
[b] 17 Ves. 213.
[c] 1 Vern. 78.
[ d]

3 Atk. 558.
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tions which constitute the objection. Upon either or both
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of these the complainant may take issue; and we have

101

seen that if the plea on argument be determined against

him, he may reply to the question of fact, and put the de-

fendant on the proof; but if he replies in the ﬁrstinstance,

without setting down the plea for argument, he thereby

admits the validity of the rule of law, which is always the

prior question; and he will not afterwards be admitted to

dispute it, since he was contented to rest his case on the

truth or falsehood of the facts alleged by the plea. [a]

150, The statement of the facts then must be direct

and positive, and such as will amount to acomplete equit-

able bar or other objection to answering. [b] It must also

be clear and precise, and contain such subsidiary aver-

ments as are necessary to avoid all ambiguity of meaning;

for the rule of construction is always unfavorable to the

pleader. Hence. averments have been divided into gen-

eral and particular. [c] The ﬁrst are those which state

tions which constitute the objection. Upon either or both
of these the con1plainant may take issue; and we have
seen that if the plea on argument. be determined against
him, he may reply to the question of fact, and put the defendant on the proof; but if he replies in the first instance,
without setting down the plea for argument, he thereby
admits the validity of the rule of law, which is always the
prior question ; and he will not afterwards be admitted to
dispute it, since he was contented to rest his case on the
truth or falsehood of the facts alleged by the plea. [a]

generally the collateral case; the latter are such as are

used in explanation of the general averments to exclude

intendments [d] (as they are technically called), which in

all cases are taken most strongly against the pleader.
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The meaning of an intendment is, that allowing an aver-

ment to be true, but that at the same time a case may be

supposed consistent with it, which would render the aver-

ment inoperative as a full defence, such case shall be pre-

sumed, unless speciﬁcally excluded by particular aver-

ment—as where a proposition in the disjunctive is not

denied in both its parts; or a proposition in the conjunc-

tive, aﬁirmed in both its parts.

[a] 3 P. Wms. 95.

[b] Mitf. 240. 2 Ves. 245. 3 Atk. 586.

[c] 00. Litt. 362 b.

[d] Mitf. 240.

150. The statement of the facts then mQst be direct
and positive, and such as will amount to a complet~ equitable bar or other objection to answering. [b] It must also
be clear and precise, and contain such subsidiary avermenta as are necessary to avoid all ambiguity of meaning;
for the rule of construction is always unfavorable to the
pleader. Hence . averme·nta have been divided into general and particular. [c] The first are those which state
generally the collateral case; the latter are such as are
used' in explanation of the general averments to exclude
intendments [d] (as they are technically called), which in
all cases are taken most strongly against the pleader.
The meaning of an intendment is, that allowing an averment to be true, but that at the same time a case may be
supposed consistent with it, which would render the averment inoperative as a full defence, such case shall be presumed, unless specifically excluded by particular averment-as where a proposition in the dis.junctive is not
denied in both its parts; or a proposition in the conjunctive, affirmed in both its parts.
8 P. Wms. 95.
Mitf. 240. 2 Ves. 245.
(c] Co. Litt. 362 b.
[d] Mitf. 240.
[a]
[b]

3 Atk. 586.
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151, The general averments must contain a detailed

statement, in their natural order, of all those circum-

102
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stances, which, taken together, amount to a valid equit-

able defence; [a] and if any of the links in the chain of

facts be wanting, it will be intended against the defendant.

It must be a statement of particular facts, and not of gen-

eral deductions from facts; [b] thus, it is not enough to

say, that a thing was duly or lawfully done or executed,

without setting out the particular manner; for that isa

question for the court to determine, and not for the de-

fendant to assume. This is meant, however, with regard

to such averments only as go to the very substance and

gist of the bar. To take a peculiar example: the bank-

ruptcy of the plaintiff subsequent to the cause of action,

is a good plea in bar, both in law and in equity. [c] It is

not, however, his being declared a bankrupt under the

commission, which constitutes the bar, but his having bona

ﬂde committed an act of bankruptcy, and the proceedings

thereon, including the transfer of his property to the

assignees. For the substance of the bar, in this case, is

the want of interest in the plaintiff, such interest being

vested in the assignees; but if any of the previous steps
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be irregular, the assignment is void. It is not sufficient,

therefore, to state that the plaintiff was duly found and

declared a bankrupt under the commission; but his

being a trader under the act, his act of bankruptcy and

the several proceedings thereon seriatim, must be set out

at full length; for although the commissioners may have

declared him a bankrupt non constat, but that their de-

cision may be reversed, and that is for the court and jury

to determine. [d] So also, in pleading a release, the con-

[a] 1 Ves. 243. 1 Bro. C. C. 578.

[b] 4 Bro. C. C. 321. 13 Ves. 29. 2 Sch. & Lefr. 305_6,

[0] 9 Ves. 77. 1 Anstr. 101.

[d] Vide what is said by Lord Eldon, in Carleton 11. Leigh-

ton, 3 Meriv. 667.

151. The general averments must contain a detailed
statement, in their natural order, of all those circumstances, which, taken together, amount to a valid equit·
able defence; [a] and if any of the links in the chain of
facts be wanting, it will be intended against the defendant.
It must be a statement of particular facta, and not of general deductions from facts; [h] thus, it is not enough to
say, that a thing· was duly or lawfully done or executed,
without setting out the particular manner; for that is a
question for the court to determine, and not for the defendant to assume. This is meant, however, with regard
to such averments only as go to the very substance and
gist of the bar. To take a peculiar example: the. bankruptcy of the pl~intiff subsequent to the cause of action,
is a good plea in bar, both in law and in equity. [c] It is
not, however, his being declared a bankrupt under the
commission, which constitutes the bar, but his having bona
fide committed an act of bankruptcy, and the proceedings
thereon, including the transfer of his property to the
assignees. For the substance of the bar, in this case, is
the want of interest in the plaintiff, such interest being
vested in the assignees; but if any of the previous steps
be irregular, the assignment is void. It is not sufficient,
therefore, to state that the plaintiff was duly found and
declared a bankrupt under the commission; but his .
being a trader under the act, his act of bankruptcy and
the several proceedings thereon aeriat·im, must be set out
at full length; for although the commissioners may have
declared him a bankrupt non constat,' but that their decision may be reversed, and that is for the court and jury
to determine. [ d] So also, in pleading a release, the con[a] 1 Ves. 243. 1 Bro. C. C. 578.
[b] 4 Bro. C. C. 321. 13 Ves. 29. 2 Sch. & Lefr. 3~.
[c] 9.Ves. 77. 1 Anstr. 101.
[d] Vide what is said by Lord Eldon, in Carleton v. Leigh-

ton, 3 Meriv. 667.
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sideration must be set out, [a] or otherwise it will be in-

tended to have been made without a sufﬁcient considera-
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tion; for the statement in the bill being taken for true,

the demand is acknowledged to be just; and then a re-

lease would not be a good bar, unless the consideration

were equivalent; [b] but that is for the court to decide.

152, If any one of the general averments admits of

an intendment unfavorable to the defendant, such intend-

ment must be excluded by a particular averment. Thus

in outlawry or excommunication, which are pleaded [sub

pede sigilli, [c] it must be averred that they are still in

force, and also that the person named in the record pro-

duced to the court under seal, and the complainant, are

sideration must be set out, [a] or otherwise it ~ill be intended to have been made without a sufficient consideration; for the statement in the b!ll being taken for true,
the demand is acknowledged to be just; a.nd then a release would not be a good bar, unless the consideration
were eq ui valent ; [ b] but that is for the court to d,cide.

one and the same person. This is similar to the usual

averment of “ guoe est eadem,” in trespass at common law.

In like manner, where the plea has been anticipated and.

impeached by a charge in the bill, the charge must be

negatived by a particular averment [d] to avoid the gen-

eral intendment that the allegations of the bill are true,

and consequently the matter of the plea invalidated. [e]

153, But, as we have explained in a former chapter,

a plea of this nature must be supported by an answer, so
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far as to deny the matter of impeachment charged in the

bill, [fj both for the technical reasons which have been

formerly detailed, and for another reason which we shall

mention here, namely: that notwithstanding the plea, the

complainant .is entitled .to discovery, so far as relates to

[a] Hard. 168. 2 Ves. 107. Gilb. For. Rom. 57.

[b] See Lord Redesdale judgment in Roche v. Morgell, 2

Sch. & Lefr. 728.

[0] Beames’ Ord. Chan. 27.

[d] Mitf. 241, 196, et seq.

[6] Mitf. 241. Gilb. For. Rom. 58.' 2 Atk. 124.

[f] Mitf. 192, and the cases cited in the note.

152. If any one of the general ave1'ments admits of
an intendment unfavorable to the defendant, such intendment must be excluded by a particular averment. Thus
in outlawry or excommunication, which are pleaded aub
pede sigilli, [c] it must be averred that they are still in
force, and also that the person named in the record produced to the court under seal, and the complainant, are
one and the same person. This is similar to the usual
averment of" qum est eadem," in trespass at common law.
In ·like manner, where the plea has been anticipated and.
impeached by a charge in the bill, the charge must be
negatived by a particular averment [d] to avoiQ. the general intendment that the allegations of the bill are true,.
and consequently the matter of the plea invalidated. [e]

153. But, as we have explained in a former chapter,
a plea of this ·nature must be supported by an answer, so
far as to deny the matter of impeachment charged in the
bill, [fj both for the technical reasons \Vhich have been
formerly detailed, and for another reason which we shal~
mention here, namely: that notwithstanding the plea, the
complainant ~s entitled .to discovery,.so far as relates to
[a] Hard. 168. 2 Ves. 107. Gilb. For. Rom. 57.
[b] See Lord Redesdale judgment in Roche v. Morgell, 2
Sch. & Lefr. 728.
[c] Beames' Ord. Chan. 27.

[d] Mitf. 241, i96, et seq.
[e] Mitf. 241. Gil b. For. Rom. 58.· 2 Atk. 124.
[f] Mitf. 192, and the cases cited in the note.
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the charge, with all its circumstantial interrogations ; [a]
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and it is in its character of a proof, and not as a pleading,

that the answer is used in this case. This is the meaning

of the position most correctly laid down by Lord Redes-

dale, when, in combating the notion that there is some-

thing incongruous in this mode of pleading. he says, that

“ the answer is no part of the defence.” [b] The plea alone

is the defence; the answer is but the discovery to which

the complainant is entitled, and which the plea cannot

cover, because the validity of the plea depends in a great

measure on the discovery, to which alone the complainant

can except; and the negative averment in the plea “ does

not require positive assertion.” [c] Answers are thus

used sometimes in support of a plea ; but in other respects,

if a defendant were to answer to parts of the bill, covered

by plea or demurrer—these pleadings being in fact, only

objections to answering—would be thereby waived. [d]

154, From the strictness of the rules regarding pleas,

it is apparent that in order to make the plea a full de-

fence, all the averments must be stated positively; [e]

although in some instances—as in case of negative aver-

ments, and of averment of facts not within the immediate
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knowledge of the defendant, he will be permitted to aver

according to the best of his knowledge and belief. [f] A

variety of facts may be averred, provided they all tend to

the same conclusion, and amount to a single objection;

[g] for, if more than one objection were taken, the plea

[al Gilb. For. Rom. 58. Mitf. 200. 6 Ves. 592.

the charge, with all its circum8tantial interrogations; [a]
and it is in its character of a proof, and not as a pleading,
that the answer is used in this case. This is the meaning
of the position most correctly laid down by Lord Redesdale, when, in combating the notion that there is something incongruous in this mode of pleading" he says, that
'' the answer is no part of the defence." [ b] The plea alone
is the defence; the answer is but the discovery to which
the complainant is entitled, and which the plea cannot
cover, because the validity of the plea depends in a great
measure on the discovery, to which alone the complainant
can except ; and the negative averment in the plea "'does
not require positive assertion." [cJ Answers are thus
used sometimes in support of a plea ; but in other respects,
if a defendant were to answer to parts of the bill, covered
by plea or demurrer-these pleadings being in fact, only
objections to answering-would be thereby waived. [d]

[b] Vide Mitf. 189, note [h] and ride Beames’ Pleas, 34.

[c] Mitf. 240.

[d] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. 2 Atk. 155. 1 Anstr. 14. 1 Vern. 90.

[c] 3 Atk. 586.

[f] Mitf. 240.

[9] 1 P. Wms. 723. 15 Ves. 79.

154. From the strictness of the rules regarding pleas,
it is apparent that in order to make the plea a full 1efence, all the averments must be stated positively; [e]
although in some instances-as in case of negative averments, and of averment of facts not within the immediate
knowledge of the defendant, he will be pern1itted to aver
according to the best of his knowledge and belief. [f] A
variety ·of facts may be averred, provided they all tend to
the same conclusion, and amount to a single objection;
[g] for, if more than one objection were taken, the plea
[a} Gilb. For. Rom. 58. Mitf. 200. 6 Ve~. 592.
[b] Vide Mitf. 189, note [h] and vide Beames' Pleas, 34.
[ c] Mitf. 240.
[d] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. 2 Atk. 155. I Anstr. 14. 1 Vern. 90.
[e] 3 Atk. 586.
[j] Mitf. 240.
[g] 1 P. Wm8. 723. 15 Ves. 79.
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would be bad for duplicity. [a] By the common law, a

too

double plea, or one which assigned more than one cause

in bar of a suit, was bad; [b] but now, by stat. 4th Ann.

c. 16, two several bars may be pleaded by the leave of the

court in any court of record. The court of,equity not

being a court of record, it was considered that a double

plea in this court would be fatal; but it has lately been

decided that with the leave of the court, the defendant

may plead double; [c] and justly, since it would be con-

trary to all analogy, that the same latitude should not be

allowed in equity as at common law; and the previous

sanction of the court suﬁiciently guards against abuse.

.

Sncrron VII.

Of the Conclusion.

155, III. The conclusion of a plea or demurrer is,

substantially an appeal to the court, whether the defend-

ant, for the reason assigned in the body of the pleading,

ought to be compelled to put in an answer and contest the

suit, or make that discovery which the complainant seeks

by his bill; and it ends with a prayer that the party may

would be bad for duplicity. [a] By the common law, a
double plea, or one which assigned more than one cause
in bar of a suit, was bad; [b] but uow, by stat. 4th Ann.
c. 16, two several bars may be pleaded by the leave of the
court in any court of record. The court of .equity not
being a court of record, it was considered that a double
plea in this court would be fatal; but it has lately been
decided that with the leave of the court, the. defendant
may plead double; [c] and justly, since it \vould be contrary to all analogy, that the same latitude should not be
allowed in equity as at common law; and the previous
sanction of the court sufficiently guards against abuse.

be dismissed from attendance, with his reasonable costs.
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The purport and design of pleas and demurrers of all de-

scriptions in equity being to avoid an answer, [d] the same

conclusion is alike applicable to every species. In general,

SECTION

however, in pleas in bar, the defendant states that he

VII.

avers the matter contained in his plea, and pleads the same

Of the Conclusion.

[a] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 1 Atk. 54. 1 Bro. C. C. 404. 2 Ves.

& Beames’, 153.

[b] Co. Litt. 304, a.

[c] Gibson 1). Whitehead, 30th July, 1819, before V. C.

LeachI cited in Madd. Chan. Prac. 299.

[ct] Gilb. For. Rom. 58.

155. III. 1.'he conclusion of a plea or demurrer is,
substantially an appeal to the court, whether the defendant, for the reason assigned in the body of the pleading,
ought to be compelled to put in an answer and cont~st the
suit, or make that discovery which the complainant seeks
by his bill ; and it ends with a prayer that the party may
be dismissed from attendance, with his reasonable costs.
The purport and design of pleas and demurrers of all descriptions in equity being to avoid an ans·wer, [d] the same
conclusion is alike applicable to every species. In general,
however, in pleas in bar, the defendant states that he
avers the matter contained in his plea, and pleads the same
2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 1 Atk. 54. 1 Bro. C. C. 404. 2 Ves.
& Beames 7, 153.
[b] Co. Litt. 304, a.
[c] Gibson v. Whitehead, 30th July, 1819, before V. C.
Leach, cited in Madd. Chan. Prac. 299.
[d] Gilb. For. Rom. 58.
[a]
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in bar; [a] but this, though usual, is not necessary, nor

will the want of it vitiate the plea. [b]

106
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156, At common law, every plea has its apt and

proper ‘conclusion, [c] by which the nature of the plea is

to be judged; and therefore an improper conclusion would

be fatal, there being an essential difference as to the

in bar,· [a] but this, though usual, is not necessary, nor
will the want of it vitiate the plea. [b]

judgment to be pronounced on each. [d] The slightest

informality will invalidate the plea in abatement; [e] be-

156. At common law, every plea has its apt and

cause the courts discountenance these pleas, which do

not go to the merits; and it is but reasonable that he that

objects upon mere form, shall bejudged by the same rule ;

besides, thejudgment in such case is only interlocutory,

guod respondeat ouster. [f] 1n equity, the decision of the

court with respect to all kinds of ,pleas and demurrers is

the same, viz.: the bill is dismissed, or the defendant is

put to answer over, and contest the suit. In this regard,

all pleas, even such as are in bar in equity, are.analagous

to pleas in abatement at common law, which do not con-

test the suit. In equity, the answer is the only pleading

which effectively contests the suit; and all pleas, whether

dilatory or peremptory, are only objections to answering.

Hence has arisen the doubt, whether there be any pleas
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in abatement in equity, as contra-distinguished from pleas

in bar; [9] and certainly it would be more correct to divide

pleas in equity into declinatory, dilatory and peremptory,

in analogy to the civil law, from which the proceedings in

this court are derived. The judgment, in all pleas in

[a] Beames’ Pleas, 49.

[b] This point was raised in the case of Merewether v.

Mellish, 13 Ves. 435 ; but it was not even noticed by the court.

[0] Co. Litt. 303 b.

[d] 1 Saund. 103, a. n. [1].

[e] 3 Term. Rep. 185. 8 Term. Rep. 515.

[f] 2 Saund. 211, a. n. [3].

[g] Vide Beames’ Pleas, 57, et seq.

proper ·conclusion, [c] by which the nature of the plea is
to be judged; and therefore an improper conclusion would
be fatal, there being an essential difference as to the
judgment to be pronounced on each. [d] The slightest
informality will invalidate the plea in abatement; [e] because the courts discountenance these vleas; which do
not go to the merits; and it is but reasonable that he that
objects upon mere forni, shall be judged by the same rule;
besides, the judgment in such case is only interlocutory,
quod respondeat ozester. [f] In equity, the decision of t~e
court with respect to all kinds of .pleas and demurrers is
the same, viz.: the bill is dismissed, or the defendant is
put to answer over, and contest the suit. In this regard,
all pleas, even such as are in bar in equity, are.analagous
to pleas in abatentent at common law, which do not contest the suit. In equity, the answer is the only pleading
which effectively contests the suit; and all pleas, whether
dilatory or peretnptory, are only objections to answering.
Hence has arisen the doubt, whether there be any pleas
in abatement in equity, as contra-distinguished from pleas
in bar; [g] and certainly it would be more correct to divide
pleas in equity into declinatory, dilatory and peremptory,
in analogy to the civil law, from which the proceedings in
this court are derived. The judgment, in all pleas in
[a]
[b]

Mellish,
[ c]
[d]
[ e]

[/]
[g]

Beames' Pleas, 49.
This point was raised in the case of Merewether v.
13 Ves. 435; but it was not even noticed by the court.
Co. Litt. 303 b.
1 Saund. 103, a. n. [1].
3 Term. Rep. 185. 8 Term. Rep. 515.
2 Saund. 211, a. n. [3].
Vide Beames' Pleas, 57, et seq.
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equity, being the same, the conclusion need not be differ-

ent; and, as we have seen, they hear an anology to pleas
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in abatement at common law ; so the conclusion is similar

to that of pleas to the person at common law, where the

defendant demands thejudgment of the court si respon-

dere debet. [a] Thus, too, and with the same anology,

pleas of matter in pais, like pleas in abatement at com-

mon law, [b] must be put in upon oath.

157, It has been questioned whether a plea in

equity, which did not conclude by averring the facts to be

true, [c] similar to the “hoc paratus est verificare,” at

common law, would be good; but since the stat. 4 Ann. c.

16, not even at common law can this objection [d] be

taken advantage of, but by special demurrer, and it would

not, it is concluded, be available in equity.

equity, being the same, the conclusion need not be different; arid, as we have seen, they bear an a no logy to pleas
in abatement at common law ; so the conclusion is s'imilar
to that of pleas to the person at common law, where the
defendant demands the judgment of the court si respondere debet. [a] Thus, too, and with the same analogy,
pleas of matter in pais, like pleas in abatement at common law, [h] must be put in upon oath.

158, When the plea or demurrer extends to part

only of the bill, the conclusion must be conformable

thereto; and as in that case there must be an answer to

the rest of the bill, not covered by the plea or demurrer,

such answer is preceded by a protestation against a waiver

of the plea. So, likewise, when the answer is in support

of the plea, it is expressed to be made for that purpose,
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and preceded by a similar protestation. This is, however,

emabundanti cautela, because an answer is only a waiver

to the‘ plea, “ when it puts in issue anything which the

pleawould cover from being put in issue.” [e] Where

an answer is added to a plea or demurrer, the prayer to

157. It has been questioned whether a plea in
equity, which did not conclude by averring the facts to be
true, [ c] similar to the ''hoc paratus eat verificare," at
comma~ law, would be good; but.since the stat. 4 Ann. c.
16, not even at common law can this objection [d] be
taken ad vantage of, but by special demurrer, and it would
not, it is concluded, be available in equity.

be dismissed with costs is inserted at the end of the

answer. In cases of this nature the conclusion runs thus:

[a] 2 Saund. 210,‘note. Tidd, 576.

[b] 2 Str. 705, 738.

[c] Randolph 12. Randolph, Hardr. 160.

[cl] 1 East, 369.

[e] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. Mitf. 195, n. [c].

158. When the plea or demurrer extends ·to part
only of the bill, the conclusion must be conformable
thereto; and as in that case there must be an answer to
the rest of the bill, not covered by the plea or demurrer,
such answer is preceded by a protestation against a waiver
of the plea. So~ likewise, when the answer is in support
of the plea, it is expressed to be made for that purpose,
and preceded by a similar protestation. 'fhis is, ·however,
ernabundanti cautela, because an answer is only a waiver
to the· plea, '' when it puts in issue anything which the
plea-would cover from being put in issue.'' [e] Where
an answer is added to a plea or demurrer, the prayer to
be dis1nissed with costs is inserted at the end of the
answer. In cases of this nature the conclusion runs thus:
(a] 2 Saund. 210, note. Tidd, 576.
[b] 2 Str. 705, 738·.
[c] Randolph v. Randolph, Hardr. 160.
( d] 1 East, 369.
[e] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. Mitf. 195, n. (e].
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“ This defendant both plead (or demur) to so much of the
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said bill as is hereinbefore mentioned, and humbly de-

mands thejudgment of this honorable court whether he

shall be compelled to make any further or other answer to

so much of the said bill as is hereinbefore pleaded (or

demurred) to. And this defendant, not waiving his said

plea (or demurrer), but relying thereon for answer to the

residue of the said bill, saith,” etc. If the answer be in

support of the plea, “this defendant not waiving his said

plea, but relying thereon, and for better supporting the

same, for answer to so much of the said bill as aforesaid,

saith,” etc. The nature and form of answers will be the
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subject of our consideration in the ensuing chapter.

"This defendant both plead (or demur) to so much of the
said bill as is hereinbefore mentioned, and humbly demands the judgment of this honorable court whether he
shall be compelled to make any further or other answer to
so 1nuch of the said bill as is hereinbefore pleaded (or
demurred) to. And this defendant, not waiving his said
plea (or demurrer), but relying thereon for answer to the
residue of the said bill, saith," etc. If the answer be in
support of the plea, .,, this defendant not waiving his said
plea, but relying thereon, and for better supporting the
same, for answer to so rriuch of the said bill as aforesaid,
saith," etc. The nature and form of answers will be the
subject of our consideration in the ensuing chapter.

CHAPTER V.

ANSWERS.

159, Ifthe defendant cannot protect himselffrom dis-

covery, by either plea or demurrer, he must give a distinct

and full answerto each particular allegation and charge in

the bill. The bill calls on the defendant “ to make full, true,

perfect and distinct answers to all and singular the mat-

ters therein contained ; and that as fully and particularly

as if they were repeated by way of interrogation; ”. and it

then proceeds to interrogate to each point circumstan-

tially. The defendant must therefore answer every part

of the substance of the statement and charges, even though

CHAPTER V.

it should be omitted in the interrogation; and further, as

the use of the interrogating part in the bill is to extract a

full confession and prevent evasion or ambiguity, every

particular question must be answered precisely in all its

bearings and circumstances, provided it be founded upon -

some express allegation in the body of the bill. [a] So

far as the answer is an admission of the facts charged by

the complainant, it stands in place of proof in the cause;

and hence the great object which the complainant has in

view, is to obtain such an answer as will either supply

proof, where the facts rest within the knowledge of the

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

defendant, and are binding in conscience only, or such as

will aid proof, viz.: where, although he shall be able to

prove the facts by the testimony of others, yet the defend-

ant’s admission will save him the trouble and expense of

examining witnesses to those points which are acknowl-

[a] 1 Bro. C. C. 503. 6 Ves. 37_8.

ANSWERS.

159. If the defendant cannot protect himself from discovery, by either plea or demurrer, he must give a distinct
and full answer to each particular allegation and charge in
the bill. The bill calls on the defenda.nt" to make full, true,
perfect and distinct answers to all and singular the matters therein contained; and that as fully and particularly
as if they were repeated by wa~ of interrogation; ". and it
then proceeds to interrogate to each point circumstantially. The defendant must therefore answer every part
of the substance of the statement and charges, even though
it should be omitted in the interrogation; and further, as
the use of the interrogating part in the bill is to extract a
full confession and prevent evasion o~ ambiguity, every
particular question must be answered precisely in all its
bearings and circumstances, provided it be founded upon ·
some express allegation in the body of the bill. [a] So
·far as the answer is an admission of the facts charged by ·
the complainant, it stands in place of proof in the cause ;
and hence the great object which the complainant has in
view, is to obtain such an· answer as will either supply
proof, where the facts rest within the knowledge of the
defendant, and are binding in conscience only, or such as
will aid proof, viz.: where, although he shall be able to
prove the facts by the testimony of others, yet the defendant's admission will save him the trouble and expense of
examining witnesses to those points which are acknowl[a] 1 Bro. C. 0. 508. 6 Ves. 87-8.
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edged by the answer. [a] Looked upon in this point of.

view, therefore, the answer must fully and fairly meet

every inquiry in the bill, for if there be any possibility of

evasion, the complainant will accept. For this reason, the

primary consideration with the draftsman is to make the

answer suﬂicient, and most of the observations we shall

have to make on the subject of answers will relate to this

point.

160, In earlier times, the forms of proceeding in this

court do not appear to have been near so strict as they

are at the present day, although perhaps they were

abundantly sufficient for all purposes at that period when

the authority of the court of chancery was yet in its in-

edged by the answer. [a] Looked upon in this point of.
view, therefore, the answer must fully and fairly meet
every inquiry in the bill, for if there be any possibility of
evasion, the complainant will accept. For this reason, the
primary consideration with the draftsman is to make the
answer aullicient, and most of the observations we shall
have to make on the subject of answers will relate to this
point.

fancy; and this looseness of form was certainly more

conformable to the notion of equity then entertained,

being considered as a relaxation of the rule of law. Thus

the answer seems to have been little more than a general

and informal statement of the adverse case, in reply to the

bill, accompanied with a traverse of all such points as the

defendant thought it .material to deny, in order to put the

complainant upon the proof, and concluding with a gen-

eral traverse of whatever was not admitted to be true.
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This general traverse at the end of the answer, though now

unriecessary, as every point must be answered separately,

is still continued in practice. [b] In like manner the de-

fendant was permitted to answer and plead, or demur, at

the same time, and to the same parts of the bill; because

the answer, being such as we have described it above, was

not considered so much in the light of a discovery, which

the defendant by his plea or demurrer would avoid, as of

a pleading to be used only on the defence. Hence it was

usual to commence the answer with a general reservation

[a] 2 Atk. 241. 2 Ves. 492.

[b] 2 P. Wms. 87. '

160. In earlier times, the forms of proceeding in this
court do not appear to have been near so strict as they
are ·at the present day, although perhaps they were
abundantly sufficient for all purposes at that period when
the authority of the court of chancery was yet in its infancy; and this looseness of form was certainly more
conformable to the no.tion of equity then entertafned,
being considered as a relaxation of the rule of law. Thus
the answer seems to have been little more than a general
and informal statement of the adverse case, in reply to the
bill, accompanied with a traverse of all such points as the
defendant thought it material to deny, in order to put the
complainant upon the proof, and concluding with a general traverse of whatever was not admitted to be true .
.This general traverse at the end of the answer, though now
unnecessary, as every point must be answered separately, .
is still continued in practice. [b] In like manner the de·
fendant was permitted to answer and plead, or demur, at
the same time, and to the same parts of the bill; because
the answer, being such as we have described it above, was
not considered so much in the light of a discovery, which
the defendant by his plea or demurrer would avoid, as of
a pleading to be used only on the defence. Hence it was
usual to commence the answer wi~h a general reservation
[a] 2 Atk. 241. 2 Ves. 492.
[b] 2 P. Wms. 87. ·
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of the right to except to the complainant’s bill; andal-

though, since the practice of the court has been matured,

the answer would be a waiver of a plea or demurrer, [a]

and consequently no objection can be taken after answer

to the bill, [b] still the old form of commencement is ad-

hered to. The commencement is now, therefore, a mere

technical form, of no further utility than as it serves to

characterize the pleading. In the case of an infant, whose

rights and interests are under the peculiar protection of

the court, this form of reserving the beneﬁt of exceptions,

as well as the usual denial of combination, at the close of

the answer, are omitted. [c]

161, The defendant, by his oath, is bound to answer

according to the best and utmost of his knowledge, remem-

brance, information and belief. That which he is ac-

quainted with of his own knowledge admits of a direct '

answer, either in the affirmative or negative, unless it be

a matter of recollection, in which respect the answer must

be qualiﬁed according to the extent of the remembrance.

Such circumstances as are known to the defendant from

of the right to except to the complainant's bill; and . although, since the practice of the court has been matured,
the answer would be a waiver of a plea or demurrer, [a]
and consequently no objection can be taken after answer
to the bill, [b] still the old form of commencement is adhered to. 'fhe commencement is now, therefore, a mere
technical form, of no further utility than as it serves to
characterize the pleading. In the case of an infant, whose
rights and interests are under the peculiar p·rotection of
the court, this form of reserving the benefit of exceptions,
as well as the usual de11ial of combination, at the close of
the answer, are o1nitted. [ c]

information‘ and hearsay only, are the proper subjects of

belief, and on which he in general has formed some
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opinion, either of assent or dissent. It is not enough,

therefore, to answer the question by saying he has been

informed, or heard of any particular fact, but he must

state whether or not he believes it to be true. [d] Again,

there may be other facts alleged in the bill, to which the

defendant is a total stranger, and of the truth of which he

[a] Mitf. 258, 3 Anst. 715. 2 Atk. 155.

Lb] But if, after an answer, the complainant amends his

bill, the defendant may, notwithstanding his former answer, put

in a plea to the amended bill. Vide Ritchie 11. Aylwin, 15 Ves.

79.

[c] Mitf. 254.

[d] Hinde, 197.

16l. The defendant, by his oath, is bound to answer
according to the b~st and utmost of his knowledge, remembrance, information and belief. That which he is acquainted with of his own knowledge admits of a direct
answer, either in the affirmative or negative, unless it be
a matter of recollection, in which respect the answer must
be qualified ~ccording to the extent of the remembrance.
Such circumstances as are known to the defendant from
information· and hearsay only, are the proper subjects of
belief, and on which he in general has formed some
opinion, either of assent or dissent. It is not enough,
therefore, to answer the question by saying he has been
informed, or heard of any particular fact, but he must
state whether or not he believes it to be true. [d] Again,
there may be other facts alleged in the bill, to which the
defendant is a total stranger, and of the truth of which he
Mit f. 258, 3 An st. 715. 2 Atk. 155.
lb] But if, after an answer, the complainant amends his
bill, the defendant may, notwithstanding his former answer, put
in a plea to the amended bill. Vide Ritchie v. Aylwin, 15 Ves.
79.
[c] Mitf. 254.
[dl Hinde, 197.
[a]
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cannot form any opinion. Thus, the answer will be either
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a direct admission or denial, or an assent or dissent, or a

declaration that the defendant cannot, as to his belief or

otherwise, form any opinion of the truth or falsehood of

the facts alleged.

162. But there may be statements or charges in the

bill, which though true in part, are yet substantially in-

correct, and which, therefore, it may be necessary to add

to, qualify, or explain. To questions of this nature the

defendant cannot give adirect answer in the ﬁrst instance ;

cannot form any opinion. Thus, the answer will be either
a direct admission or denial, or an assent or dissent, or a
declaration that the defendant cannot, as to his belief or
otherwise, form any opinion of the truth or falsehood of
the facts alleged.

but he must state the case according to the fact, and con-

clude by denying that the particular statement or charge

162. But there may be statements or cha.rges in the

is true, ‘-‘ further or otherwise,” than as he has explained

it. This is the meaning of a traverse in an answer, so

frequently to be met with in the books as contra_dis-

tinguished from a direct denial; and although it is now

marked by the technical words absque hoc, it is, to all in-

tents and purposes, a traverse, being preceded by an in-

ducement of matter inconsistent with the. statement of

the complainant, but which, without the denial in the

conclusion, would not tender an issue ; and this, we have

seen, is the deﬁnition of a traverse, as explained in a for-
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mer chapter. [a]

163, It is an observation worthy of the student’s

attention, that in order to make all answer sufﬁcient,and

thereby avoid exceptions, the words of the interrogation

ought, as nearly as possible, to be followed, but so as that

the charge may not be answered literally, but in sub-

stance. Thus it should be said, “this defendant admits,

or denies it to be true; ” or, “has been informed and be-

lieves it to be true, that,” etc., following the words of the

bill in the interrogating part. So, likewise, when the

defendant disclaims all knowledge, he should say, “and

[a] Vide ante, c. 1.

bill" which though true in part, are yet substantially incorrect., and which, therefore, it may be necessary t~ add
to, qualify, or explain. To questions of this nature the
defendant cannot give a direct answer in the first instance;
but he must. state the case according to the fact, and conclude by denying that the particular statement or charge
is true,'~ further or otherwise," than as he has explained
it. This is the meaning of a traverse in an answer, so
frequently to be met with in the books as contra-distinguished from a direct denial; and although it is now
marked by the technical words. absque hoc, it is, to all intents and purposes, a traverse, being preceded by an inducement of matter inconsistent with the. statement of
the complainant. but which, without the denial in the
conclusion, would not tender an issue; and this, we have
seen, is the definition of a traverse, as explained in a former chapter. [a]

163. It is an observation worthy of the student's
attention, that in order to make an answer sufficient,, and
thereby avoid exceptions, the words of the interrogation
ought, as nearly as possible, to be followed, but so as that
the charge may not be answered literally, but in subst::tnce. Thus it should be said, " this defendant admit~,
or denies it to be true; " or, "has been informed and believes it to be true, that," etc., following the words of the
bill in the interrogating part. So, likewise, when the
defendant disclaims all knowledge, he should say." and
[a] Vide ante, c. 1.
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this defendant doth not know, and cannot, as to his belief

113

or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof by the said

bill, answer or set forth whether,” etc., repeating the

interrogatory. The traverse is in this form: “this defen-

dant, further answering, saith that,” etc. (stating‘his

case), “ and this defendant further, or otherwise than as

aforesaid, denies it to be true that,” etc. (the words of the

interrogatory). If the defendant be interrogated to a

point of law merely, and not of fact, instead of answer-

ing he submits the question to the decision of the court:

“and this defendant submits it to this honorable court,

whether,” etc. We have already seen that many circum-

stances which would have been available as a defence by

way of plea, may be insisted upon by answer—-as where

the defendant does not require to protect himself from

discovery [a] or where it might be doubtful whether the

same defence would hold as a plea; [b] or where, from

the variety of matters to be put in issue, a plea would not

achieve the object of shortening the suit and saving ex-

pense. [c] In this respect the \answer confesses and

avoids the particular allegation of the bill, similarly to

what we have described when treating of pleas: “and
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this defendant admits it to be true that, etc., but then

he saith that,” etc. (stating the matter in objection) ; and

it is a common but unnecessary practice to conclude with

insisting upon having the same beneﬁt of the objection so

stated, as if the same were pleaded in bar to the relief, or

demurred to as to the discovery, where it would cause a

penalty or forfeiture, or a breach of conﬁdence in a coun-

sel, attorney, or arbitrator. These are the only cases, as

we have stated in the preceding chapter, in which the

defendant can insist by answer against making a dis-

[a] Mitf. 249.

[b] 2 P. Wms. 145.

' [0] 1 Atk. 54. .

8

this defendant doth not know, and cannot, as to his belief
or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof by the said
bill, answer or set forth whether,'' etc., repeating the
interrogatory. The traverse is in this form: ''this defendant,. further answering, saith that," etc. (stating • his
case)," and this defendant further, or otherwise than as
aforesaid, ~enieM it to be true that.," etc. (the words ·of the
interrogatory). If the defendant be interrogated to a
point of law merely, and not of fact, instead of answering he submits the question to the decision of the court:
"and this defendant submits it to this honorable court,
whether," etc. We have already seen that many circumstances which would have been available as a defence by
way of plea, tnay be insisted upon 'by answer-as where
the defendant does not require to protect hiinself from
discovery [a] or where it might be doubtful whether the
same defe11ce would hold as a plea; [b] or where, from
the variety of matters to be put in issue, a plea would not
achieve the object of shortening the suit and saving expense. [c] In this respect the .answer confesses and
avoids the particular allegation of the bill, similarly to
what we have described when treating of pleas: "and
this defendant admits it to be true that, etc., but then
he saith that," etc. (stating the matter in objecti9n); and
it is a common but unnecessary practice to conclude with
insisting upon having the same benefit of the objection so
stated, as if the sa1ne were pleaded in bar to the relief, or
demurred to as to the discovery, where it would c~use a
pena~ty or forfeiture, or a breach of confidence in a counsel, attorney, or arbitrator. These are the only cases .. as
we have stated in the preceding· chapter, in which the
defendant can insist by answer against making a dis[a]

Mitf. 249.
[b] 2 P. Wms. 145.
' [c] 1 Atk. 54..

8
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covery; in all other cases where the defendant submits to
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answer, although he might have good ground for pleading

or demurring, he must answer fully. [a]

164, It was formerly thought that if a defendant

denied by his answer the foundation of the bill, as where

he denied the complainant’s title, or where such title had

not been previously established at law, he might decline

making any discovery as to those inquiries in the bill

which rested on the assumption of the matter denied, [b]

as of good title for instance, unless such discovery were

material as affecting the controverted point. This has

been long a multum vexata quaastio, and one which Lord

Eldon termed a “ distracted point” ; [c] for the cases

abound with contradictions and nice and subtle distinc-

tions upon the subject. [d] But the question is now put

completely at rest, it having been recently decided “ that

a defendant cannot by answer object to answering, though

by plea he may;” [e] and Sir John Leach, expressing

his opinion on this point, said,“ I think that this is so

useful a rule, I shall always adhere to it.” The allowing

a contrary rule to prevail, would be to confound all just

distinctions, and to do away all the advantages that result
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from adhering to systematic forms.

165, The old practice seems to have obtained from

having allowed too great a latitude of construction to a

different rule, namely: that where there is a series of

questions depending upon a supposition of the fact upon

which they are built being admitted, if that fact be

denied, it would undoubtedly be superﬂuous to go on and

[a] 3 Madd. Rep. 70.

[b] Mitf. 251_2_3.

[0] Shaw v. Ching, 11 Ves. 306.

[d] 2 Madd. Chan. Prac. 338-9.

[e] Mazzaredo v. Maitland, 3 Madd. Rep. 70.

covery; in all other cases \\"here the defendant submits to
answer, although he might have good ground for pleading
or demurring, !I.e 1nust answer fully. [a]

164. It was formerly thought that if a defendant
denied by his answer the foundation of the bill, as where
he denied the complainant's title, or where such title had
not been previously est.ablished at law, he might decline
making any discovery as to those inquiries in the bill
which rested on the assumption of the matter denied, [b]
as of good title for instance, unless such discovery were
material as affecting the controverted point. This has
been long a 'll~ultum ve~ata qucsatio, and one which Lord
Eldon termed a " distracted point" ; [ c] for the cases
abound with contradictions and nice and subtle distinctions upon the subject. [d] But the question is now put
completely at rest, it having been recently decided "that
a defendant cannot by answer object to answering, though
by plea he may;" [e] and Sir John Leach, expressing
his opinion on this point, said, " I think that this is so
useful a rule, I shall always adhere to it." The allowing
a contrary rule to prevail, would be to confound all just
distinctions, and to do away all the advantages that result
from adhering to systematic forms.

165. The old practice seems to have obtained from
having allowed too great a latitude of construction to a
different rule, name~y: that where there is a series of
questions depending upon a supposition of the fact upon
which they are built being admitted, if that fact be
denied, it would undoubtedly be superfluous to go on and
[a] 3 Madd. Rep. 70.
[b] Mitf. 251-2-3.
[c] Shaw v. Ching, 11 Ves. 306.
[d] 2 Madd. Chan. Prac. 338-9.
[e] Mazzaredo v. Maitland, 3 Madd. Rep. 70.
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give a particular negative to each query deduced from

115

such presumed fact. But this rule relates to a single

allegation and its consequents, and not to a point, which,

if insisted on by a negative plea, would be a good objec-

tion to the discovery of independent matter; and the

reason of this rule is, that the answer may not be ren-

dered needlessly prolix by the insertion of that which is

suﬁiciently denied by the previous answer.

166, For the similar purpose of avoiding prolixity,

deeds or other writings should not ordinarily be set out in

hoec verba, even though called for by the bills. [a] It is

sufficient if they are referred to, and left with the clerk in

court, for the complainant to take copies, if he thinks

proper; or the court will order them to be produced on

give a particular negative to each query deduced from
such presumed fact. But this rule relates to a single
allegation and its consequents, aud not to a point, which,
if insisted on by a negative plea, would be a good objection to the discovery of independent matter; and the
reason of this rule is, that the answer may not be rendered needlessly prolix by the insertion of that which is
sufficiently denied by the preyious answer.

the examination of witnesses. [b] In all other respects,

however, the answer to each inquiry must be full and

precise; and although general accounts and inventories

and such like, may be set out in schedules annexed to the

answer, and which the defendant prays may be taken as

part thereof, yet any particular question relating to such

account, etc., must be answered speciﬁcally, and it will

not be enough to refer generally to the schedule in
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answer to such particular query. [c] Most of the rules

relating to the precision of answers are to be found in the

following extract from Lord Glarendon’s orders: [d] “An

answer to a matter charged as a defendant’s own fact,

must regularly be without saying ‘ to his remembrance ; ’

or, ‘ as he believeth,’ if it be laid to be done within seven

years before, unless the court, upon exception taken, shall

ﬁnd special cause to dispense with so positive an answer;

and if the defendant deny the fact, he must traverse or

[a] Hinde, 198. Beames‘ Ord. Chan. 69, 166.

[b] Hinde, 198.

[c] 1 Bro. C. C. 503.

[ct] Beames’ Ord. Chan. 179.

166. For the similar purpose of avoid·ing prolixity,
deeds or other writings should not ordinarily be set out in
hmc verba, even though called for by the bills. [a]

It is
sufficient if they are referred to, and left with the clerk in
court, for the complainant to take copies, if he thinks
proper; or the court will order them to be produced on
the examination of witnesses. [b] In all other respects,
however, the ans\ver to each inquiry must be full and
precise; and although general accounts and inventories
and such like, may be set out in schedules annexed to the
answer, and which the defendant prays may be taken as
part thereof, yet any partic~lar question relating to such
account, etc., must be answered specifically, and it will
not be enough to refer generally to the schedule in
answer to such particular query. [c] Most of the rules
relating to the precision of answers are to be _found in the
following extract from Lord Clarendon's orders: [d] '-'An
answer to a matter charged as a defendant's O\Vn fact,
tnust regularly be without saying 'to his· remembrance;'
or,' as he believeth,' if it be laid to be done within seven
years before, unless the court, upon exception taken, s~all
find special cause to dispense with so positive an answer;
and if the defendant deny the fact, he must traverse or
Hinde, 198. Beames' Ord. Chan. 69, 166.
Hinde, 198.
[c] 1 Bro. 0. C. 503.
[d] Beames' Ord. Chan. 179.
[a]
[b]
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deny it (as the cause requires) directly and not by way of
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negative pregnant. [a] As, if he be charged with a re-

ceipt of a sum of money, he must deny or traverse that

he hath not received that sum or any part thereof, or else

set forth what part he hath received. And if a fact be

laid to be done with divers circumstances, the defendant

must not deny or traverse it literally, as it is laid in the

bill, but must answer the point of substance positively

and certainly.”

167, An answer must not, no more than a plea or

demurrer, be argumentative; [b] but should rely on

matter of fact only. There is one more observation

which the student will do well to recollect, namely: that

when any admission which might operate against the de-

fendant is followed by an avoidance or explanation, this

should be one continuous sentence: for though the

deny it (as the cause requires) directly and not by way of ,
negative pregnant. [a] As, if he be charged with a receipt of a sum of money, he must deny or traverse that
he hath not received that sum or any part thereof, or else
set forth what part he hath received. And if a fact be
laid to be done with divers circumstances, the defendant
must not deny or traverse it litera1ly, as it is laid in the
bill, but must answer the point of substance 'positively
and certainly."

answer, when replied to, cannot be read at the hearing in

support of the defendant’s case, yet if part of any sen-

tence be read by the complainant, the defendant will be

entitled to have the whole of that sentence read; and,

in like manner, when a sentence has a direct reference to

a previous part of the answer, the defendant has a right
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to read the part referred to.

168, In order to give the student a general idea of

the form of an answer, we shall here insert an answer to

the skeleton bill given in a former chapter ; and, as far as

it may be done, with its several variations:

[a] A negative pregnant is a negative, implying also an

aﬁirmative; as if the man being impleaded to have done a

thing on such a day, or in such a place, denieth that he did it

modo et forma declarata, which implieth, nevertheless, that in

some sort he did it.” Oowell. Beames’ Ord. Chan. 179I n. 56.

[b] 11 Ves. 303.

167. An answer must not, no more than a plea or
detnurrer, be argumentative; [b] but should rely on
matter of fact only. rrhere is one more observation
which the student will do well to recollect, namely: that
when any admission which might operate against the defendant is followed by an avoidance or explanation, this
should be one continuous sentence: for though the
answer, when replied to, cannot be read at the hearing in
support of the defendant's case, yet if part of any sentence be read by the complainant, the defendant will be
entitled to have the whole of that sentence read; and,
in like manner, when a sentence has a direct reference to
a previous part of the answer, the defendant has a right
to read the part referred to.

168. In order to give the student a general idea of
the form of an answer, we shall here insert an answer to
the skeleton bill given in a former chapter ; and, as far as
it may be done, with its several variations :
[a] A negative pregnant is a negative, implying also an
affirmative; as if the man .being impleaded to have done a
thing on such a day, or in such a place, denieth that he did it
modo et forma declarata, which implieth, nevertheless, that in
some sort he did it." Cowell. Reames' Ord. Chan. 179, n. 56.
[b]

11 Ves. 303.
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of Complaint of A. B. Complainant.

“ This defendant saving and reserving to himself, now

and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of beneﬁt

and advantage of exception which can or may be had or

taken to the said complainant’s said bill of complaint, for

answer thereto, or to so much thereof as this defendant is

advised is in anywise material or necessary for him to

make answer unto. answers and says he believes it to be

true, that at the time in the said bill in that behalf men-

tioned, such events did take place as led to the relation

now existing between the said complainant, A. B., and

this defendant; and he admits it to be true, that such re-

lation does in fact exist. And this defendant, further an-

swering, saith, he admits it to be true, that the said com-

plainant and this defendant are parties to such relation,

under circumstances to which particular equitable inci-

dents are concomitant; but then, he saith, such equitable

incidents depend upon the performance of a condition

precedent; and that such condition has never been per-

formed by the said complainant, although this defendant

hath always been ready and willing, and hereby offers to
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perform his part of the contract, whenever the- said com-

plainant shall have complied with terms thereof on his

part. And this defendant, further answering, saith, that

had the said‘ complainant performed the said condition

precedent, such duties as are in the said bill in that behalf

set forth ‘to be performed by this defendant, would have

arisen from the said relation; but further or otherwise

than as aforesaid, this defendant denies it to be true, that

such duties as are in the said bill set forth to be performed

by this defendant, did arise from the said relation. And

this defendant denies it to be true, that the said complain-

ant hath, by himself or his agents, or in any other manner,

made such or the like applications and requests as are in

"rrhe .Answer of 0. D. Defendant, to the Bill
of Complaint of A. B ..Oomplainant.
''This defendant saving and reserving to himself, now
and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of benefit
and advantage of exception which can or 1nay be had or
taken to the said complainant's said bill of complaint, for
answer thereto, or to so much thereof as this defendant is
advised is in anywise materf~l or necessary for him to
make answer unto~ answers and says he believes it to be
true, that at the time in th(, said bill in that behalf mentioned, such events did take place as Jed to the relation
now existing between the said complainant, A. B., and
this defenrlant; and he admits it to be true, that such relation does in fact exist. And this defendant, further answering, saith, he admits it to be true, that the said complainant and this defendant are parties to such relation,
under circumstances to which particular equitable incidents are concomitant; but then, be saith, such equitable
incidents depend upon the performance of a condition
precedent; and that such condition has never been performed by the said complainant, although this defendant
hath always been ready and willing, and hereby offers to
perform his part of the contract, whenever the· said complainant shall have complied with tern1s thereof on his
part. And this defendant, further answering. saith, that
had the ·said· complainant performed the said condition
precedent, such duties as ar.e in the said bill in that behalf
set forth ·to be performed by this defendant,. would have
arisen from the said relation ; but further or otherwise
than as aforesaid, this defendant denies it to be true, that
such duties as are in the said bill set forth to be performea
by this defendant, did arise fro1n the said relation. And
this Jefendant denies it to be true, that the said complainant bath, b.y himself or his agents, or in any other manner,
made such or the like applications and request.s as are in
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the said bill in that behalf mentioned, or any applications
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and requests in respect of the matters in the said bill men-

tioned. And this defendant doth not know, nor can he as

to his belief or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof

by the said bill, set forth whether the circumstances in the

said bill charged are true, or how otherwise. And this de-

fendant denies all and all manner of unlawful combina-

tion and confederacy, wherewith he is by the said bill

charged; ‘without this, that there is any other matter,

cause, or thiiiggin the said bill of complaint contained

(material or necessary for the defendant to make answer

unto, and not herein and hereby well and suﬁiciently

answered, confessed, traversed, and avoided, or denied), is

true, to the knowledge or belief of this defendant; all

which matters and things this defendant is ready and will-

ing to aver, maintain, and prove, as this honorable court

shall direct; and humbly prays to be hence dismissed,

with his reasonable costs and charges in this behalf most

wrongfully sustained.”

169, It can be scarcely necessary to observe that the

above general form is given merely for the example; and

that answers cannot pursue any precise method or ar-
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rangement, but must follow the circumstances of the case,

and the allegations of the bill. For further answers, and

the answers to amended bills, which are always considered

as a continuation and part of the former answer, we refer

the student to the Appendix. We have endeavored to

mould the above form so as to give instances of — 1, an

assent; 2, admission; 3, confession and avoidance; 4,

traverse; 5, denial; and 6, disclaimer of knowledge. The

example of denial affords us also an apt illustration of the

rule that it is useless to deny a fact, the negation of which

the said bill in that behalf mentioned, or any applications
and requests in respect of the matters in the said bill mentioned. And this defendant doth not know, nor can he as
to his belief or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof
by the said bill, set forth whether the circumstances in the
said bill charged are true, or how otherwise. And this defendailt denies all and all manner of unlawful combination a.~~ ' confederacy, wbel-ewith he is by the said bill
charged·;.- ·without this, that there is any other matter,
cause, ·or thinef;in the said bill of complaint contained
(material or necessary for the defendant to make answer
unto, and not herein and· hereby well and sufficiently
answered, confessed, traversed, and avoided, or denied), is
true, to the knowledge or belief of this defendant; all
which matters and things this defendant is ready and willing to aver, maintain, and prove, as this honorable court
shall direct; and humbly prays to be hence dismissed,
with his reasonable costs and charges in this behalf most
wrongfully sustained."

is necessarily involved‘ in the answer to a former question.

Thus, as the defendant denies that any requests were

169. It can be scarcely necessary to observe that the
above general form is given merely for the example; and
that ans\\rers cannot pursue any precise tnethod or arrangement, but must follow the circumstances of the case,
and the allegations of the bill. For further answers, and
the answers to amended bills, whicli are always considered
as a continuation and part of the former answer, we refer
the student to the Appendix. We have endeavored to
mould the above form so as to give instances of- 1, an
assent; 2, admission; 3, confession and avoidance; 4,
traverse; 5, denial; and 6, disclaimer of knowledge. The
example of denial affords us also an apt illustration of the
rule that it is useless to deny a fact, the negation of which
is necessarily involved· in the answer to a former question.
l,hus, as the defendant denies that any requests were
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made to him, it would be utter triﬂing to say that he did

119

not refuse to comply with them, or why.

170, The conclusion, which is a common form, and

now quite unnecessary, supplies us with an example of .

the formal traverse, with an absque hoc. This is a general

traverse of every allegation in the bill which the answer

did not speciﬁcally meet but formerly it was the custom

to insert, immediately preceding the general traverse, a

particular traverse of those parts of the bill which the de-

fendant meant to deny; the whole foregoing part of the

answer being nothing but inducement, or a statement of

the defendant’s case, inconsistent with that made by the

bill. [a] '

171, As an infant is not bound by the answer put in

for him by his guardian, and as the Attorney General can-

not be compelled to answer at all, [b] such answers cannot

be excepted to; [c] and they are therefore, seldom full.

For the form of those answers, as well as for disclaimers,

which are a species of answer ﬁled by persons made de-

fendants, who claim no interest or concern in the suit, we

must refer the student to the Appendix.

[a] The student will find in the Appendix the precedent
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of a bill, and an answer to it in the old form, taken from the

Curcus Cancellariae, p. 125, et seq.

[b] Dick. 730.

[c] Madd. Cha. Prac. 336, and the cases cited in the note.

Mitt‘. 254.

made to him, it would be uttet trifling to say that he did
not refuse to comply with them, or why.
170. The conclusion, which is a common form, and
now quite unnecessary, supplieR us with an example of .
the fortnal traverse, with an absque hoc. This is a general
traverse of every allegation in the bill which the answer
did not specifically meet but forn1erly it was the custom
to insert, immediately preceding the general traverse, a
particular traverse of those parts of the bill which the defendant meant to deny ; the whole foregoing part of the
answer being nothing but inducement, or a statement of
the defendant's case, inconsistent with that" made by the
bill. a]
171. As an infant is not bound by the answer put in
for him by his guardian, and as the Attorney General cannot be compelled to answer at all, [h] such auswera cannot
be excepted to; [c] and they are therefore, seldom full.
For the form of those answers, as well as for disclaimers,
which are a species of anRwer filed by persons made defendants, who claim no interest or concern in the suit, we
must refer the student to the Appendix.

r

[a] The· student will find in the Appendix the precedent
of a bill, and an ·answer to it in the old form, taken from the
Cu reus Cancellari~e, p. 125, et seq.
[b) Dick. 730.

[c] Madd. Cha. Prac. 886, and the cases cited in the note.
Mitf. 254.

CHAPTER VI.

THE REPLICATION-

172, When the answer, according to the practice

which formerly prevailed, was only a statement of the de-

fendant’s case in reply to the bill, and not, as at the pres-

ent day, a full discovery of all the matters charged, it

usually became necessary for the complainant to make a

special replication to such statement in the answer, which

was followed by a special rejoinder, rebutter, and so on,

until a distinct issue wasjoined, as at common law. But,

as the practice now stands, the-answer being a full discov-

CHAPTER VI.

ery to every point, the complainant may ﬁnd sufﬁcient

admissions in the answer, upon which to ground a decree;

THE REPLICATION.

whereupon he proceeds to a hearing upon bill and answer

only. If the admissions be accompanied by a statement

in avoidance, the complainant will be allowed, instead of

replying specially to the new matter, to amend his bill and

extract fresh discovery. The amended hill, therefore, and

further answer supply the place of special pleadings,

which are now obsolete and the reason why this practice

has obtained in equity, though not at common law, is that

the great object of special pleading at common law is to

keepthe law and the fact distinct, they being to be tried
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by seperate tribunals; but in equity the whole question

comes before the court for its decision, both on the plead-

ings and the proofs.

173, When the defendant, by his answer, denies the

material facts of the bill, an issue is then tendered upon

them, and the complainant mustjoin issue and prove the

facts thus disputed by the testimony of two witnesses at

172. When the answer, according to the practic.e
which formerly prevailed, was only a statement of the defendant''s case in reply to the bill, and not, as at the present da.y, a full discovery of all the matters charged, it
usually becallle necessary for the complainant to make a
special replication to such statement in the answer, which
was followed by a special rejoinder, rebutter, and so on,
until a distinct issue was joined, as at cornmon law. But,
as the practice now stands, the -answer being a full discovery to every point, the_ complainant may find sufficient
admissions in the answer, upon which to ground a decree;
whereupon he proceeds to a hearing upon bill and answer
only. If the admissions be accompanied by a statement
in avoidance, the complainant will be allowed, instead of
replying specially to the new matter, to amend his bill and
extract fresh discovery. 1,he amended bill, therefore, and
further answer supply the place of special pleadings,
which are now obsoiete and the reason why this practice
has obtained in equity, though not at common law, is that
the great object of special pleading at common law is to
keep· the law and the fact distinct, they being to be tried
by seperate tribunals; but in equity the whole question
comes before the court for its decision, both on the pleadings and the proofs.

173. When the defendant, by h-is answer, denies the
material facts of the bill, an issue is then tendered upon
then1, and the complainant mustjoin issue and prove the
facts thus disputed by the testimony of two witnesses at
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least, against the positive oath of the defendant. [a] Such

121

issue is joined by a general replication, that the complain-

ant aver and prove his bill to be true, certain and suffi-

cient; which is an issue, both as to the law and the facts,

according to the constitution of the court. Whe.n the

answer advances a new statement on behalf of the defend-

ant, the complainant should tender an issue to the new

facts and oblige the defendant to prove them, as otherwise

they will be taken to be true. This also is done by the

general replication, stating that the answer of the defend-

ant is uncertain, untrue and insuﬁicient, which tenders an

issue, both of law and fact, on which the defendant joins

issue by a formal rejoinder—a pleading which is supposed

to be ﬁled, but is never actually drawn—the practice being

to serve the defendant with the subpoena ad rejungendum

(unless he submits to rejoin gratis), which is equivalent

to a notice of replication, and issue is then joined between

the parties. [b] Hence we ﬁnd that the replication in

equity only serves as a mere form for producing an issue,

and as such it need not be signed by counsel. [c] The

form of it is as follows:

The Replicatton of A. B., complainant,
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to the Answer of C. D., defendant.

This repliant, saving and reserving to himself all and

all manner of advantage of exception to the manifold in-

suﬁiciencies of the said answer, for replication thereunto,

saith, that he will aver and prove his said bill to be true,

certain and sufﬁcient, in the law to be answered unto; and

that the said answer of the said defendant is uncertain,

untrue, and insufficient to be replied unto by this repliant;

without this, that any other matter or thing whatsoever in

[a] 2 Chan. Ca. 8. 1 Vern. 161. 3 Atk. 270. 649.

[b] Vide ante, p. 80. Mos. 123, 296.

[c] Hinde, 285.

. least, against the positive oath of the defendant. [a] Such
issue is. joined by a general replication, that the .complainant aver and prove his bill to be true, certain and sufficient,· which is an issue, both as to the law and the facts,
according to the constitution of the court. Whe.n the
answer advances a new statement on behalf of the defendant, the complainant should tender an issue to the new
facts and oblige the defendant to prove them, as otherwise
they will be taken to be true. This also is done by the
general re!)lication, stating that the answer of the defe1~d
ant is uncertain, untrue and insuflicient, which tenders an
.issue, both of law and fact, on which the defendant joins
issue by a formal rejoinder-a pleading which is supposed
to be filed, but is never actually drawn-the practice being
to serve the defendant with. the subpmna ad rejun.qendum
(unles8 he submits to rejoin gratia), which is equivalent
to a notice of replication, and issue is then joined between
the parties. [b] Hence we find that the replication in
equity only serves as a mere fortp for producing au issue,
and as such it need not be signed by counsel. [c] The
form of it is as follows :
The Replicatton of A. B., complainant,
to the Answer of C. D., defendant.
This repliant, savin~ and reserving to himself all and
all manner of advantage of exception to the manifold insufficiencies of the said answer, for replication thereunto,
saith, that he will aver and p'rove his said bill to be true,
certain and suffi.ci~nt, in the la\v to be answered unto; and
that the said answer of the said defendant is uncertain,
untrue, and insufficient to be replied unto by this repliant;
without thia, that any other matter or thing whatsoever in
2 Chan. Ca. 8. 1 Vern. 161. 3 Atk. 270. 649.
[ b] Vide ante, p. 80. Mos. 123, 296.
[c] Hinde, 285.
[a]
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the said answer contained, material or effectual in the

122
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law, to he replied unto, confessed and avoided, traversed

or denied, is true. All which matters and things this re-

pliant is, and will be, ready to aver, due proof, as this

honorable court shall direct; and humbly prays, as in and

by his said bill he hath already prayed.

The general replication concludes the pleadings in

equity.

174, Having now pointed out the several grounds of

defence to a suit in equity we will for the convenience of

the student give a skeleton synopsis of those defences.

the said answer contained, material or effectual in the
law, to be replied unto, confessed and avoided, traversed
or denied, is true. All which matters and things this repliant is, and will be, ready to aver, due proof, as this
honorable court shall tlirect; and humbly prays, as in and
by his said bill he hath a~ready prayed.

SYNOPSIS OF SEVERAL GROUNDS OF DEFENCE.

I. OBJECTIoNS To THE JURISDICTIoN:-—

1st. Want of equity.

2d. Jurisdiction in some other court of equity.

The general replication concludes the pleadings in
equity.

II. Onmcrron IN ABA'1‘EMENT:—

174. Having now pointed out the several grounds of

1st. Personal disability.

Outlawry.

Excommunication.

Attainder.

Allen enemy.

defence to a suit in equity we will for the convenience of
the student give a skeleton synopsis of those defencet~.

Infancy.
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Coverture.

SYNOPSIS OF SEVERAL GROUNDS OF DEFENCE.

Lunacy, or idiotcy.

."P‘$"!“.°-"E°!“

2d. Mode of preceding defective.

I.

OBJECTIONS TO THE JURISDICTION:-

1st. Want of equity.
2d. Jurisdiction in some other court of equity.

Another suit depending.

Want of proper parties.

Multifariousness.

Splitting of suits.

II.

OBJECTION IN ABATEMENT:-

.-..

-

Want of proper afﬁdavit annexed, etc.

1st. Personal dlsablll ty.
1. Outlawry.
2. Excommunication.
8. Attainder.
4. Allen enemy.
5. Infancy.
6. Coverture.
7. Lunacy, or idlotcy.

.=n:=~s-’.I~1.~*

III. Onsncnons IN Banz-

lst. To deny the relation assumed by the hill.

1. By answer.

2. By negative plea.

1. Which denies the character attributed to either complainant

or defendant by the bill.

2. Which denies that the defendant has such an interest as can

make him liable.

2d.

III.

'
Mode of preceding detootlve.
1. Another suit depending •.,
2. Want of proper parties. ·
8. Multifariousness.
4. Spllttlnar of suits.
5. Want or proper aftldavit annexed, etc.

OBJECTIONS IN BAR:-

1st. To deny the relation assumed by the blll.
1. By answer.
2. By negatl ve plea.
1. Which dentes the cha~acter attributed to elther,complalnant
or defendant by the bill.
2. Which denies that the defendant has such an Interest as can
make hlm Hable.

SYNOPSIS or SEVERAL caousns or DEFENCE. 123

SYNOPSIS OF SEVERAL GROUNDS OF DEFENCE.

211. To inva.lida,te1he relation.

123

1. Parties incapable to contract.

Alien purchasers, etc.

2d.

To invaltd~ relation.

2. Contract illegal, insufficient, or altered.

1. Parties incapable ~o contract.

illegality. or insuﬂilciency of the consideration. -

Allen purchasers, etc.

Statute of Frauds.

2. Contract illegal, insuftlcient, or altered.

Want of title in plaintiff ab tnitio,

Want of present interest,

1.
2.
8.
4.
5.
6.

Bankruptcy or insolvency.

Forfeiture.

.°°9":".°°E°i"

3. The right being contingent, did not accrue.

The non-performance ofa condition precedent.

3d. That no right ever existed.

Illegality, or lnsufticlency or the consideration.
Statute of Frauds.
Want of title ln plalntltf ab tnitio,
Want of present Interest,
Bankruptcy or Insolvency.
Forfei tore.

1. Want of privity.

3. The right being contingent, dld not accrue.

2. A purchase for valuable consideration, without notice.

The non·performance of a condition precedent.

3. Title paramount.

4th. That the right, though once existing, is barred.

1. By the act of the party.

1. Stated account.

2. Award.

3. Release.

3d.

That no right ever existed.
1. Want of privity.
2. A purchase for valuable consideration, without notice.
3. Tl tle paramount.
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2. By the act of law.

1. A ﬁne and non claim.

2. A Recovery.

3. A Judgment.

4. A Decree, or dismissal of the suit.

3. By the act of God.

Contract becomes impossible to be performed.

N. B. The mode of defence which denies the right, is applicable where

any of the above objections are apparent on the face of the bill.

4th. That the right, though once existing, Is barred.
1. By the act of the party.
1. Stated account.
2. Award.
3. Release.
2. By the act of law.
1. A fine and non claim.
2. A Recovery.
8. A .Judgment.
4. A Decree, or dismissal of the suit.
3. By the act or God.
Contract becomes impossible to be performed.
N. B. The mode or defence which dentes the right, Is applicable where
any of the ~bove objections are apparent on the face of the bill.

. FORMS.

BILLS (ADDRESS OF.)

1. In Chancery.

To the Right Honorable the Earl of Eldon, Lord High

Chancellor of Great Britain.

Humbly complaining, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lordship.

2. When the Seals are in Commission.

To the Right Honorable A. B., C. D., and E. F., Lords,

Commissioners for the custody of the Great Seal of

Great Britain.

Humbly, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lordships.

I

3. In the Exchequer.

FORMS.

To the Right Honorable Frederick Robinson, Chancellor

and Under Treasurer of His Majesty’s Court of Ex-

chequer at Westminster; the Right Honorable Sir

BILLS (ADDRESS OF.)

Richard Richards, Knight, Lord Chief Baron of the

same Court, and the rest of the Barons there.

1.

Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Honors.

4. In the Chancery of Lancaster.

To the Right Honorable Charles Earl of Liverpool, Chan-

cellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and one of his Ma-

jesty’s Most Honorable Privy Council.

Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lordships.

In Chancery.

'fo the Right Honorable the Earl of Eldon, Lord High
Chancellor of Great Britain.
Humbly complaining, etc ............•......... Lordship.
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5. In the Great Sessions of Wales.

To the Honorable A. B. and C. D., Esqrs., his Majesty’s

When the Seals are in Commission.

2.

To the Right Honorable A. B., C. D., and E. F., Lords,
Commissioners for the custody of the Great Seal of
Great Britain.
Humbly, etc ......................•.......••• Lordships.
3.

In the Excltequer..

To the Right Honorable Frederick Robinson, Chancellor
and Under Treasurer of His Majesty's Court of Exchequer at Westminster; the Right Honorable Sir
Richard Richards, Knight, Lord Chief Baron of the
same Court, and the rest of the Barons there.
Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . .....................•.. Honors.

4. In the Chancery of Lancaster.
To the Right Honorable uharles Earl of Liverpool, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and one of his Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council.
H urn bly, etc. . ..................•.........••. Lordships.
6.

In the Great Sessions of Wales.

To the Honorable A. B. and C. D., Esqrs., his Majesty's

FORMS. 125
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Justices of the Great Sessions for the several Counties

125

of Glamorgan, Brecon and Radnor.

Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lordships.

I 6. In the Lord Mayor’s Court.

To the Right Honorable A. B., Lord Mayor of the City of

London, and the Worshipful, his Brethren, the Alder-

men of the same City. '

Justices of the Great Sessions for the several Counties
of Glamorgan, Brecon and Radnor.
Hum\lly, etc..•.•...•...•...•.•.•...•..••...• Lordships.

Humbly, etc.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lordship and Worships.

6.

COMMENCEMEN T.

ln the Lo1•d Kayor'a Court.

1. In Chancery.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,

your orator, A. B., of ( place of abode and addition), that

etc., etc.

2. In the Exchequer.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Honors, your

orator, A. B., of, etc., debtor and accountant to his Ma-

To the Right Honorable A. B., Lord Mayor of the City of
Lond~n, anti the Worshipful, his Brethren, the Aldermen of the same City.
Humbly, etc..•••......•..•.•...• Lordship and Worships.

jesty,as by the records of their honorable court, and other-

wise it doth or may appear, that, etc.

8. By a Peer.

COMMENCEMENT.

Complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, your ora-

tor, the Right Honorable A. Earl of B., (or as the case may

1. · In Chancery.

be), that, etc.
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4. By a Body Corporate.

Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your

orators, the Mayor, bailiffs, and commonalty of the City

of A., that, etc.

5. By Creditors, Leyatees, etc., on behalf of themselves

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your orator, A. B., of (place of abode and addition), that
etc., etc.

and other Creditors.

~.

. Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your

V

In the EflJchequer.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Honora, your
orator, A. B., of, etc., debtor and accountant to his Ma.
jesty, as by the records of their honorable court, and otherwise it doth or may appear, that, etc.

a.

By a; Peer.
Complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, your orator, the Right Honorable A. Earl of B., (or aa the caae may
be), that, etc.
By a Body Corporate.
Humbly complainings show unto your Lordship, your
orators, the Mayor, bailiffs, and commoualty of the Oity
of A., that, etc.
4,.

6.

By Creditors, Legateea, etc., on behalf of tn.emaelvea
and othe1• Creditors.
Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your

126 romns.

orators and oratrixes, A. B., of, etc., 0. D., of, etc., E. F.,

126
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of, etc., spinster, G. H., of, etc., on behalf o|‘ themselves

and all other the bond and simple contract creditors (or

legatees or newt of kin) of I. J ., late of, etc., deceased, who

shall come in and contribute to the expenses of this suit,

that, etc.

6. By an Infant.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,

your orator, A. B., an infant under the age of 21 years,

that is to say, of the age of —— years, or thereabouts, by

C. D., of, etc., his (relation) and next friend, that, etc.

orators and oratrixes, A. H., of, etc., C. D .• of, etc., E. F.,
of, etc., spinster, G. H., of, etc., on behalf of themselves
and all other the bond and simple contract creditors ( 01'
legatees or neaJt of kin) of I. J., late of, etc., deceased, who
shall come in and contribute to the expenses of this suit,
that, etc.

7. By a Feme Covert.

6.

Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship,

By an Infant.

your orator and oratrix, A. B., of, etc., and (3., his wife,

that, etc.

8. By a Feme Covert, claiming in opposition to her

Husband.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,

your oratrix, C., the wife of A. B., etc., by D. E., her next

friend, that, etc.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your orator, A. B., an infant under the age of 21 years,
that is to say, of the age of --years, or thereabouts, by
C. D., of, etc., his (relation) and next friend, that, etc.

9. By a Feme Covert whose Husband is an Exile, etc.

7.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,

By a Ferne Covert.
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your oratrix, A. B., of, etc., the wife of C. B., late of, etc.,

who hath by due course of law been sentenced to trans-

portation to parts beyond the sea, where he now is (or who

hath abjured the realm, or who is an alien enemy). that,

etc.

Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship,
your orator and oratrix, A. B., of, etc., and C., his wife,
that, etc.

10. By a Lunatic.

Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your

8.

By a Feme Covert, claimin,q in opposition to her

orators, A. B., of, etc., and C. D., late of, etc., but now of

etc., against whom a commission of lunacy has lately been

awarded and issued, and is now in force; and under which

Husband.
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your oratrix, C., the wife of A. B., etc., by D. E., her next
friend, that, etc.
9.

By a Feme Covert whose Husband is an Er1Jile, etc.

Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your oratrix, A. B., of, etc., the wife of C. B., late of, ate.,
who hath by due course of law b~en sentenced to transportation to parts beyond the Rea, where he no\v is (or who
hath abjured the realm, or w4o ia an alien enemy) . that,
etc.
10.

By a Lunatic.

Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your
orators, A. B., of, etc., and C. D., late of, etc., but now of
etc., against whom ·a con1mission of lunacy has lately been
awarded and issued. and is now in force; and under which
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commission the said C. D. was duly found and declared to
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be a lunatic, and your orator, A. B., appointed committee

of his estate; that,etc.

11. Information on behalf of the Crown.

Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,

Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of his

commission the said C. D. 'vas duly found and declared to
be a lunatic, an.d your orator, A. B., appointed committee
of his estate; that, etc.

Majesty, that, etc.

12. Information on behalf of those who partake of the

Prerogative.

Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,

Knight, his Majesty’s Attorney General, on behalf of his

Majesty, and the masters, fellows, and scholars of Trinity

College, Cambridge, (or as the case may be) that, etc.

13. Information with a Relator.

Information on behalf"' of the Crown.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of his
Majesty, that, etc.
11.

Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,

Knight, his Majesty’s Attorney General, at and by the re-

lation of C. D., clerk, vicar of the parish of E., and F. G.

and H. J., church wardens of the same parish, for and on

behalf of themselves and the rest of the parishoners of

the said parish, (or as the case may be) that, etc.

14. Information and Bill.

Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
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Knight, his Majesty’s Attorney General, at and by the re-

lation of C. D. and E. F., of, etc., and humbly complain-

Information on behalf of those who partake of the
Prero.qative.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of his
Majesty, and the masters, fellows, and scholars of Trinity
College, Cambridge, (or as the case may be) t.hat, etc.
12.

ing show unto your Lordship, the said C. D. and E. F.,

that, etc., (statement). And his Majesty’s Attorney Gen-

era], by the relation aforesaid, informeth ; and your orators

further show unto your Lordship, that, etc.

15. Information on behalf of a Lunatic.

Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,

Knight, his Majesty’s Attorney General, on behalf of C.

Information with a Relator.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, at and by the relation of C. D., clerk, vicar of the parish of E., and F. G.
and H. J., church wardens of the same parish, for and on
behalf of themselves and the rest of the parishoners of
the said parish, (or as the case may be) that, etc.
13.

14. Information and Bill.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, at and by the relation of C. D. and E. F., of, etc., and humbly cotnplaining show unto your Lord'3hip, the said C. D. and E. F.,
that, etc., (.~tatement). And his Majesty's Attorney General, by the relation aforesaid, informeth; and your orators
further show unto your Lordship, that, etc.
Information on behalf of a Lu,natic.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of C.
15.
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D., a lunatic, at and by the relation of E. F., of, etc-., that,
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etc.

16. Information for the Queen.

Information, showeth unto your Lordship, A. B., Esq.,

Attorney General of her Majesty the Queen Consort,

D., a lunatic, at and by the relation of E. F., of, etc.. , that,
etc.

that, etc.

Statement of Requests and Charge 0/ Confederacy.

And your orator hath accordingly, both by himself

and his agents, frequently and in a friendly manner ap-

plied to and requested the said C. D. and E. F., (the de-

fendants) to, etc.; and your orator well hoped that such

his just and reasonable requests would have been com-

Information for the Queen.
Information, showeth unto your Lordship, A. B., Esq.,
Attorney General of her Majesty the Queen Consort,
that, etc.
16.

plied with, as in justice and equity they ought to have

been. But now so it is, may it please your lordship, the

said C. D. and E. F., combining and confederating with

divers other persons at present unknown to your orator,

but whose names, when discovered, your orator prays he

may be at liberty to insert in -this his bill, with apt and

proper words to charge them as parties defendant hereto,

and contriving how to injure and oppress your orator in

the premises, the said C. D. and E. F., absolutely refuse

to comply with your orator’s aforesaid reasonable requests ;
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and to countenance such their unjust conduct, they some-

times pretend that (pretences and charges). All Which

actings, pretences, and refusals of the said confederates,

are contrary to equity and good conscience, and tendto

the manifest wrong and injury of your orator in the prem-

ises.

Clause of. Equity, and Commencement of the Interrogat-

ing Part.

In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora-

tor is without remedy in the premises at common law,

and cannot have adequate relief except in a court of

Statement of Requests and Charge of Confederacy.
And your orator hath accordingly, both by-himself
and his agents, frequently and in a friendly manner applied to and requested the said 0. D. and E. F., (the defendants) to, etc.; and your orator well hoped that such
his just and reasonable requests would have been complied with, as in justice and equity they ought to have
been. But now so it is, tnay it please your lordship, the
said 0. D. and E. F., combining and confederating with
divers other persons at present unknown to your orator,
but whose names, when discovered, your orator prays he
may be at liberty to insert in this his bill, with apt and
proper words to charge them as parties defendant hereto,
and contriving how to injure and oppress your orator in
the premises, the said 0. D. and E. F., absolutely refuse
to comply with your orator's aforesaid reasonable requests;
and to countenance such their unjust conduct, they sometimes pretend that (pretences and char.qes ). All which
actings, pretences, and refusals of the said confederates,
are contt:ary to equity and good con~ci~nce, and tend· to
the manifest \Vrong and injury of your orator in the premises.
Clause of. Equity, and Cotnmenoement of the Interro.qating Part.
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora.
tor is without remedy in the premises at common law,
and cannot have adequate relief except in a court of
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equity, where matters of this sort are properly cognizable

129

and relievable; to the end that the said C. D. and E. F.,

and their confederates, when discovered, may upon their

equity, where matters of this sort are properly cognizable
and relievable; to the end that the said C. D. and E. F.,
and their confederates, whe11 discavered, may upon their
seve1·al and respective corporal oaths, accordinf,t to the
best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge,
~emembrance, information, and belief, full, true, perfect,
and distinct answers make to all and singular the matters
aforesaid, and that as fully and particularly as if the same
were here repeated, and they thereunto severally and respectively, distinctly interrogated; and more especially
that the said defendants, 0. D. and E. F., may, in manner
aforesaid, answer and set forth whether, etc.

several and respective corporal oaths, according to the

best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge,

remembrance, information, and belief, full, true, perfect,

and distinct answers make to all and singular the matters

aforesaid, and that as fully and particularly as if the same

were here repeated, and they thereunto severally and re-

spectively, distinctly interrogated; and more especially

that the said defendants, C. D. and E. F., may, in manner

aforesaid, answer and set forth whether, etc.

SPECIAL INQUIRIES.

1. As to Applications and Requests.

And whether your orator hath not by himself or

agents, or how otherwise, made such applications and re-

quests to the said defendants, as are hereinbefore in that

behalf mentioned, or some such or the like, or any, and

what other applications and requests in respect of the sev-

eral matters aforesaid, and whether the said defendants

have not refused to comply therewith, and why?

2. As to a Deed set forth in the Bill.
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Whether such indenture, bearing date on or about

the—— day of—, as hereinbefore particularly men-

tioned, was not made between such parties as hereinbe-

; fore stated; or whether some indenture of some and what

SPECIAL INQUIRIES.

date was not made between some and which of the said

parties, and was not of some such or the like purport or

effect, or how otherwise.

9.

1.

As to Applications and Requests.

And wttether your orator hath not by himself or ·
agents, or how otherwise, made such applications and requests to the said defendants, as are hereinbefore in that
behalf mentioned, or some such or the like, or any, and
what other applications and requests in respect of the several matters aforesaid, and whether the said defendants
have not refused to comply therewith, and why~

As to a IJeed set forth in the Bill .

S.

.

l

Whether such .indenture, bearing· date on or about
the-- day of--, as hereinbefore particularly mentioned, was not made between such parties as hereinbefore stated; or whether some indenture of some and what
date was not made bet\veen some and which of the said
parties, and was not of some such or the like. purport or
effect, or how otherwise.
9
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3. For an Account of Money had and received.
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And that the said defendants may set forth an ac-

count of all and every sum and sums of money received

by them or either of them or by any person or

persons by their or either of their order, or for their or

either of their use, for or in respect of the said (as the case

may be), and when and from whom, and from what in

particular all and every such sums were respectively re-

ceived, and how the same respectively have been applied

or disposed of.

4. For an Account of the Rents and Profits of a Testa-

tor’s Real Estate.

And the said defendants may set forth a full, true,

and just rental and particular of the real estates, whereof

or whereto the said testator was seized or\entitled in fee

simple, at the time of his death; and also a full, true and

particular account of all and every sum and sums of

money, which hath or have been received by them, or

For an Account of .Money had and received.
And that the said defendants may set forth an .account of all and every sum and sums of money received
by them or either of them or by any person or
persons by their or either of their order, or for their or
either of their use, for or in respect of the said (a-s the case
may be), and when and from whom, and from what in
particular all and every such sums were respectively received, and how the same respectively have been applied
or disposed of.
3.

any other person or persons by their or either of their or-

der, or for their or either of their use, for or in respect of

the rents and proﬁts of the said estates, or any part there-

of; and whether any, and which of the said estates, or any
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part or parts thereof, have or hath not been sold or dis-

posed of, and at what price or prices respectively, and

when and to whom; and whether such price or prices re-

spectively have or hath not been paid, and to whom; and

if not, why not.

5. For an Account of Personals.

And that the said defendants may discover and set

forth a full, true, and particular account of all and singu-

lar the personal estate and effects of the said testator, and

of every part thereof, which hath been possessed by or

come to the hands of the said defendants, or either of

4.. For an Account of the Rents and Profits of a Testator's Real Estate.
And the said defendants may set forth a full, true,
and just rental and particular of the real estates, whereof
or whereto the said testator was seized or.entitled in fee
simple, at the time of his death; and also a full, true and
particular account of all and every sum and sums of
money, which hath or have been received py them, or
any other person or persons by their or either of their order, or for their or either of their use, for or in respect of
the rents and profits of the said estates, or any part thereof; and whether any, and which of the said estates, or any
part or parts thereof, have or hath not been sold or disposed of, and at what price or prices respectively, and
when and to whom; and whether such price or prices respectively have or hath not been paid, and to whom; and
if not, why not.
5. For an Account of Personals.·
And that the said defendants may discover and set
forth a full~ true, and particular account of all and singular the personal estate and effects of the said testator, and
of every part thereof, which hath been possessed by or
come to the hands of the said defendants, or either of
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them, or to the hands of any other person or persons, by

their or either of their order, or for their or either of their

use; with the particular nature, quantities, qualities, and

true and utmost values thereof, and of every part thereof

respectively; and how the same, and every part thereof,

hath been applied and disposed of; and whether any and

what part thereof, now remains unapplied and undisposed

of, and why ; and whether any, and what part of such

personal estate remains outstanding, to any, and what

amount, and why; and that the said defendants may also

set forth an account of the debts due from the said testator,

and of his funeral expenses and legacies; and whether

any, and which of such debts are outstanding; and why.

6’. For the production of Deeds and Papers.

And that the said defendants may set forth a list or

schedule and description of every deed, book, account,

letter, paper or writing relating to the matters aforesaid,

or any of them, or wherein or whereupon there is any

note, memorandum, or writing, relating in any manner

thereto, which now are, or ever were, in their or either,

and which, of their possession or power, and may particu-

larly describe which thereof now are in their, or either,

131

.
them, or to the hands of any other person or persons, by
their or either of their order, or for their or either of their
use; with the particular nature, quantities, qualities, and
true and utmost values thereof, and of every part thereof
respectively ; and how the same, and every part thereof,
hath been applied and disposed of; and whether any and
what part thereof, now remains unapplied and undisposed
of, and why; and whether any, and what part of such
personal estate remains outstanding, to any, and what
amount, and why; and that the said defendant~ rnay also
set forth an account of the debts due from the said testator,
and of his funeral expenses and legacies; and wheth~r
an~', and which of such debts are outstanding; and why.
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and which of their possession or power, and may deposit

the same in the hands of their clerk or clerks in court, for

the usual purposes; and otherwise that the said defendants

6.

Ji'or the production of Deeds n/nd Papers.

may account for such as are not in their possession or

power.

1. Prayer for General Relief.

And that your orator may have such further and

other relief in the premises, as to your Lordship shall

seem meet, and the nature and justice of the case may re-

quire, may it please, etc.

And that the said defendants tnay set forth a list or
schedule and description of every deed, book, account,
letter, paper or writing relating to the matters aforesaid,
or any of t.hem, or wherein or whereupon there is any
note, memorandum, or writing .. relating in any manner
thereto, which now are, or ever were, in their or either,
and which, of their possession or power, and may particularly describe which thereof now are in their, or either,
and which of their possession or power, and may deposit
the same in the hands of their clerk or clerks in court, for
the usual purposes; and otherwise that the said defendants
may account for such a~ are not in their possession or
power.
1.

Prayer for General Rel·ief.

And that your orator may have such further and
other relief in the premises, as to your Lordship shall
seem meet, and the nature and justice of the case may require, may it please, etc.

132 I I roams.
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2. Prayer of Bill of Revivor.

To the end therefore that the said suit and proceed-

f.

ings therein may stand revived against the said C. D. and

Prayer of Bill of Revivor.

be restored to the same plight and condition as the same

were in at the time of (abatement), or that the said C. D.

may show good cause to the contrary, may it please, etc.

3. Conclusion of Prayer in a Bill of Discovery.

And that your orator may have a full disclosure and

discovery of all and every the matters and things afore-

said, may it please, etc.

4. Prayer of a bill to perpetuate Testimony.

And that your orator may be at liberty to have his

To the end thPrefore tha~ the said suit and proceedings therein may stand revived against the said 0. D. and
be restored to the same plight and condit1on as the same
were in at the time of (abatement), or that the said 0. D.
may show good cause to the contrary, may it. please, etc.

witnesses examined to the several matters and things

hereinbefore mentioned, so that the testimony of the said

witnesses may be preserved and perpetuated; and that

your orator may be at liberty on all future occasions, to

read and make use of the same, as he shall be advised,

may it please, etc.

Clause of Equity in the same.

In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora-

3.

Conclusion

f)(

Prayer in a Bill of .Discove·'I'Y·

And that your orator may have a full disclosure and
discovery of all and every the matters and thitigs aforesaid, may it please, etc.

tor cannot have the said witnesses examined in order to

perpetuate their testimony, without the aid of a court of
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equity, to the end, etc.

5. Prayer of Bill of lnterpleader.

And that the said O. D. and E. F. may be decreed to

interplead and adjust their said several claims and

demands between themselves, your orator being willing

and desirous that the said (demand) should be paid to

such of said defendants as shall appear to be entitled

thereto, and your orator doth hereby offer to pay the same

\

#. Prayer of a bill to perpetuate Testimony.
And that your orator may be at liberty to have his
witnesses examined to the several matters and · things
hereinbefore mentioned, so that the testimony of the said
witnesses may be preserved and perpetuated; and that
your orator may be at liberty on all future occasions, to
read and make use of the same, as he shall be advised,
may it please, etc.

Clause of Equity in the same.
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your. orator cannot have the said witnesses examined in order to
perpetuate their testimony, without the aid of a court of
equity, to the end, etc.
6.

Prayer of Bill of Interpleader.

And that the said 0. D. and E. F. may be decreed to
interplead and adjust their said several claims and
demands between themselves, your orator being willing
and desirous that the said (demand) should be paid to
such of said defendants as shall appear to be entitled
thereto, and your orator doth hereby offer to pay the same

FORMS. ‘ 133

into the hands of the accountant general of this honorable

FORMS.

court, to be disposed of as this honorable court shall direct

133

(if injunction)—

6. Prayer for an Injunction.

And that in the meantime, the said C. D. and E. F.,

their counsel, solicitors, agents and attorneys may be

restrained by the order and injunction of this honorable

court, .from prosecuting or commencing any action or

into the bands of the accountant general of ~hi~ honorable
court, to be disposed of as this honorable court shall direct

(if injunction)-

actions at law against your orator, for or in respect of the

6.

several matters aforesaid, and that your orator, etc. (gen-

Prayer for an Injunction.

eral relief.)

Clause of Equity, in a Bill of Interpleader.

In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora-

tor is remediless in the premises, without the aid of a

court of equity where the said several claimants may

interplead and settle and adjust their several rights and

demands between themselves, so that your orator may be

enabled to pay the said (demand) with safety, to the end,

etc.

7. Conclusion of Certiorari Bill.

And that in the meantime, the said C. D. and E. F.,
their counsel, solicitors, agents and attorneys may be
restrained by the order and injunction of this honorable.
court, . from prosecuting or co~n1encing any action or
actions at law against your orator, for or in respect of the
several matters aforesaid, and that your orator, etc. (gen· .

In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as for\want

of jurisdiction in the said (court below) your orator is

eral relief.)
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remediless there; and your orator is advised that he is

entitled to have a writ of certiorari issued from this hon-

orable court, and directed to (court below) commanding

Clause of Equity, in a Bill of Interpleader.

him to certify and remove said bill, and all proceedings

thereon, unto this honorable court; may it therefore

I please, etc.

8. Prayer of Bill of Review.

And that for the reasons aforesaid, the said cause and

decree therein pronounced, may be reviewed by this hon-

In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your oratot· 'is remediless in the premises, without the aid of a
court of equity where the ·said several claimants may
interplead and settle and adjust their several rights and
demands between themselves, so that your orator may be
enabled to pay the said (demand) with safety, to the end,
etc.

Ooncluaion of Certiorari Bill.

7.

In consideration whereof, and· forasmuch as for ·want
of juri~diction in the said (court below) your orator is
remediless there; and your orator is advised that he is
entitled to have a writ of certiorari issued from this honorable court, and directed to (court below) commanding
him to certify and remove said bill, and all proceedings
• thereon, unto this honorable court; may it therefore
. please, etc.
8.

Pray.er of Bill of Review.

And that for the reasons aforesaid, the said cause and
decree therein pronounced, may be reviewed by this hon-

134 FORMS.

orable court, and that the said decree may be reversed for
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error apparent therein, and no further proceedings taken

thereon; may it please, etc. "

DEMURRERS, PLEAS AND ANSWERS.

(Title of.)

The Answer (or Plea, or Demurrer) of C. D., the defend-

ant (or one of the defendants) to the bill of complaint

orable court, and that the said decree may be· reversed for
error apparent therein, and no further proceedings taken
thereon; may it please, etc.
!

of A. B., complainant.

Joint and Several Answers.

The joint and several Answer of C. D. and E. F. the

defendants (or two of the defendants) to the bill of

DEMURRERS, PLEAS AND ANSWERS.

complaint of A. B., complainant.

I nfant’s Answer.

The Answer of 0. D., an infant under the age of twenty-

(Title of.)

one years, by E. F., his guardian, one of the defend-

ants to the bill of complaint of A. B., complainant.

1. Commencement and Conclusion of an Answer.

This defendant, saving and reserving to himself now,

and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of beneﬁt

and advantage of exception, which can or may be had or

The Answer (or Plea, or Demurrer) of 0. D., the defendant (or one of the defendants) to the bill of complaint
of A. B., complainant.

taken to the said complainant’s said bill of complaint, for

Joi1it and Several Answers.

answer thereto, or to so much thereof as this defendant is
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advised is in anywise material or necessary for him to

make answer unto, and answers and says, etc.

(conclude.) And this defendant denies all and all man-

ner, etc.

2. Joint Answer.

The joint and several Answer of C. D. and E. F. the
defendants (or two of the defendants) to the bill of
complaint of A. B., complainant.

These defendants, etc., (as before) each answering for

himself (and herself) and not the one for the other,

Infant's Answer.

rrhe Answer of 0. D., an infant under the age of twentyone years, by E. F., his guardian, one of the defend, ants to the bill of complaint of A. B., complainant.
1.

Commencement and Conclusion of an Answer.

This defendant, saving and reserving to himself now,
and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of benefit
and advantage of exception, which can or may be had or
taken to the said complainant's said bill of complaint, for
answer thereto, or to so 1nuch thereof as this defendant is
advised is in anywise material or necessary for him to
make answer unto, and answers and says, etc.
(conclude.) And this defendant denies all and all manner~ etc.
~. Joint Answer.
These defendants, etc., (as before) each answering for
hirnself (and herself) and not the one for the other,
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jointly and severally answer and say, etc.; and these

FORMS.

defendants deny all, etc.

135

3. Infant’s Answer.

This defendant, answering by his said guardian, saith,

that he is an infant of the age of years, or there-

abouts, and he therefore submits his rights and interests

jointly and severally answer and say, etc.; and these
defendants deny alJ, etc.

in the matters in question in this cause, to the protection

of this honorable court; without this, that, etc.

.

4. Title of Further Answer, and of Answer to

Amended Bill.

The further Answer of C. D., defendant to-the (original)

bill, (and his answer to the amended bill) of com-

plaint of A. B., complainant.

This defendant, saving and reserving to himself the

same beneﬁt of exception to the said (original) (and

Infant's Answer.
~rhis defendant, answering by his said guardian, saith,
that he is an infant of the age of
years, or thereabouts, and he therefore submits his rights and interests
in the matters in question in this cause, to the protection
of this honorable court.; without this, that, etc.
9.

amended) bill, as by his former answer to the said (orig-

inal) bill is saved and reserved, for answer thereto, etc.;

(conclude) without this, that, etc.

5. Answer and Disclaimer.

The Answer and Disclaimer of C. D., one of the defend-

ants, to the bill of complaint of A. B., complainant.
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This defendant, etc.; (conclude.) And this defendant

saith, that he never had, or claimed or pretended to have,

nor has he now, nor does he claim, or pretend to have any

right, title, or interest of, in, or to the said (matter in

question) or any part thereof; and this defendant dis-

claims all right and title of, in or to the same, and every

part thereof; and this defendant denies, etc.

6. He Answer of a Formal Party. who is a stranger to

the Facts charged. ‘

This defendant, saving and reserving to himself, etc.,

Title of Further Answer, and of Answer to
Amended Bill.
'I' he further Answer of C. D., defendant to· the {original)
bill, (and his answer to the amended bill) of complai~t of A. B., complainant.
This defendant, saving and reserving to himself the
same benefit of exception to the said {original) {and
amended) bill, as by his former answer to the said {original) bill is saved and reserved, for answer thereto, etc.;
(conclude) without this, that, etc.
4.

Answer and Disclaimer.
The Answer and Disclairner of C. D., one of the defendants, to the bill of complaint of A. B., cornplainant.
'fhis defendant . etc.; {concl~ede.) And this defendant.
saith~ that he never had, or claimed or pretended to have,
nor has he now, nor does he claim, or pretend to have any
right, title, or interest of, in, or to the said {matter in
qtteation) or any part thereof; and this defendant disclaims all ri~ht and title of, in or to the same, and every
part thereof; and this defendant denies, ete.
5.

6.

The .Answer of a Forrnal Party . who is a atran,qer to
th.e Facts charged.
This defendant., saving and reserving to himself, etc.,
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answers and says, that he is a stranger to all and singular
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the matters and things in said complainants bill of com-

plaint contained, and therefore leaves the complainant to

make such proof thereof as he shall be able to produce,

without this, that, etc.

N. B. This is the usual answer of the Attorney General.

7. Conclusion of an Answer, claiming the same Beneﬁt

of Defence as if the Bill had been-demurred to for

want of equity.- ‘

And this defendant submits to this honorable court,

that all and every of the matters in the said complainant’s,

bill mentioned and complained of, are matters which may

answers and says, that he is a stranger to all and singular
the matters and things in said complainants bill of complaint contain~d, and therefore leaves the complainant to
make such proof thereof as he shall be able to produce,
without this, that, etc.
N. B. Tbls Is the nsual answer or the Attorney General.

be tried and determined at law. and with respect to which

the said complainant is not entitled to any relief from a

court of equity; and this defendant hopes he shall have

the same beneﬁt of this defence as if he had demurred to

the said complainant‘s bill; and this defendant denies,

etc.

THE COMMENCEMENT AND CONCLUSION OF A

' DEMURRER.

1. To the whole Bill.

This defendant, by protestation, not confessing or

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in the

said complainant’s bill contained to be true, in such man-

ner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth

demur thereto; and for cause of demurrer showeth that,

etc. (conclude.) Wherefore, and for divers other causes

of demurrer, appearing in said bill, this defendant humbly

demands the ‘judgment of this honorable court, whether

he shall be compelled to make any further or other

answer to the said bill; and prays to be hence dismissed,

Conclusion of an Answer, claiming the same Benefit
of Defence as if tne Bill had been·demurred to for
want of equity ..
And this defendant submits to this honorable court,
that all and every of the ·matters in the said complainant's.
bill mentioned and con1plained of, are matters which may
be tried and determined at law, and with respect to which
the said complainant 1s not entitled to any relieJ from a
court of equity; and this defendant hopes he shall have
the same benefit of this defence as if he had demurred to
the said complainant"s bill; and this defendant denies,
etc.

7.

THE COMMENCEMENT AND CONCLUSION OF A
DEMURRER.

To the whole Bill.
ThiR defendant, by protestation, not confe-ssing or
acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in the
said complainant's bill contained to .be true, in such manner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth
demur thereto; and for cause of detnurrer showeth that,
etc. (conclude.) Wherefore, and for divers other causes
of demurrer, appearing in said bill, this defendant humbly
demands the 'jurlgment of this honorable court, whether
he shall be compelled to make any further or other
anRwer to the saiu bill; and prays to be hence dismissed,
1.
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with his reasonable costs, in this behalf most wrongfully

137

sustained.

2. Demurrer to Part of the Bill, and Answer to the

Residue.

This defendant, by protestation, etc., as to so much of

the said bill as seeks (parts demurred to), doth demur;

and for cause of demurrer showeth, that, etc. (conclude.)

Wherefore, and for divers other causes of demurrer,

appearing in the said bill, this defendant humbly demands

with bis reasonable costs, in this behalf most wrongfully
sustained.
~.

.Demurrer to Part of the Bill, and .Answer to the
Residue.

the judgment of this honorable court, whether he shall

be compelled to make any further answer unto such part

of the said bill as is so demurred unto aforesaid; and as

to the residue of said bill this defendant not waiving his

sa-id demurrer, but relying thereon, and saving and reserv-

ing to himself, etc.‘ (as before, aide answer.)

8. Commencement and Conclusion of a Plea.

This defendant, by protestations, etc. (as in demur-

rer), doth plead thereto, and for plea saith, etc. ( conclude.)

All which matters and things this defendant doth aver to

be true, and is ready to prove, as this honorable court

shall direct. Wherefore, he doth plead thepsame (in bar,

or as the case may be) to the said bill, and humbly
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demands the judgment, etc. (as in demurrer.)

4. Plea to part and Answer to residue of Bill.

(Is the same as Demurrer and Answer, mutatis mutandis.)

EXCEPTIONS.

1. To an Answer.

This defendant, by protestation, etc., as to so much of
the said bill as seeks (parts demurred to), doth demur;
.. and for cause of demurrer showeth, that, etc. (conclude.)
Wherefore, and for divers other causes of demurrer,
appearing in tbe said bill, this defendant humbly demands
the judgment of this honorable court, whether he shall
be compelled to make any further answer unto such part
of the said bill as is so demurred unto aforesaid ; and as
to the residue of said bill this defendant not waiving his
said detnurrer, but relying thereon, and saving and reserving to himself, etc.. (as before, vide answer.)

Between A. B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Complainant,

and C. D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Defendant.

Exceptions taken by the said complainant to the answer

3.

Commencement and Conclusion of a Plea.

This defendant, by protestations, etc. (as in demurrer), doth plead thereto, and for plea saith, etc. (conclude.)
All which matters and things this defendant doth aver to
be true, and is ready to prove, as this honorable eourt
shall direct. Wherefore, he .doth plead the_ same (in bar,
or- as tn.e case may be) to the said bill, and humbly
demands the judgment, etc. (as in ·demurrer.)

4. Plea to part and Answer to rea~due of Bill.
(Is the ja·me as Detnurrer and Answer, mutatis mutandis.)

EXCEPTIONS.
1.

To an Answer.

Between A. B ......................•••.••• Co1nplainant,
and 0. D.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...••..•••.•.• Defendant.
Exceptions taken by the said complainant to the answer

138 rows.

put in by the said defendant, C. D., to the said com-
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plainant’s bill of complaint.

1st. For that the said defendant, C. D., has not, to

the best and utmost of his knowledge, remembrance,

information and belief, answered and set forth whether

(the interrogatory verbatim as in the bill.)

2d. For that the said defendant hath not in manner

aforesaid, answered and set forth whether, etc.

In all which particulars the said answer of the said

defendant, C. D., is, as the said complainant is advised,

imperfect, insuﬁicient and evasive; and the said com-

plainant therefore excepts thereto, and prays that the

put in by the said defendant, C. D., to the said complainant's bill of complaint.
1st. For that the said defendant, C. D., has not, to
the best and utmost of his knowledge, remetnbrance,
information and belief, answered and set forth whether
( tlte interro,qatory verbatim as in the bill.)

said defendant, C. D., may put in a further and better

answer to the said bill of complaint.

.

2. Exceptions to Master’s Report.

In Chancery.

A. B., Complainant,

Between and

C. D., Defendant.

Exceptions taken by the said complainant to the report of

E. F., Esq., one of the masters of this honorable

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 17:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104452406
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

court, to whom this cause stands referred, bearing

date the day of

First exception: For that the said master has, in and

2d. For that the said defendant hath not in manner
aforesaid, answered and set forth whether, etc.

In all which particulars the said answer of the said
defendant, C. D., is, as the said complainant is advised,
imperfect, insufficient and evasive; and the said complainant therefore excepts thereto, and prays that the
said defendant, 0. D., n1ay put in a further and better
answer to the said bill of complaint.

by his said report, certiﬁed, etc. (as the case may be.)

Whereas, the said master ought to have certiﬁed that, etc.

Second exception: For that the said master has cer-

tiﬁed, etc.

In all which particulars the report of the said master is,

2.

EaJceptions to Master's Report.

as the said defendant is advised, erroneous, and the

said defendant appeals therefrom to the judgment of

this honorable court.

In Chancery.
A. B., Complainant,
and
C. D., Defendant. _
Exceptions taken by the said complainant to the report of
E. F., Esq., one of the masters of this honorable
court, to who1n this cause stands referred, bearing
date the
day of
Between

l

First exception: For that the said master has, in and
by his said report, certified, etc. (as the. case may be.)
Whereas, the said master ought to have certified that, etc.
Second exception: For that the said master has certified, etc.
In all which particulars the report of the said master is,
as the said defendant is advised, erroneous, and the
said defendant appeals therefrom to the judgment of
this honorable court.
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INTERROGATORIES.

139

For the Eacamination of Witnesses.

In Chancery.

INTERROGATORIES.

Between A. B., Complainant, and C. D. and E. F.,

Defendant.

Interrogatories to be exhibited to witnesses to be pro-

duced, sworn and examined in this cause, now depend-

For the Er»aminatio11, of Witnesaea.

ing and at issue in this honorable court.

On the part of the said complainant:

In Chancery.

1st. Do you know the parties, complainant and

defendant, in the title of these interrogatories named, or

any and which of them, and how long have you known

them, or any and which of them, respectively? Declare

the truth of the several matters by this interrogatory

inquired after, according to the best of your knowledge,

remembrance and belief, with your reasons at large.

2d Interrogatory: Whether or no, etc. (as the case

may be), declare, etc.

Lastly: Do you know, or can you set forth, any other

Between A. B., Con1plainant, and 0. D. and E. F.,
Defendant.
Interrogatories to be exhibited to witnesses to be produced, swor~ and examined in this cause, now depending and at issue in this honora~le court.
On the part of the said complainant:

matter or thing which may in anywise tend to the beneﬁt

or advantage of the complainant in this cause? If yea,

set forth the same, and all the circumstances and particu-
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lars thereof, as if you had been interrogated thereto,

according to the best of your knowledge, remembrance

and belief, with the reasons for such your belief, fully and

at large.

Interroyatories before lhe Master (title of).

In Chancery.

Between A. B., and C. D., Complainants, and E. F.

and G. H., Defendants.

Interrogatories to be exhibited before I. J., Esq., one of

the masters of this honorable court, for the examina-

1st. Do you know the parties, complainant and
defendant, in the title of these interrogatories named, or
any and which of t.hem~ and how long have you known
thetn, or any and whtch of them, respectively~ Declare
the truth of the several matters by this interrogatory
inquired after, according· to the best of your knowledge,
remembrance and belief, with your reasons at large.
2d Interrogatory: Whether or no, etc. (aa the caae
may be), declare, etc.
Lastly: Do you know, or can you set forth, any other
matter or thing which may in anywise tend to t.he benefit
or advantage of the complainant in this cause~ If yea,
set. forth the same, and all the circumstances and particulars thereof,' as if you had been interrogated thereto,
according to the best of your knowledge, remembrance
and belief, with the reasons for such your qelief, fully and
at large.

Interrogatories before lhe ¥aster (title of).
In Chancery.
Between A. B., and C. D., Complainants, and E. F.
and G. H., Defendants.
Interrogatories to be exhibited before I. J., Esq., one of
the masters of this honorable court, for the examina-
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tion of (as the case may be), pursuant to an order
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made in this cause (or as the case may be), bearing

date the _— day of -———, in the year

First interrogatory, etc., etc.

.

it PRECEDENT OF A BILL AND ANSWER.

(From the Garsus Cancellarioe.)

A Bill to cause one to show his Writings, whereby he holds

his Lands, etc.

tion of (as the case may be), pursuant to an order
made in this cause (or as the case may be), bearing
date the - - day of--, in the year
First interrogatory, etc., etc.

Humbly complaining, W. B. showeth, etc.: That,

whereas, about four years last past, one '1‘. L., of,.etc., upon

a certain judgment in a plea of debt, amounting to the

sum of, etc., or thereabouts, by him obtained in her Ma-

* PREUEDENT

OF A BILL AND ANSWER~

jesty’s court of common pleas, against one G. L., of M., in

the county of, etc., sued forth her Majesty’s writ of ﬁeri

(From the OurBUB Oancellarire.)

facias, directed to the sheriff of the said county, for the

levying of the said debt of the goods and chattles of the

said G. L. By virtue of which writ the said sheriff did,

amongst other things, take into his hands one lease for

divers years yet to come, made to the said G. L. by one T.

S., Esq., in the county of D., of three parcels of land, called

or known by the name or names of, etc., with all‘and
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singular their appurtenances, lying and being in the par-

ishes of, etc., in the said county of, etc., together with all

and singular woods, underwoods and trees, growing or

being in or upon the premises, or any part thereof; to-

gether, also, with the reversion and reversions of the

premises aforesaid, and of every part and parcel thereof,

together with all manner of commons, ways, estovers,

proﬁts, commodities, hereditaments, and appurtenances to

the same premises, belonging or appertaining. And after-

wards, that is to say, on the —— day of, etc., he, the said

* Referred to in page 377.

A Bill to cause one to show his Writings, whe?,eby he holds
h·is Lands, etc.
Humbly complaining, W. B. showeth, etc.: That,
whereas, about four years last past, one 'r. L., of,~tc., upon
a certain judgment in a plea of debt, amounting to the
sum of, etc., or th~reabouts, by him obtained in her Ma·
jesty's court of common pleas, against one G. L., of M., in
the county of, etc., sued forth her Majesty's writ of fieri
facias, directed to the sheriff of the said county, for the
levying of the said debt of the goods and chattles of the
said G. L. :By virtue of which writ the said sheriff did,
amongst other things, take into his hands one lease for
divers years yet to come, made to the said G. L. by one T.
S., Esq., in the county of D., of three parcels of land, called
or known by the name or names of, etc., with all· and
singular their appurtenances, lying and being in the parishes of, etc., in the said county of, etc., together with all
and singular woods, underwoods and trees, growing or
being in or up.on the premises, or any part thereof; together, also, with the reversion and reversions of the
premises aforesaid, and of every part and parcel thereof,
together with all manner of commons, ways, estovers,
profits, commodities, hereditaments, and appurtena.nces to
the same premises, belonging or appe~taining. And afterwards, that is to say, on the-- day of, etc., he, the said

* Referred to in page 377.
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sheriff, by his deed bearing date, etc., under his hand and
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seal, did, in consideration of, etc., to him paid towards the

satisfaction of the debt and thejudgment aforesaid, bar-

gain, sell, assign and set over the said lease and term of

years yet to come, of all and singular the said premises,

unto one W. B., of London, Gent. Which said W. B., not

long after did, in consideration of, etc., by your orator to ,

him paid, bargain, sell, assign and set over unto your ora-

tor, all and singular the said premises, and every part

thereof; upon which bargain, sale, and assignment of the

said premises so made as aforesaid, your orator was in very

good hopes to have peaceably and quietly entered into

the said premises, and so to have held, occupied and en-

joyed the same accordingly. But now so it is, may it

please your Lordship, that one T. R., of, etc., pretending

to have a lease for divers years yet to come, of some part

of the said lands made unto him by the said G. L., long

time before any such sale or assignment made thereof to

your orator as aforesaid, hath and still doth keep your ora-

tor out of the possession of the said lands and premises;

upon which lease or demise he, the said '1‘. R., pretends a

certain yearly rent is reserved to the said G. L., his execu-
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tors or assigns; which rent (if any be), your orator hath

vheard is, etc., by the year, and which your orator, by

reason of the lawful conveyance to him made as aforesaid,

ought, both in reason and good conscience, to have and

enjoy during such term as the said T. R. shall hold and

occupy the land aforesaid, by reason of the said lease

which he so pretendeth to have. But forasmuch as your

orator doth not certainly know whether the said '1‘. R. has

any such lease, or (if he hath any such lease) what date

the same beareth, nor what term the said T. hath herein

unexpired, nor what rent is thereby, reserved, nor what

covenants are therein contained; and also, forasmuch as

your orator cannot, by the strict rules of law, enter into

sheriff, by his deed bearing date, etc., under his hand and
seal, did, in consideration of, etc., to him paid towards the
satisfaction of the debt and the judgment aforesaid, bargain, sell, assi.gn and set over the said lease and term of
years yet to come, of all and singular the said premises,
unto one W. B., of London, Gent. Which said W. B., not
long after did, in consideration of, etc., by your orator to .
him paid, bargain, sell, assign and set over unto your orator, all and singular the .ilaid prert1ises, and every part
thereof; upon which bargain, sale, and assignment of the
said.premises so made as aforesaid, your orator was in very
good hopes to have peaceably and quietly entered into
the said premises, and so to_ have held, occupied and enjoyed the same accordingly. But now so it is, may it
please your Lordship, that one T. R., of, etc., pretending
to have a lease for divers years yet to come, of some part
of the said lands made unto him by the said G. L., long
time before any such sale or assignment made thereof to
your orator as aforesa~d, hath and still doth keep your orator out of the possession of the said lands and pretnises;
upon which lease or demise he, the said 1,. R., pretends a
certain yearly rent is reserved to the said G. L., his executors or assigns; which rent (if any be), your orator hath
·heard is, etc., by the year, and \vhich your orator, by
reason of the lawful conveyance to him made as aforesaid,
ought, both in reason and good conscience, to have and
enjoy during such term as the said T. R. shall hold and
occupy the land aforesaid, by reason of the said lease
which he so pretendeth to have. But forasmuch as your
orator doth not certainly know whether the said rr. R. has
any such lease, or (if he hath any such lease) what date
the same beareth, nor what term the said T. hath herein
unexpired, nor what rent is thereby_ reserved, nor what
covenants are therein contained; and also, foras1nuch as
your orator cannot, by the strict rules of law, enter into
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the premises, nor knoweth howin due form of law to com-
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mence any action against the said T. R., either for the re-

covery of the said land or the rent aforesaid. And for

that the said T. R. doth not only use and occupy the said

lands and premises to his own proﬁt and advantage, with-

out yielding or paying any rent therefor to your orator, or

to any other person lawfully claiming the same, but doth

also utterly refuse to show his said lease whereby he

claimeth to hold the said lands aforesaid, either to your

orator or any other person; and for that the said T., in

combination and confederacy with, etc.,( as the usual clause

of confederacy). All which actings and doings of the said

T., etc., are contrary to right,.equity and good conscience,

and tend to the manifest wrong, injury and oppression of

your orator. In tender consideration whereof, and foras-

much as your orator is remediless, etc. (as usual) ; and

for that your orator hath no ordinary way by the ordinary

course of the common law to enforce the said T. R. to pro-

duce or show to your orator such writings as he hath for

the holding and occupying the lands aforesaid, but is alto-

gether destitute of the means to have a sight of the same,

but by the aid and assistance of this honorable court. To
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the end, therefore, that the said T. R. may be enforced

upon his oath to discover what right he hath to the prem-

ises, or any part thereof, and what rent or rents he hath

paid for the same, and to whom; and that he may also set

forth in his answer, upon oath, a true copy or true copies

of such lease or other writings in hoec verba, whereby he

claimeth the premises aforesaid, or any part thereof; and

that the said T. may truely and directly answer upon oath

all the matters and things hereinbefore contained, as fully

and perfectly as if the same had been here again repeated

and interrogated, and may particularly set forth upon oath

whether, etc. May it therefore please your Lordship to

grant, etc., process prayed, vers. T. R.

the premises, nor knoweth how in due forrn of law to commence any action against the said T. R., either for the recovery of the said land or the rent aforesaid. And for
that the said T. R. doth not only use and occupy the said
lands and premises to his own profit and advantage, without yielding or paying any rent therefor to your orator, or
to any other person lawful1y clain1ing the same, but doth
also utterly refuse to 8how his said lease \Vhereby he
claimeth to hold the said lands aforesaid, either to your
orator or any other person; and for that the said T., in
combination and confederacy with, etc.,( as the usual clause
of confederacy). All which actings and doings of the said
T., etc., are contrary to right, .equity ann good conscience,
and tend to the manifest wrong, injury and oppression of
your orator. In tender conRideration whereof, and forasmuch as your orator is remedilesA, etc. (as usual); and
for that your orator hath no ordinary way by the ordinary
course of the common law to enforce the said T. R. to produce or show to your orator such writings as he l)ath for
the holding and occupying the lands aforesaid, but is altogether destitute of the means to have a sight of the same,
but by the aid and assistance of this honorable court. To
the end, therefore, that the· said T. R. may he enforced
upon his oath to discover what l'ight he hath to the premises, or any part thereof, and what rent or rents he hath
paid for the satne, and to whom; and that he may also set
forth in his ans\\"er, upon oath, a true copy or true copies
of such lease or other writings i1~ hmo verba, whereby he
claimeth the premises aforesaid, or any part thereof; and
that the said T. may truely and directly answer upon oath
all the matters and things hereinbefore contained, as fully
and perfectly as if the same had been here again repeated
and interrogated, and may particularly set forth upon oath
whether, etc. May it therefore please your Lordship to
grant, etc., process prayed, vers. T. R.
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T /16 Answer of T. 15., Defendant, to the Bill of Com-

FORMS.

plaint of W. B., Gent, Complainant.

The said defendant now, and at all times hereafter,

saving, etc., saith, That the said G. L. named in the com-

plainant’s said bill, was possessed for divers years yet to

The Anawer of T. R., Defent!ant, to tlte Bill of Complaint of W. B., Gent, Complainant.

come of the said parcels of land in the said bill mentioned,

and called or known by the name of, etc., by virtue of a

lease thereof, made by the said T. S., Esq., in the said bill

also named, unto the said G. L. long before the supposed

extent speciﬁed in the said bill of complaint. And the

said G. L. so being thereof possessed long before the sup-

posed extent (if any such there were) had in such manner

as in the said bill of complaint is supposed, made a lawful

demise and lease of part of the said three parcels of land,

containing fourteen acres, or thereabouts, unto the said

defendant for divers years yet to come; upon which lease

the said G. L. reserved a yearly rent, to be paid during the

continuation of the said lease; by force of which lease the

defendant entered into the said fourteen acres, part of the

said three said parcels of land, and was, and yet is law-

fully possessed accordingly, and ever since hath, and yet

doth enjoy the same, by virtue of the said lease and de-
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mise, and is thereby to have and enjoy the same during

the continuance of the said years, of which there are at

this time about sixty years to come and unexpired, and

saith, That the complainant is a person altogether un-

known to this defendant, being one he, this defendant,

never had any dealings or correspondence with, and there-

‘-fore this defendant cannot but Wonder at this suit, com-

menced by the said complainant against this defendant,

touching the premises. And this defendant saith, That

the said G. L., after the said lease and. demise so made to

the said defendant, of the said fourteen acres of land as

aforesaid, and before the said supposed extent, made a

grant and assignment of the interest and term of the said

The said defendant now, and at all times hereafter,
saving, etc., saith, That .the said G. L. named in the complainant's said bill, was possessed for divers years yet to
come of the said parcels of land in the said bill mentioned,
and called or known by the name of, etc., by virtue of a
lease thereof, made by the said '1 S., Esq., in the said bill
also nan1ed, unto the said G. L. long before the supposed
e~tent specified in the said bill of complaint.. And the
said G. L. so being thereof possessed long b~fore the supposed extent (if any such there were) had in such manner·
as in the said bill of complaint is supposed, made a lawful
den1ise and lease of part of the said three parcels of land,
containing fourteen acres, or thereabout~, unto the ~aid
defendant for divers years yet to come; upon which lease
the said G. L. reserved a yearly rent, to be paid during the
continuation of the said lease; by force of which lease the
defendant entered into the said fourteen acres, part of the
said three said parcels of land, and was, and yet is lawfull.v possessed accordingly, and ever since hath, and yet
doth enjoy the same, by virtue of the said lease and demise, and is thereby to have and enjoy the same during
the continuance of the said years, of which there are at
this time about sixty years to con1e and unexpired, and
saith, That the complainant is a person altogether unknown to this defendant, being one he, this defendant,
never had any dealings or correspondence with, and there. fore this defendant cannot but wonder at this suit, commenced by the said complainant against this defendant,
touching the premises. And this defendant saith, That
the said G. L., after the said lease and. demise so made to
the said defendant, of the said fourteen acres of ]and as
aforesaid, and before the said supposed extent., made a
grant and assignment of the interest and tertn of the said
1

•
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G. L., as well of the fourteen acres, which the said de~
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fendant hath and occupieth by virtue of the said lease,for

divers years thereof yet to come and undetermined; as

also of the residue of the said three parcels of land men-

tioned in the said bill of complaint, unto H. L., son of the

said G. L., unto which grant and assignment the said de-

fendant was privy. And therefore this defendant humbly

conceives, and is advised, That he, this defendant, is, for

the payment of his rent, chargeable, and ought by the law

to pay, the same rent so reserved, unto the said H. L., and

not to the said complainant, which said R., this defendant,

doth verily think is the lawful landlord during the said

term for years yet to come, and not the said complainant,

who is altogether a stranger to this defendant, and saith,

That the said complainant never at any time heretofore

demanded any rent for the said part of the land that this

defendant hath, and occupieth, by virtue of the said lease

, for years; And also saith, that he is sued by the said W.

B. in the said bill of complaint named, in her Majesty’s

Court of Queen’s Bench, in an action of debt brought by

him against the said defendant; and therefore the said de-

fendant is somewhat surprised at this suit brought against
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him by the said complainant, touching the premises,

whereby this defendant is wrongfully vexed, and sued

without any just cause; without that, that there is any

such extent made of the said three parcels of land, called,

etc.; or that after the same extent there was any such bar-

gain and sale made by the sheriff of the said term and

lease for years to the said W. B. as in the said bill set

forth, or that the said W. B. bargained or sold the prem-

ises to the complainant, or that the said complainant

ought to have and enjoy the said premises to the knowl-

edge of this defendant. And without that there is any

other matter, cause,etc., (as before.)

G. L., as well of the fourteen acrPs, which the said defendant hath and occupieth by virtue of the said lease, for
divers years thereof yet to come and undetermined; as
also of the residue of the said three parcels of land mentioned in the said bill of complaint, unto H. L., son of the
said G. L., unto which grant and assignment the said defendant was privy. And therefore this defendant humbly
conceives, and is ad vised, That he, this defendant, is, for
the payment of his rent, chargeable, and ought by the law
to pay, the same rent so reserved, unto the said H. L., and
not to the said complainant, which said R., this defendant, •
·doth verily think is the lawful landlord during the said
term for years yet to come, and not the said complainant,
who is altogether a stranger to this defendant, and saith,
That the said complainant never at any time heretofore
demanded any rent for the said part of the land that this
defendant hath, and occupieth, by virtue of the said lease
for years ; And also saith, that he is sued by the said W.
B. in the said bill of cotnplaint named, in her Majesty'e:
Oourt of Queen's Bench, in an action of debt brought by
him against the said defendant_; and therefore the said defendant is sotnewhat surprised at this snit brought against
him by the said complainant, touching the premises,
whereby this defendant is wrongfully vexed, and sued
without any just cause; without that, that there is any
such extent made of the said three parcels of land, called,
·etc.; or that after the same extent there was any such bargain and sale made by the sheriff of the said term and
lease for years to the said W. B. as in the said bill set
forth, or that the said W. B. bargained or sold the prem.;
ises to the complainant, or that the said complainant
ought to have and enjoy the said premises to the know}.
edge of this defendant. .Lt\.nd without that there is any
other matter, cause,.etc., (as before.)
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